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PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS
SVANTE JANSON
Abstract. The election methods introduced in 1894–1895 by Phragme´n
and Thiele, and their somewhat later versions for ordered (ranked) bal-
lots, are discussed in detail. The paper includes definitions and examples
and discussion of whether the methods satisfy some properties, includ-
ing monotonicity, consistency and various proportionality criteria. The
relation with STV is also discussed. The paper also contains historical
information on the methods.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to give a detailed presentation in English
of the election methods by Edvard Phragme´n [56; 57; 58; 59] and Thorvald
Thiele [76], originally proposed in 1894 and 1895, respectively; we show also
some properties of them. (The presentation is to a large extent based on
my discussion in Swedish in [40, Chapters 13 and 14].) Both methods were
originally proposed for unordered ballots (see below), but ordered versions
were later developed, so we shall consider four different methods. We also
briefly discuss some other, related, methods suggested by Thiele [76].
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Versions of both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods have been used in
Swedish parliamentary elections (for distribution of seats within parties),
and Phragme´n’s method is still part of the election law, although in a minor
role, while Thiele’s method is used for some elections in e.g. city councils,
see Appendix D.
Brief biographies of Phragme´n and Thiele are given in Appendix A.
1.1. Background. The problem that Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods try
to solve is that of electing a set of a given number s of persons from a larger
set of candidates. Phragme´n and Thiele discussed this in the context of a
parliamentary election in a multi-member constituency; the same problem
can, of course, also occur in local elections, but also in many other situations
such as electing a board or a committee in an organization.
One simple method that has been used for centuries is the Block Vote,
where each voter votes for s candidates, and the s candidates with the
largest number of votes win. (See further Appendix E.1.1.) In the late 19th
century, when (in Sweden) political parties started to became organized, it
was evident that the Block Vote tends to give all seats to the largest party,
and as a consequence there was much discussion about more proportional
election methods that give representation also to minorities.
Many proportional election methods have been constructed. Among them,
the ones that dominate today are list methods, where each voter votes for
a party, and then each party is given a number of seats according to some
algorithm, see Appendix E.3. An important example is D’Hondt’s method
(Appendix E.3.1) proposed by D’Hondt [24; 25] in 1878. Phragme´n and
Thiele were inspired by D’Hondt’s method, and Phragme´n [56; 57] called his
method a generalization of D’Hondt’s method, but they did not want a list
method. They wanted to keep the voting method of the Block Vote, where
each voter chooses a set of persons, arbitrarily chosen from the available
candidates, without any formal role for parties. Thus, a voter could select
candidates based on their personal merits and views on different questions,
and perhaps combine candidates from different parties and independents.
(This frequently happened, see Examples 13.1 and 13.2 from the general
election 1893.) Then, an algorithm more complicated than the simple Block
Vote would give the seats to candidates in a way that, hopefully, would give
a proportional representation to minorities. As we shall see in Section 11,
both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods achieve this at least in the special
case when there are parties with different lists, and every voter votes for
one of the party lists; then both methods give the same result as D’Hondt’s
method. However, the methods were designed to cope also with more com-
plicated cases, when two different voters may vote for partly the same and
partly different candidates.
Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods, especially the ordered versions, are
thus close in spirit to STV (Appendix E.2.1), which also is a proportional
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election method where parties play no role, see Section 17 for a closer com-
parison. (Phragme´n knew about STV, at least in Andræ’s version, and had
proposed a version of it before developing his own method, see Section 18.5.)
1.2. Contents of the paper. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s election methods
are described in detail in Sections 3–10, in both unordered (Sections 3–7)
and ordered (Sections 8–10) versions. Section 11 shows that all the methods
reduce to D’Hondt’s method in the case of party lists. Section 12 treats the
simple special case of a single-member constituency, when only one candidate
is elected.
Section 13 contains a number of examples, many of them comparing the
methods; some of the examples are constructed to show weak points of some
method. (There are also examples in some other sections.) Sections 14–16
discuss further properties of the methods (monotonicity, consistency and
proportionality), and Section 17 discusses the relation between Phragme´n’s
method and STV.
Some variants of the methods are described in Section 18.
The purpose of this paper is not to advocate any particular method, but
we give a few conclusions in Section 19.
The appendices contain further information, including biographies and
the history of the methods. Furthermore, Appendix E gives for the reader’s
convenience brief descriptions of several other election methods that are
related to Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s or occur in the discussions.
2. Assumptions and notation
For the election methods studied here, we assume, as discussed in the
introduction, that each voter votes with a ballot containing the names of
one or several candidates. (Blank votes, containing no candidates, may
also be allowed, but in the methods treated here they are simply ignored.)
Parties, if they exist, have no formal role and are completely ignored by the
methods.
These election methods are of two different types, with different types of
ballots:
Unordered ballots: The order of the names on a ballot does not
matter. In other words, each ballot is regarded as a set of names.
(Sometimes called approval ballots, since the voter can be seen as
approving some of the candidates.)
Ordered ballots: The order of the names on a ballot matters. Each
ballot is an ordered list of names. (Sometimes called ranked ballots,
or preferential voting.)
Of course, the practical arrangemants may vary; for example, the voter may
write the names by hand, or there might be a printed or electronic list of all
candidates where the voter marks his choices by a tick (unordered ballots)
or by 1, 2, . . . in order of preference (ordered ballots).
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In some election methods, there are restrictions on the number of can-
didates on each ballot (see Appendix E.1–E.2 for examples). We make no
such assumptions for Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods; each voter can vote
for an arbitrary number of candidates. However, the unordered versions can
be modified by allowing at most s (the number to be elected) candidates
on each ballot (for philosophical reasons or for practical convenience); this
was for example done in the version of Thiele’s method used in Sweden
1909–1922, see Appendix D.1 For the ordered versions, there is no point in
forbidding (or allowing) more than s names on each ballot, since only the s
first names can matter.2
It is often convenient to consider the different types of ballots that appear,
and count the number of ballots of each type. If α is a type of ballot that
appears (or might appear), let vα denote the number of ballots of that type,
i.e., the number of voters choosing exactly this ballot. Furthermore, let
V =
∑
α vα denote the total number of (valid) votes, and let pα := vα/V be
the proportion of the votes that are cast for α.
Remark 2.1. Many election methods are homogeneous, meaning that the
result depends only on the proportions pα. This includes Phragme´n’s and
Thiele’s methods.3
Remark 2.2. It is possible to let different voters have different weights,
which in principle could be any positive real numbers. The only difference
is that vα now is the total weight of all voters choosing α, and that this is a
real number, not necessarily an integer.4 We leave the trivial modifications
for this extension to the reader, and continue to talk about numbers of votes.
Remark 2.3. Every election method has to have provisions for the case
that a tie occurs between two or more candidates. Usually ties are resolved
1 I do not know whether Phragme´n intended this restriction or not. I cannot find
anything stated explicitly about it in Phragme´n’s papers [56; 57; 59], but all his examples
are of this type. Remember also that Phragme´n intended his method as an alternative to
the then used Block Vote (Appendix E.1.1), where unordered ballots with this restriction
were used, and it is possible that he intended the same for his method. Thiele [76], on the
contrary, gives several examples with more names on the ballots than the number elected.
2 This does not hold for all methods using ordered ballots, for example neither for STV
(Appendix E.2.1) nor for scoring rules (Appendix E.2.3), as is easily seen be considering
the case s = 1.
3 Although homogeneity seems like a natural property, not all election methods used
in practice are strictly homogeneous. In quota methods, see e.g. [62], as well as in STV
(Appendix E.2.1), a “quota” is calculated, and this is (perhaps by tradition) usually
rounded to an integer, see [62, Section 5.8] for several examples, meaning that the election
method is not homogeneous. Similarly, in Phragme´n’s method as used in Sweden, see
Appendix C.1, rounding to two decimal places is specified for all intermediary calculations;
again this means that the method is not strictly homogeneous. However, in both cases
the methods are asymptotically homogeneous, as the number of votes gets large, and for
practical purposes they can be regarded as homogeneous, at least for public elections.
4 This was the case in local elections in Sweden 1909–1918, when a voter had 1–40 votes
depending on income, and a modification of Thiele’s method was used, see Appendix D.
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by lot, although other rules are possible.5 Phragme´n originally proposed a
special rule for his method, see Appendix B, but he seems to have dropped
this later and we shall do the same. We assume that ties are resolved by lot
or by some other rule, and we shall usually not comment on this.
2.1. Some notation. We let throughout s be the number of seats, i.e., the
number of candidates to be elected; we assume that s is fixed and determined
before the election. We use a variable such as i for an unspecified candidate.
In examples, candidates are usually denoted by capital letters A, B,. . .
The outcome of the election is the set E of elected candidates. By as-
sumption, |E| = s, where |E| denotes the number of elements of the set E .
When there are ties, there may be several possible outcomes.
In the discussions below, ’candidate’ and ’name’ are synonymous. Simi-
larly, we identify a voter and his/her ballot.
In numerical examples,
.
= is used for decimal approximations (correctly
rounded).
2.1.1. Unordered ballots. In a system with unordered ballots, each ballot can
be seen as a set of candidates, so the different types of ballots are subsets
of the set of all candidates. We denote such sets by σ. Note that candidate
i appears on a ballot of type σ if and only if i ∈ σ; hence, the total number
of ballots containing i is
∑
σ∋i vσ.
2.1.2. Ordered ballots. In a system with ordered ballots, the different types
of ballots are ordered list of some (or all) candidates. We denote such ordered
lists by α.
3. Phragme´n’s unordered method
3.1. Phragme´n’s formulation. Phragme´n presented his method in a short
note in 1894 [56], followed by further discussions, motivations and explana-
tions in [57; 58; 59], see Appendix B. His definition is as follows (in my words
and with my notation). Phragme´n assumes that the ballots are of the un-
ordered type in Section 2, i.e., that each ballot contains a set of candidates,
without order and without other restrictions. A detailed example is given
in Section 3.3; further examples are given in Section 13.
Phragme´n’s unordered method. Assume that each ballot has some vot-
ing power t; this number is the same for all ballots and will be determined
later. A candidate needs total voting power 1 in order to be elected. The
voting power of a ballot may be used by the candidates on that ballot, and
it may be divided among several of the candidates on the ballot. During the
procedure described below, some of the voting power of a ballot may be al-
ready assigned to already elected candidates; the remaining voting power of
the ballot is free.
5Non-mathematical rules are occasionally used, for example giving preference to the
oldest candidate. (Such rules have not been used in connection with Phragme´n’s or
Thiele’s methods as far as I know.)
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The seats are distributed one by one.
For each seat, each remaining candidate may use all the free voting power
of each ballot that includes the candidate. (I.e., the full voting power t
except for the voting power already assigned from that ballot to candidates
already elected.) The ballot voting power t that would give the candidate
voting power 1 is computed, and the candidate requiring the smallest voting
power t is elected. All free (i.e., unassigned) voting power on the ballots
that contain the elected candidate is assigned to that candidate, and these
assignments remain fixed throughout the election.
The computations are then repeated for the next seat, for the remaining
candidates, and so on.
Ties are, as said in Section 2, broken by lot, or by some other supplemen-
tary rule. (See Appendix B for Phragme´n’s original suggestion.)
Note that the required voting power t increases for each seat, except
possibly in the case of a tie.
We consider the method defined above in some more detail. We begin
with the first seat. Since candidate i appears on
∑
σ∋i vσ ballots, the smallest
voting power t that makes it possible for i to get the seat, provided it gets all
voting power from each available ballot, is thus ti = 1/
∑
σ∋i vσ. Phragme´n’s
rule is that the seat is given to the candidate i that requires the smallest
voting power ti. Hence the first seat goes to the candidate appearing on the
largest number of ballots.
Suppose that the first seat goes to candidate i, and that this requires
voting power t(1) = ti. The ballots containing i have thus all used voting
power t(1) for the election of i; this allocation will remain fixed forever.
We now increase the voting power t of all ballots, noting that the ballots
containing i only have t− t(1) free voting power available for the remaining
candidates. We again calculate the smallest t such that some candidate
may be given total voting power 1; we give this candidate, say j, the second
seat and let t(2) be the required voting power. Furthermore, on the ballots
containing j, we allocate all available voting power to the election of j.
We continue in the same way. In general, suppose that n > 0 seats have
been allocated so far, and that this requires voting power t(n). Suppose
further that on each ballot for the set σ, an amount rσ of the voting power
already is used, with 0 6 rσ 6 t
(n). If the voting power of each ballot is
increased to t > t(n), then each ballot for σ has thus a free voting power
t−rσ, which can be used by any of the candidates on the ballot. The voting
power available for candidate i is thus∑
σ∋i
vσ(t− rσ) = t
∑
σ∋i
vσ −
∑
σ∋i
vσrσ (3.1)
and for this to be equal to 1 we need t to be
ti =
1 +
∑
σ∋i vσrσ∑
σ∋i vσ
. (3.2)
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The next seat is then given to the candidate with the smallest ti; if this is
candidate i, the required voting power t(n+1) is thus ti, so rσ is updated to
r′σ := t
(n+1) = ti =
1 +
∑
σ∋i vσrσ∑
σ∋i vσ
(3.3)
for each σ such that i ∈ σ. (rσ is unchanged for σ with i /∈ σ.)
These formulas give an algorithmic version of Phragme´n’s method.
Remark 3.1. In [59], Phragme´n describes the method in an equivalent
way using the term load instead of voting power; the idea is that when a
candidate is elected, the participating ballots incur a total load of 1 unit,
somehow distributed between them. The candidates are elected sequentially.
In each round, the loads are distributed and the candidates are chosen such
that the maximum load of a ballot is as small as possible. (The same
description is used by Cassel [5].) This is also a useful formulation, and
it will sometimes be used below.
Remark 3.2. Phragme´n [59] illustrates also the method by imagining the
different groups of ballots as represented by cylindrical vessels, with base
area proportional to the number of ballots in each group. The already elected
candidates are represented by a liquid that is fixed in the vessels, and the
additional voting power required to elect another candidate is represented
by pouring 1 unit of a liquid into the vessels representing a vote for that
candidate, distributed among these vessels such that the height of the liquid
will be the same in all of them. This is to be tried for each candidate; the
candidate that requires the smallest height is elected, and the corresponding
amounts of liquid are added to the vessels and fixed there.
Remark 3.3. Sometimes it is convenient to think of the voting power as
increasing continuously with time; at time t each ballot has voting power t.
The voting power available to each candidate thus also increases with time,
and as soon as some candidate reaches voting power 1, this candidate is
elected and the free voting power on each participating ballot is permanently
assigned to this candidate (which reduces the free voting power to 0 for
these ballots, and thus typically reduces the available voting power for other
candidates). This is repeated until s candidates have been elected.
3.2. An equivalent formulation. The numbers ti above will in practice
be very small, and it is often more convenient to instead use Wi := 1/ti. We
also let qσ := vσrσ; this is the total voting power allocated so far from the
ballots of type σ, and can be interpreted as the (fractional) number of seats
already elected by these ballots; qσ is called the place number of this group
of ballots. Note that
∑
σ qσ always equals the number of candidates elected
so far.
This leads to the following algorithmic formulation. To see that it really
is equivalent to the formulation in Section 3.1, it suffices to note that with
Wi = 1/ti and qσ = vσrσ, (3.4) below is the same as (3.2), and the update
rule (3.5) is the same as (3.3).
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Phragme´n’s unordered method, equivalent formulation. Seats are
given to candidates sequentially, until the desired number have been elected.
During the process, each type of ballot, i.e., each group of identical ballots, is
given a place number, which is a rational non-negative number that can be
interpreted as the fractional number of seats elected so far by these ballots;
the sum of the place numbers is always equal to the number of seats already
allocated. The place numbers are determined recursively and the seats are
allocated by the following rules:
(i) Initially all place numbers are 0.
(ii) Suppose that n > 0 seats have been allocated. Let qσ denote the place
number for the ballots with a set σ of candidates; thus
∑
σ qσ = n. The
total number of votes for candidate i is
∑
σ∋i vσ, and the total place
number of the ballots containing candidate i is
∑
σ∋i qσ. The reduced
vote6 for candidate i is defined as
Wi :=
∑
σ∋i vσ
1 +
∑
σ∋i qσ
, (3.4)
i.e., the total number of votes for the candidate divided by 1+ their
total place number.
(iii) The next seat is given to the candidate i that has the largest Wi.
(iv) Furthermore, if candidate i gets the next seat, then the place numbers
are updated for all sets σ that participated in the election, i.e., the sets
σ such that i ∈ σ. For such σ, the new place number is
q′σ :=
vσ
Wi
=
(
1 +
∑
σ∋i
qσ
) vσ∑
σ∋i vσ
. (3.5)
For σ such that σ 6∋ i, q′σ := qσ.
Steps (ii)–(iv) are repeated as many times as desired.
We see that the number Wi may be interpreted as the total number of
votes for candidate i, reduced according to the extent to which the ballots
containing i already have successfully participated in the election of other
candidates. (For that reason, we call Wi the “reduced vote” above.) Cf.
D’Hondt’s method, see Appendix E.3.1, which as said above, Phragme´n
tried to generalize.
Remark 3.4. Let W (n) be the winning (i.e., largest) reduced vote when
the n-th seat is filled. Then, by (3.5), during the calculations above, the
current place number qσ is vσ/W
(ℓ), if the last time that some candidate on
the ballot (i.e., in σ) was elected was in round ℓ. (Provided any of them
has been elected; otherwise qσ = 0; in this case we may define ℓ = 0 and
W (0) :=∞.)
Remark 3.5. It is in practice convenient to use place numbers qσ defined
for groups of identical ballots as above, but it is sometimes also useful to
6 The Swedish term is ja¨mfo¨relsetal (comparative figure).
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consider the place number of an individual ballot; for a ballot of type σ this
is rσ = 1/W
(ℓ), with ℓ as in Remark 3.4.
Remark 3.6. The equivalence with the formulation in Section 3.1 shows
that
W (n) = 1/t(n) (3.6)
with t(n) as in Section 3.1. (And t(0) := 0.)
3.3. An example. Phragme´n [56, 57, 58] illustrates his (unordered) me-
thod with the following example (using slightly varying descriptions in the
different papers). We present detailed calculations (partly taken from Phrag-
me´n) using both formulations above.
Example 3.7 (Phragme´n’s unordered method).
Unordered ballots. 3 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
1034 ABC
519 PQR
90 ABQ
47 APQ
The total numbers of votes for each candidate are thus
A 1171
B 1124
C 1034
P 566
Q 656
R 519.
Using the formulation of Phragme´n’s method in Section 3.1, we see that the
smallest voting power that gives some candidate command of voting power
1 is t(1) = 1/1171
.
= 0.000854, which gives A voting power 1171/1171 = 1.
Hence A (which has the largest number of votes) is elected to the first seat.
If now the voting power is increased to t > t(1), then each ballot ABC,
ABQ or APQ has free voting power t− t(1) = t− 1/1171, while each ballot
PQR has free voting power t. Hence, the voting power that each of the
remaining candidates can use is
B: 1124(t − t(1))
C: 1034(t − t(1))
P: 519t + 47(t− t(1)) = 566t− 47t(1)
Q: 519t + 137(t− t(1)) = 656t− 137t(1)
R: 519t.
In order for these values to be equal to 1, we need for B the voting power t
to be, see (3.2),
tB :=
1 + 1124t(1)
1124
= t(1) +
1
1124
=
2295
1316204
.
= 0.001744,
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and for Q a voting power
tQ :=
1 + 137t(1)
656
= t(1) +
1− 519t(1)
656
=
327
192044
.
= 0.001703,
while the remaining candidates obviously require more than either B or Q.
Since tQ < tB, Q is elected to the second seat, and t
(2) = tQ.
For the third seat, if the voting power of each ballot is increased further
to t > t(2), then each ballot ABC has free voting power t − t(1), and each
ballot PQR, ABQ or APQ has free voting power t− t(2). Hence, the voting
power that each remaining candidate can use is
B: 1034(t − t(1)) + 90(t− t(2)) = 1124t − 1034t(1) − 90t(2)
C: 1034(t − t(1))
P: 566(t − t(2))
R: 519(t − t(2)).
In order for this to equal 1, B needs the voting power t to be
tB :=
1 + 1034t(1) + 90t(2)
1124
=
195525
107928728
.
= 0.001812
while P needs t to be
tP :=
1 + 566t(2)
566
= t(2) +
1
566
=
188563
54348452
.
= 0.003470
while C and R obviously require more than B and Q, respectively. Since
tB < tP, B is elected to the third seat. (Also, t
(3) = tB .)
Hence, the elected by Phragme´n’s method are AQB.
Using “load” instead of “voting power”, see Remark 3.1, we do the same
calculations; we now say that first A is elected which gives a load t(1) =
1/1171 to each ballot ABC, ABQ or APQ (total load 1171t(1) = 1); then
Q is elected which gives a load t(2) = 327/192044 to each ballot PQR and
an additional load t(2) − t(1) = 163/192044 to each ballot ABQ or APQ
(total new load 519 ·327/192044+137 ·163/192044 = 1); finally, B is elected
which gives an additional load t(3)− t(1) = 103357/107928728 to each ballot
ABC and t(3)− t(2) = 11751/107928728 to each ballot ABQ (total new load
1034 ·103357/107928728+90 ·11751/107928728 = 1). The final loads on the
ballots of the four types are (t(3), t(2), t(3), t(2)), where t(2) = 327/192044
.
=
0.001703 and t(3) = 195525/107928728
.
= 0.001812.
Using the formulation with place numbers and reduced votes in Sec-
tion 3.2, we obtain the same result by similar but somewhat different cal-
culations, cf. (3.6). For the first seat, the reduced votes Wi are just the
number of votes for each candidate; hence A is elected with WA = 1171.
This gives a place number 1/1171 for each participating ballot, and thus
1034/1171
.
= 0.8830 for all ballots ABC together, 90/1171
.
= 0.0769 for the
ballots ABQ and 47/1171
.
= 0.0401 for the ballots APQ.
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Hence, for the second seat, the reduced votes for B and Q are, by (3.4),
WB =
1124
1 + 1124/1171
=
1316204
2295
.
= 573.51
(since the 1124 ballots containing B have a combined place number 1124/1171)
and
WQ =
656
1 + 137/1171
=
192044
327
= 587.29
(since the 656 ballots containing Q have a combined place number 137/1171),
while the remaining candidates have smaller reduced votes (WC
.
= 549.12,
WP
.
= 544.16, WR = 519). Hence Q is elected to the second seat. The
place numbers for the four groups of ballots are 1034
WA
= 10341171
.
= 0.8830,
519
WQ
= 169713192044
.
= 0.8837, 90
WQ
= 1471596022
.
= 0.1532, 47
WQ
= 15369192044
.
= 0.0800, with
sum 2.
For the third seat, we have the reduced votes
WB =
1124
1 + 1034/1171 + 14715/96022
=
107928728
195525
.
= 551.99
and
WP =
566
1 + 169713/192044 + 15369/192044
=
54348452
188563
.
= 288.22
while the remaining candidates have smaller reduced votes (WC
.
= 549.12 as
for the second seat, WR
.
= 275.52). Hence B is elected to the third seat.
4. Thiele’s unordered methods
Thiele [76] praised Phragme´n’s contribution [56], but proposed a different
method based on a different idea. Thiele realized that his idea led to a diffi-
cult optimization problem that was not practical to solve, so he also proposed
two approximations of the method. There are thus three different methods
by Thiele for unordered ballots; we may call them Thiele’s optimization me-
thod, Thiele’s addition method and Thiele’s elimination method,7 but since
only the addition method has found practical use, we mainly consider this
method and we often call the addition method simply Thiele’s method. (The
addition method was also the only of the methods that was considered in
the discussions in Sweden in the early 20th century, see Appendix D and
e.g. [5], [6].) The three methods are defined below. A detailed example is
given in Section 4.4; further examples are given in Section 13.
7In Thiele [76] (in Danish), the optimization method has no name, the addition method
is called Tilføjelsesreglen and the elimination method is called Udskydelsesreglen; in his
examples, there are also captions in French, with the names re`gle d’addition and re`gle de
rejet.
When the addition method was used in Sweden 1909–1922, it was called Reduktions-
regeln (the Reduction Rule).
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4.1. Thiele’s optimization method. Thiele’s idea was that a voter that
sees n of the candidates on his8 ballot elected, will feel a satisfaction f(n),
for some increasing function f(n), and the result of the election should be
the set of s candidates that maximizes the total satisfaction, i.e., the sum
of f(n) over all voters.
In formulas, if a set E of candidates is elected, a voter that has voted for
a set σ will feel a satisfaction f(|σ ∩ E|).
As Thiele notes, we can without loss of generality assume f(0) = 0 and
f(1) = 1. We also let wn := f(n)− f(n− 1), the added satisfaction when a
voter sees the n-th candidate elected; thus
f(n) =
n∑
k=1
wk. (4.1)
Of course, the result of the method depends heavily on the choice of the
function f(n). Thiele discusses this, and argues that the function depends on
the purpose of the election. He claims that for the election of a government
or governing body, each new member is as important as the first, so
f(n) = n (4.2)
(i.e., wn = 1); he calls this the strong method. On the other hand, for the
election of a committee for comprehensive investigation of some issue, he
sees no point in having several persons of the same meaning, so he sets
f(n) = 1{n > 1} :=
{
0, n = 0,
1, n > 1,
(4.3)
(i.e., w1 = 1, wn = 0 for n > 2); he calls this the weak method. Finally,
Thiele claims that there are many cases between these two extremes, in
particular when electing representatives for a society, where proportional
representation is desired.9
Thiele notes that the choice (4.2) gives the result that the s candidates
with the largest numbers of votes will be elected; this is thus Approval Voting
(Appendix E.1.2). (If each ballot can contain at most s names we obtain
Block voting, Appendix E.1.1.) Thiele notes that this yields a method that
is far from proportional.
On the other hand, Thiele notes that the choice
f(n) = 1 +
1
2
+ · · · +
1
n
, (4.4)
8In 1895, only men were allowed to vote, in Denmark as well as in Sweden.
9Whether this argument is convincing or not is perhaps for the reader to decide. Tenow
[74] argues that Thiele here rather seems to evaluate the methods by the desirability
of their outcome, and that his “satisfaction” thus becomes a fiction and is chosen to
achieve the desired result. However, while this philosophical question may be relevant for
applications of the methods, it is irrelevant for our main purpose, which is to present the
methods as algorithms and give some of their mathematical properties.
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(i.e., wn = 1/n), yields a proportional method in the case when no name
appears on more than one type of ballot, see Section 11. This is therefore
Thiele’s choice for his proportional method.
In the sequel we shall use the choice (4.4), except when we explicitly state
otherwise.10 Thiele’s optimization method for proportional elections is thus
the following:
Thiele’s optimization method. For each set S of s candidates, calculate
the “satisfaction”
F (S) :=
∑
σ
vσf(|σ ∩ S|), (4.5)
where the function f is given by (4.4). Elect the set S of the given size that
maximizes F (S).
However, Thiele notes that the maximization over a large number of sets
S is impractical. With n candidates to the s seats, there are
(
n
s
)
sets S
that have to be considered, and as an example, Thiele [76] mentions 30
candidates to 10 seats, when there are more than 30 million combinations
(30 045 015).11 Thiele [76] thus for practical use proposes two approximation
to his optimization method, where candidates either are selected one by one
(the addition method), or eliminated one by one (the elimination method),
in both cases maximizing the total satisfication in each step. These methods
are described in detail in the following subsections.12 (Thiele was aware that
the methods might give different results, and showed this in some of his
examples; see Examples 13.3–13.4 and Remark 5.2.)
Remark 4.1. Thiele’s optimization method was reinvented by Simmons in
2001, under the name Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), see [43].
4.2. Thiele’s addition method. Thiele’s addition method is a “greedy”
version of his optimization method, where candidates are elected one by
one, and for each seat, the candidate is elected that maximizes the increase
of the total satisfaction of the voters. For a general satisfaction function
f satisfying (4.1), the satisfication of a ballot σ containing a candidate i
is increased by wk+1 when i is elected, where k is the number of already
elected on this ballot. This yields the following simple description, where
we use wn = 1/n to obtain a proportional method. The general version is
obtained by replacing 1/(k + 1) by some (arbitrary) numbers wk+1 > 0.
10 The strong version (4.2) is as said above equivalent to Approval Voting.
The weak version (4.3) seems to be more interesting mathematically than for practical
applications. See [76, Examples 5 and 6] for an example including all three methods with
the weak function (4.3), in this case yielding different results.
11Using a concept not existing in Thiele’s days, the problem of finding the maximizing
set(s) is NP-hard, see [12, Theorem 1] or [70, Theorem 3].
12 Thiele [76] recommends using the elimination method, for the reason that the addi-
tion method selects the elected sequentially, which might give the first elected pretensions
to be superior to their colleagues.
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Thiele’s (addition) method. Seats are given to candidates sequentially,
until the desired number have been elected.
For each seat, a ballot where k > 0 names already have been elected is
counted as 1/(k + 1) votes for each remaining candidate on the ballot. The
candidate with the largest vote count is elected.
As said above, we usually call the method “Thiele’s method”.
Remark 4.2. Thiele’s addition method with the weak satisfaction function
(4.3) is studied in Aziz et al. [11] and is there called Greedy Approval Voting
(GAV). (In this case, each seat goes to the candidate with most votes among
the ballots that do not contain any already elected candidate.)
4.3. Thiele’s elimination method. Thiele’s elimination method works
in the opposite direction. Weak candidates are eliminated until only s (the
desired number) of them remain. Each time, the candidate is eliminated
that minimizes the decrease of the total satisfaction of the voters caused
by the elimination. For a general satisfaction function f satisfying (4.1),
the satisfication of a ballot σ with k remaining candidates is decreased by
wk when one of them is eliminated. This yields the following description,
where again we use wn = 1/n to obtain a proportional method. The general
version is obtained by replacing 1/k by some (arbitrary) numbers wk > 0.
Thiele’s elimination method. Candidates are eliminated one by one,
until only s remain. The remaining ones are elected. In each elimination
step, a ballot where k > 1 names remain is counted as 1/k votes for each
remaining candidate on the ballot. The candidate with the smallest vote
count is eliminated.
Note the (superficial?) similarity with the Equal and Even Cumulative
Voting in Appendix E.1.5, but note that here the calculation is iterated,
with the vote counts changing as candidates are eliminated.
Remark 4.3. Thiele’s elimination method has recently been reinvented
(under the name Harmonic Weighting) as a method for ordering alternatives
for display for the electronic voting system LiquidFeedback [47].
4.4. An example. We illustrate Thiele’s unordered methods by the same
example as was used to illustrate Phragme´n’s method in Example 3.7.
Example 4.4 (Thiele’s optimization, addition and elimination methods).
Unordered ballots. 3 seats. Thiele’s three methods.
1034 ABC
519 PQR
90 ABQ
47 APQ
With Thiele’s optimization method (Section 4.1), we note first that in this
example, we have dominations A > B > C and Q > P > R, in the sense that,
for example, replacing A by B or C always decreases the satisfaction of a set
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of candidates; hence it suffices to consider the four possible outcomes ABC,
ABQ, APQ, PQR instead of all
(6
3
)
= 20 possible sets of three candidates.
These sets yield the satisfactions
ABC: 1034 · 116 + 519 · 0 + 90 ·
3
2 + 47 · 1 = 6233/3
.
= 2077.67
ABQ: 1034 · 32 + 519 · 1 + 90 ·
11
6 + 47 ·
3
2 = 4611/2 = 2305.5
APQ: 1034 · 1 + 519 · 32 + 90 ·
3
2 + 47 ·
11
6 = 6101/3
.
= 2033.67
PQR: 1034 · 0 + 519 · 116 + 90 · 1 + 47 ·
3
2 = 1112
Hence the largest satisfaction is given by ABQ, so ABQ are elected.
With Thiele’s addition method (Section 4.2), the first seat goes to the
candidate with the largest number of votes, i.e., A (1171 votes, see Exam-
ple 3.7).
For the second seat, all ballots ABC, ABQ and APQ now are worth 1/2
vote each. This gives the vote counts
B 1034/2 + 90/2 = 562
C 1034/2 = 517
P 519 + 47/2 = 542.5
Q 519 + 90/2 + 47/2 = 587.5
R 519.
Thus Q has the highest vote count and is elected to the second seat.
For the third seat, the ballots ABC and PQR have the value 1/2, and the
ballots ABQ and APQ have the value 1/3 each. Hence the vote counts are
B 1034/2 + 90/3 = 547
C 1034/2 = 517
P 519/2 + 47/3
.
= 275.17
R 519/2 = 259.5.
Hence B gets the third seat.
With Thiele’s elimination method (Section 4.3), in the first round, each
ballot is counted as 1/3 (since they all contain 3 names), so R has the
smallest vote count (519/3=173) and is eliminated.
This increases the value of the ballots PQR to 1/2 each for P and Q, so
the vote counts in the second round are
A 1034/3 + 90/3 + 47/3 = 1171/3
.
= 390.33
B 1034/3 + 90/3 = 1124/3
.
= 374.67
C 1034/3
.
= 344.67
P 519/2 + 47/3 = 1651/6
.
= 275.17
Q 519/2 + 90/3 + 47/3 = 1831/6
.
= 305.17.
P has the smallest vote count and is eliminated.
In the third round, the ballots are worth 13 , 1,
1
3 ,
1
2 , and thus the vote
counts are
A 1034/3 + 90/3 + 47/2 = 2389/6
.
= 398.17
B 1034/3 + 90/3 = 1124/3
.
= 374.67
C 1034/3
.
= 344.67
PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS 17
Q 519 + 90/3 + 47/2 = 1145/2 = 572.5.
Thus C is eliminated, and the remaining ABQ are elected.
We see that in this example, all three Thiele’s methods yield the same
result, which also agrees with Phragme´n’s method (Example 3.7).
5. House monotonicity
The Alabama paradox occurs when the house size s (i.e., the number of
seats) is increased, with the same set of ballots, and as a result someone loses
a seat; see [13] for the historical context. (See also [42].) An election method
is house monotone if the Alabama paradox cannot occur. More formally,
and taking into account the possibility of ties, an election method is house
monotone if whenever, for a given set of ballots, Ss is a possible outcome of
the election for s seats, then there exists a possible outcome Ss+1 for s+ 1
seats such that Ss+1 ⊃ Ss.
Obviously, any sequential method where seats are assigned one by one
is house monotone; this includes Phragme´n’s method and Thiele’s addition
method in both the unordered versions above and the ordered versions below.
Similarly, Thiele’s elimination method is house monotone. However, Thiele’s
optimization method is not house monotone (as noticed by Thiele [76]), see
Examples 13.3 and 13.4. Example 13.4 can be generalized as follows to other
satisfaction functions f .
Theorem 5.1. Let f(n) be a satisfaction function with f(0) = 0 and f(1) =
1. Then Thiele’s optimization method is house monotone if and only if
f(n) = n.
Proof. First, if f(n) = n, then, as said above, Thiele’s optimization method
is equivalent to Approval Voting (Appendix E.1.2), which obviously is house
monotone.
For the converse, consider an election with 4 votes, for AB, AC, B, C. For
s = 1, a possible outcome is A, but if w2 < 1, then the only outcome for
s = 2 is BC. In the opposite direction, in an election with the 2 votes A and
BC, a possible outcome for s = 1 is A, but if w2 > 1, then the only outcome
for s = 2 is BC. Hence, if the method is house monotone, then w2 = 1.
More generally, for any n > 0, consider the same two examples but add
n further candidates D1,. . . ,Dn to every ballot. Then the only outcome for
s = n is D1· · ·Dn. For s = n + 1, a possible outcome is D1· · ·DnA, but for
s = n+ 2, the outcome is D1· · ·DnBC in the first example if wn+2 < wn+1,
and in the second example if wn+2 > wn+1. Hence, if the method is house
monotone, then wn+2 = wn+1 for every n > 0, and thus wn = w1 = 1 for
every n > 1. 
The ties in the examples used in the proof can be avoided by modifying the
examples so that the different alternatives have slightly different numbers
of votes.
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Remark 5.2. Thiele’s optimization method and addition method coincide,
for a general satisfaction function f , if and only if the optimization method
is house monotone. (This is obvious, at least in the absence of ties, from
the fact that the addition method is a greedy version of the optimization
method. The case with ties is perhaps easiest seen by using Theorem 5.1.)
Hence, the two methods coincide only for f(n) = n.
Similarly, Thiele’s optimization method and elimination method coincide
only for f(n) = n.
The examples in the proof above also show that the addition and elimina-
tion methods do not coincide for any other function f . This can be seen with-
out further calculations by noting that in these examples, for s = n+1, the
addition method and the optimization method coincides, while for s = n+2
(when only one candidate is eliminated), the elimination method coincides
with the optimization method; hence, if the addition method coincides with
the elimination method, then the optimization method coincides with the
addition method in these examples, which is impossible when it is not house
monotone.
As said above, Thiele [76] noted that for the “proportional” satisfaction
function (4.4), the three methods may give different result, see Example 13.3.
He also gave an example showing the same for the “weak” satisfaction func-
tion (4.3) [76, Examples 5 and 6].
6. Unordered ballots, principles
The unordered version of Phragme´n’s method and Thiele’s methods sat-
isfy the following general principles:
Principles for unordered versions of Phragme´n’s and thiele’s
methods.
(U1) The ballots are unordered, so that each voter lists a number of can-
didates, but their order is ignored.
(U2) In the allocation of a seat, each ballot is counted fully for every can-
didate on it (ignoring the ones that already have been elected). The
value of a ballot is reduced (in different ways for the different meth-
ods) when someone on it is elected, but the effective value of a ballot
does not depend on the number of unelected candidates on it.
As a consequence of (U2), the methods have also the following property,
which reduces the need for tactical voting.
(U3) If any number of candidates are added to a ballot, but none of them
is elected, then the result of the election is not affected.
Note that (U2) and (U3) hold also for Approval Voting (which can be seen
as a special case of Thiele’s general optimization method, see Section 4.1),
but not for some other election methods with unordered ballots, for example
Equal and Even Cumulative Voting (Appendix E.1.5), where a vote is split
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between the names on it, and the value of a ballot for each candidate on it
decreases if more names are added.
7. Unordered ballots and decapitation
Unordered ballots have some problems that are more or less independent
of the election method used to distribute the seats, and in particular apply
to both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods.
If there are organized parties, a party usually fields more candidates than
the number that will win seats, for example to be on the safe side since the
result cannot be predicted with certainty in advance. If all voters of the
party are loyal to the party and vote for the party list, the result will be
that all candidates on the party list will tie, and the ones that are elected
will be chosen by lot from the party list.
The party can avoid this random selection, and for example arrange so
that the party leader gets a seat (if the party gets any seat at all), by
organizing a scheme where a small group of loyal members vote for specially
selected subsets of the party list, with the result that the party’s candidates
will get slightly different number of votes, in the order favoured by the party
organization. However, this will still be sensitive to a coup from a rather
small minority in the party, that might secretly agree not to vote for, say, the
party leader. To protect against such coups, the party can give instructions
to vote on specific sets of candidates to a larger number of voters, but it is
certainly a serious drawback of an election system to depend on complicated
systems of tactical voting. (This might also, depending on the system, make
it more difficult for the party in the competition with other parties, and the
party might risk to get fewer seats.)
Moreover, even if party A is well-disciplined and there is no internal op-
position, it is possible that a small group from another party, say B, will
cast their votes on some less prominent and perhaps less able candidates
from party A, instead of voting for their own party. Of course, that might
give party A another seat, but with a small number of tactical votes, this
risk is small. On the other hand, there is a reasonable chance that the extra
votes will elect the chosen candidates from A instead of the ones preferred
by the party. This tactical manoeuvre, called decapitation, can thus prevent
e.g. the party leader of an otherwise successful party to be elected.
Decapitation does not necessarily occur because of sinister tactics by some
groups; it can also occur by mistake, when too many voters believe that
their primary candidate is safe and therefore also vote for others. One such
situation is discussed in Example 13.17. (There in connection with further
complications caused by an election system with additional rules.)
I do not know to what extent such decapitation occurred in practice,
but at least the unintentional type in Example 13.17 occurred [6, p. 8],
and decapitation was something that was feared and much discussed in the
discussions about electoral reform in Sweden around 1900; see for example
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[5, p. 25] and [6, pp. 13, 20, 33, 35]. As a result, versions using ordered
ballots were developed of both Phragme´n’s method and Thiele’s addition
method, as described in the following sections.13 (We do not know of any
ordered versions of Thiele’s optimization and elimination methods, except
that Bottoms-up, see Appendix E.2.2, perhaps might be seen as an ordered
version of his elimination method.)
8. Ordered ballots, principles
The ordered versions of Phragme´n’s method and Thiele’s (addition) me-
thod differ from the unordered versions in Sections 3 and 4 in two ways:
Principles for ordered versions.
(O1) The ballots are ordered, so that each voter lists a number of candi-
dates in order.
(O2) In the allocation of a seat, each ballot is counted only for one candi-
date, viz. the first candidate on it that is not already elected.
This is detailed in the following sections.
Note that (O2) implies the following property, similar to (U3) for the
unordered versions.
(O3) If any number of candidates are added after the existing names on a
ballot, then the result of the election is not affected unless all existing
candidates are elected.
Thus, a voter can add names after his or her favourite candidates without
risking to hurt their chances.
9. Phragme´n’s ordered method
Phragme´n’s ordered method is thus obtained by modifying the version
in Section 3 using the principles (O1)–(O2) in Section 8. This method
was proposed in 1913 by a Royal Commission on the Proportional Election
Method [6] (see Appendix D); Phragme´n was one of the members of the
commission, so it is natural to guess that he developed also this version.14
(A similar method had been proposed by Tenow [73] in 1910.)
The method has been used in Swedish elections for the distribution of
seats within parties since 1921, although it now plays only a secondary role;
see Appendices D and C.1.
13 Phragme´n [57] makes another suggestion to avoid the problem of decapitation (saying
that it is just one possibility among many), while keeping unordered ballots. In this
proposal, parties could register ordered party lists. The ballots would still be regarded as
unordered, but a vote on a party list, say ABCDE, would in addition to the vote ABCDE
also be regarded as (for example) 1
10
extra vote on shorter lists, in this case ABCD, ABC,
AB and A, split between them with 1
40
extra vote each. It seems that everyone ignored this
suggestion, including Phragme´n himself in later writings, and it seems for good reasons.
14 Phragme´n [55] had already in 1893 used ordered ballots in one example when he
discussed a version of STV.
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9.1. First formulation. The ordered version can thus be defined as follows,
cf. Section 3.1. A detailed example is given in Section 9.4; further examples
are given in Section 13.
Phragme´n’s ordered method, formulation 1. Assume that each ballot
has some voting power t; this number is the same for all ballots and will
be determined later. A candidate needs total voting power 1 in order to be
elected. During the procedure described below, some of the voting power of a
ballot may be already assigned to already elected candidates; the remaining
voting power of the ballot is free, and is used by the ballot’s current top
candidate, i.e., the first candidate on the ballot that is not already elected.
The seats are distributed one by one.
For each seat, each ballot is counted for its current top candidate. (If
all candidates on a ballot are elected, the ballot is ignored.) The top candi-
date receives the free voting power of the ballot. (I.e., the full voting power
except for the voting power already assigned from that ballot to candidates
already elected.) For each candidate, the ballot voting power t that would
give the candidate voting power 1 is computed, and the candidate requiring
the smallest voting power t is elected. All free (i.e. unassigned) voting power
on the ballots that were counted for the elected candidate is assigned to that
candidate, and these assignments remain fixed throughout the election.
The computations are then repeated for the next seat, with the remaining
candidates, and so on.
Remark 9.1. As for the unordered version in Section 3, we can think of
the voting power of each ballot increasing continuously with time, see Re-
mark 3.3. Again, the voting power available to each candidate increases with
time, and when some candidate reaches voting power 1, that candidate is
elected. (A difference from the unordered version is that the available voting
powers of the other candidates do not change when someone is elected; in
particular, the voting powers of the candidates never decrease.)
9.2. Second formulation. The same calculations as in Section 3 show that
the formulation above is equivalent to the following more explicit algorithm,
cf. Section 3.1:
Phragme´n’s ordered method, formulation 2. Seats are given to can-
didates sequentially, until the desired number have been elected. During the
process, each type of ballot, i.e., each group of identical ballots, is given a
place number, which is a rational non-negative number that can be inter-
preted as the (fractional) number of seats elected so far by these ballots; the
sum of the place numbers is always equal to the number of seats already
allocated. The place numbers are determined recursively and the seats are
allocated by the following rules:
(i) Initially all place numbers are 0.
(ii) Suppose that n > 0 seats have been allocated. Let qα denote the place
number for the ballots with a list α of candidates; thus
∑
α qα = n.
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For each candidate i, let Ai be the set of lists α such that i is the first
element of α if we ignore candidates already elected. The total number
of votes counted for candidate i in this step is
∑
α∈Ai
vα, and the total
place number of the ballots counted for candidate i is
∑
α∈Ai
qα. The
reduced vote for candidate i is defined as
Wi :=
∑
α∈Ai
vα
1 +
∑
α∈Ai
qα
, (9.1)
i.e., the total number of votes counted for the candidate divided by 1
+ their total place number.
(iii) The next seat is given to the candidate i that has the largest Wi.
(iv) Furthermore, if candidate i gets the next seat, then the place numbers
are updated for all lists α that participated in the election, i.e., the lists
α ∈ Ai. For such α, the new place number is
q′α :=
vα
Wi
=
(
1 +
∑
α∈Ai
qα
) vα∑
α∈Ai
vα
. (9.2)
For α /∈ Ai, q
′
α := qα.
Steps (ii)–(iv) are repeated as many times as desired.
Indeed, the commission report [6] that proposed the method in 1913 intro-
duced it in this form; the committee first discussed the current method and
various proposals to improve it, and showed by examples that they all were
unsatisfactory, and then presented the method above gradually, through a
sequence of examples of increasing complexity, as the correct generalization
of D’Hondt’s method to ordered lists.15
Remark 9.2. As in Section 3, the connection between the two formulations
above is that Wi = 1/ti, where ti is the voting power per ballot that would
give i voting power 1 in the current round. In particular, (3.6) still holds
for the winning voting power and reduced vote in each round.
9.3. Third formulation. In practical applications of the method, it is not
necessary to keep track of and calculate place numbers for each individual
type of ballot; since each ballot counts only for its current top name, it
suffices to group ballots according to their current top name. This sim-
plification was introduced already in the commission report [6] where the
method was introduced, and it is used in the Swedish Elections Act, where
this method has played a part (within parties) since 1921, see Appendix D,
and where the method is defined in the following form (in my words; for the
actual text of the Elections Act, see Appendix C.1):
Phragme´n’s ordered method, formulation 3. Seats are given to can-
didates sequentially, until the desired number have been elected. During the
15The commission report also noted that the method was essentially the same as the
method for unordered ballots presented in 1894 by one of the members of the commission,
Phragme´n [56, 57].
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process, the ballots are organized in groups; the ballots in each group have
the same top candidate, ignoring candidates already elected, and the group
is valid for that candidate. Each group is also given a place number, which
is a rational non-negative number that can be interpreted as the (fractional)
number of seats elected so far by these ballots; the sum of the place num-
bers of the different groups is always equal to the number of seats already
allocated.
The groups are created, their place numbers are determined and the seats
are allocated by the following rules:
(i) Initially, the ballots are divided into groups according to their first
name. Each group is given place number 0.
(ii) Suppose that n > 0 seats have been allocated. Denote the current set of
groups of ballots by Γ, and for each group γ ∈ Γ, let vγ be its number of
votes and qγ its place number; furthermore, let iγ be the candidate that
the group is valid for. For each candidate i, let Γi := {γ ∈ Γ : iγ = i},
the set of groups valid for that candidate, and define the reduced vote
by
Wi :=
∑
γ∈Γi
vγ
1 +
∑
γ∈Γi
qγ
, (9.3)
i.e., the total number of votes currently valid for the candidate divided
by 1 + the total place number of the corresponding groups.
(iii) The next seat is given to the candidate i that has the largest Wi.
(iv) If candidate i gets the next seat, then the groups valid for i are merged
together and then divided into new groups according to the new top
candidate on the ballots, i.e., the first candidate after i that is not
already elected. (Ballots were all candidates are elected are put aside
and ignored in the sequel.) Each new group γ is given a place number
qγ :=
vγ
Wi
. (9.4)
All other groups remain unchanged, and keep their place number.
Steps (ii)–(iv) are repeated as many times as desired.
It is easily seen that this version is equivalent to the version in Section 9.2;
each group contains all ballots of some set of types (each given by a list α
of names), and the number of votes and the place number for the group are
just the sums of the number of votes and of the place numbers for these
types.
9.4. An example. We illustrate Phragme´n’s ordered method by his un-
ordered example in Example 3.7, but now interpreting the ballots as ordered
(with the first candidate first).
Example 9.3 (Phragme´n’s ordered method).
Ordered ballots. 3 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
1034 ABC
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519 PQR
90 ABQ
47 APQ
We use the formulation of Phragme´n’s ordered method in Section 9.2.
Since each ballot is counted only for its first name, we have in the first
round 1171 votes for A and 519 votes for P, so A is elected.
This gives a place number (= assigned voting power = load) 1/1171 to
each ballot ABC, ABQ or APQ, and thus, in the second round, the four
groups of ballots have place numbers 10341171 , 0,
90
1171 ,
47
1171 , see (9.2). (If we use
the formulation in Section 9.3, we group the ballots ABC and ABQ together;
this group has 1124 votes and place number 11241171 .)
In the second round, the top names are B and P. They have 1124 and 566
votes with total place numbers 11241171
.
= 0.9599 and 471171
.
= 0.0401 (with sum
1), respectively, and thus reduced votes
WB =
1124
1 + 11241171
=
1316204
2295
.
= 573.51
and
WP =
566
1 + 471171
=
331393
609
.
= 544.16
Thus B is elected to the second seat.
The place numbers for the four groups of ballots are now 1034
WB
= 1186515658102
.
=
1.8029, 0, 90
WB
= 103275658102
.
= 0.1569, 471171
.
= 0.0401 (with sum 2).
In the third round, the top names on the four types of ballots are C, P,
Q, P, and their reduced votes are
WC =
1034
1 + 1186515658102
=
680477468
1844617
.
= 368.90
WP =
566
1 + 471171
=
331393
609
.
= 544.16
WQ =
90
1 + 103275658102
=
59229180
761377
.
= 77.79.
Hence, P is elected to the third seat.
Elected: ABP.
10. Thiele’s ordered method
Thiele’s ordered method is obtained by modifying his unordered addition
method in Section 4.2 using the principles in Section 8.
Thiele’s ordered method. Seats are given to candidates sequentially,
until the desired number have been elected.
For each seat, a ballot is counted for the ballot’s current top candidate,
i.e., the first candidate on the ballot that has not already been elected; if this
is the k-th name on the ballot (so the preceding k−1 have been elected), then
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the ballot is counted as 1/k vote. (Ballots where all candidates have been
elected are ignored.) The candidate with the largest vote count is elected.
A detailed example is given in Section 10.1; further examples are given in
Section 13.
Remark 10.1. This is based on Thiele’s proportional satisfaction function
(4.4). Of course, just as in Section 4, other functions f may be used. We
leave this to the reader to explore.
The ordered version of Thiele’s method was proposed in the Swedish
parliament in 1912 (by Nilson in O¨rebro), as an improvement of the then
used unordered Thiele’s method for distribution of seats within parties (see
Appendix D). It was not adopted, but it was later adopted, still within
parties, for elections inside city and county councils, and it is still used for
that purpose, see Appendix C.2.
10.1. An example. We illustrate also Thiele’s ordered method with the
same example as in Examples 3.3, 4.4 and 9.4.
Example 10.2 (Thiele’s ordered method).
Ordered ballots. 3 seats. Thiele’s method.
1034 ABC
519 PQR
90 ABQ
47 APQ
Since each ballot is counted only for its first name, we have in the first
round (as in Example 9.3) 1171 votes for A and 519 votes for P, so A is
elected.
For the second seat, all ballots ABC, ABQ and APQ now have a value
1/2 each. This gives the vote counts
B 1034/2 + 90/2 = 562
P 519 + 47/2 = 542.5
Thus B has the highest vote count and is elected to the second seat.
For the third seat, the four types of ballots have the values 13 , 1,
1
3 ,
1
2 each.
Hence the vote counts are
C 1034/3
.
= 344.67
P 519 + 47/2 = 542.5
Q 90/3 = 30.
Hence P gets the third seat.
Elected: ABP. (As with Phragme´n’s method in Example 9.3.)
11. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods generalize D’Hondt’s
The election methods considered in this paper are blind to the possible
existence of parties. Nevertheless, it is important to see how they perform
in the presence of parties. We therefore consider the following special case:
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party list case. There is a number of parties such that:
• Each party has a single list of candidates. (Ordered or unordered,
depending on the election method.)
• The lists are disjoint. (I.e., no person runs for more than one party.)
• Every voter votes for one of the party lists.
In this case, Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods reduce to D’Hondt’s me-
thod (described in Appendix E.3.1). This was explicitly stated (and shown)
by Phragme´n [57, pp. 38–40] for his method; Thiele [76, p. 425] states ex-
plicitly only the special case when the fraction of votes for each party is an
integer times 1/s, so that a perfectly proportional representation is possible,
but his proof really shows the general result.
Theorem 11.1 (Phragme´n, Thiele). In the party list case just described,
Phragme´n’s unordered and ordered methods and Thiele’s three unordered
methods and his ordered method (assuming the proportional satisfaction
function (4.4)) all yield the same distribution of seats between parties as
D’Hondt’s method.
Proof. More or less obvious, and left to the reader. Note that for the un-
ordered methods, all candidates from the same party will tie, and that for
Phragme´n’s methods, the place number of a list equals the number of seats
already given to that list (since lists are disjoint). 
Remark 11.2. For the unordered methods, there is a minor difference with
D’Hondt’s method in the case of a tie, if that is resolved by lot. In D’Hondt’s
method, a tie will be resolved by choosing one of the tying parties at random,
while in Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods, one of the tying candidates is
chosen at random, and thus a party with many candidates will have a larger
chance of getting the seat.
Remark 11.3. For the unordered methods, by the assumptions of the party
list case, all candidates from the same party will tie, so which of them that
will be elected to the seats won by the party will typically be determined by
lot. (See also Section 7.) For the ordered methods, the seats of a party will
be assigned in the order the candidates appear on the list.
Remark 11.4. The theorem extends to Thiele’s methods with a different
satisfation function f(n) =
∑n
k=1wk; in the party list case they all give the
same result as the divisor method with divisors 1/wn (see Appendix E.3).
See [20], where also further related results are given.
12. Electing a single person
Another simple special case is when s = 1, so that only one person is to be
elected. (A single-member constituency.) Of course, in this case, there are
simpler methods, but it is of interest to see how the methods above perform.
Theorem 12.1. In the case s = 1, the following holds.
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(i) For unordered ballots, Phragme´n’s method and Thiele’s optimization
and addition method elect the candidate with the largest number of
votes. I.e., they are equivalent to Approval Voting (Appendix E.1.2).
(ii) For ordered ballots, Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods elect the can-
didate with the largest number of first votes. I.e., they are equivalent
to Single-Member Plurality (First-Past-The-Post, see Appendix E.1.1).
(Names after the first name on a ballot are thus ignored.)
Proof. Obvious. 
Remark 12.2. Note that Thiele’s elimination method may give a different
result, see Example 13.4.
13. Examples
We give several examples to illustrate and compare the different methods.
(Many of them are constructed by various authors to illustrate weaknesses
of some method.) See also Examples 3.7, 4.4, 9.3, and 10.2.
It is seen that, except in very simple cases, Phragme´n’s methods lead
to rational numbers with large denominators and that they thus are not
suitable for hand calculations; this is not a problem with computer assis-
tance.16 17
In the examples below, ABC denotes a ballot with the names A, B and
C; in the case of ordered ballots, the names are given in order, with A the
first name.
In several of the examples, there are obvious ties because of symmetries.
We then usually give only one, typical, outcome, sometimes without com-
ment.
Example 13.1 (Phragme´n’s unordered method). Phragme´n [57, pp. 19, 28,
44] discusses the following example, taken from the parliamentary election
1893 (Stockholm’s second constituency). There were actually 2624 valid
ballots, but for simplicity Phragme´n ignores 73 ballots of various types with
less than 10 ballots each.18
Unordered ballots. 5 seats. Phragme´n’s method.19 20
1233 TVFPE
585 TLNBQ
124 TVFLN
16In the use of the method in Sweden (Appendix C.1), all numbers are calculated to
two decimal places (rounded down), so exact rational arithmetic is not used.
17For computational aspects, see also [19].
18The five remaining types, shown below, were all promoted by various political orga-
nizations; note that there are considerable overlaps.
19 T = Themptander, V = von Friesen, F = Fredholm, P = Palme, E = Eklund, L =
Love´n, N = Nordenskio¨ld, B = Backman, Q = Pettersson, J = Johansson, W = Wikman.
20The actual election used the Block Vote, and the elected were, counting also the
ballots ignored here, TVFPE with 1995, 1470, 1458, 1316 and 1313 votes, respectively;
the next candidate had 1301 votes [9, p. 29].
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547 LNBQJ
62 VFPEW
Phragme´n uses this example to discuss several conceivable methods, and
gives detailed calculations for his method which results in the election of, in
order (after resolving ties arbitrarily) TLVNF.
Example 13.2 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered methods). Phragme´n
[57, p. 49] gives also another example from the parliamentary election 1893
(Stockholm’s fifth constituency). There were actually 1520 valid votes, of
which 57 (of types with less than 10 ballots each) are ignored in the example.
Unordered ballots. 5 seats. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods.21 22
680 HEOBG
341 HEXBG
322 HYPQG
49 HPXQG
47 ZYPQL
14 HEOBX
10 HPOQG
Phragme´n shows that his method would elect HGEBQ (or HGEBP; the last
seat is tied, as is the order between E and B, but both are elected in any
case).
Thiele [76, Examples 1 and 2] uses the same example (omitting Z and L
to show that all ballots do not have to have the same number of names, and
perhaps also to shorten the calculations) and shows that his addition and
elimination methods both also elect HGEBQ (or HGEBP).
Thiele’s optimization method yields also the same result. (Thiele [76]
did not calculate this, presumably because even with his omission of two
candidates, there are
(9
5
)
= 126 sets to consider.)
Example 13.3 (Thiele’s three unordered methods). The following example
by Thiele [76, Examples 3 and 4], here slightly modified to avoid ties, shows
that the three methods by Thiele (see Section 4) can give different results.
Unordered ballots. 2 seats.
960 ACD
3000 BCD
520 BC
1620 AB
1081 AD
1240 AC
360 BD
21 H = Ho¨jer, G = G. Eriksson, E = P.J.M. Eriksson, B = Bergstro¨m, O = Olsson, X
= Branting, Q = O¨stberg, P = Palm, Y = Hellgren, Z = Billmansson, L = Lindvall.
22The actually elected, using the Block Vote and counting also the ballots ignored here,
were HGEBO, with 1454, 1421, 1055, 1053, 715 votes, respectively, with 469 votes for the
next candidate [9, p. 29].
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360 D
120 C
60 B
Thiele’s optimization method elects AB, his addition method elects CA and
his elimination method elects BD.
This example also shows that the optimization method is not house mono-
tone, see Section 5; if only 1 is elected, the optimization method elects C
(as the addition method does; the elimination method elects D).
Phragme´n’s method elects CA, and thus gives the same result as Thiele’s
addition method.
(With 3 seats, Thiele’s optimization method and elimination method elect
BCD, while the addition method and Phragme´n’s method elect CAD.)
Example 13.4 (Thiele’s three unordered methods). Tenow [74] gave a sim-
pler example showing that Thiele’s three unordered methods are different
(and thus also that Thiele’s optimization method is not house monotone).
Unordered ballots.
12 AB
12 AC
10 B
10 C
For 1 seat, Thiele’s optimization method elects A, but for 2 seats, the method
elects BC.
Thiele’s addition method elects A for 1 seat, and AB or AC for 2 seats.
Thiele’s elimination method eliminates first A; hence it elects BC for 2
seats, and B or C for 1 seat.
In the examples above, Phragme´n’s method yields the same result as
Thiele’s (addition) method. The following examples are constructed to show
differences between the two methods (and to show weaknesses of Thiele’s
methods). The first three examples are rather similar, and have two parties
(or factions) that agree on one (or several) common candidates.
Example 13.5 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered or ordered methods).
Phragme´n [59] compares his method and Thiele’s (addition) method for un-
ordered ballots (and argues in favour of his own) using the following example
(here slightly modified to avoid ties). The example works also for ordered
ballots, with the given order.
Unordered or ordered ballots.
2001 AB1B2B3. . .
1000 AC1C2C3 . . .
This could be two parties B and C, and a highly respected independent
candidate A, or two factions that both accept the same leader.
In an example like this, with two types of ballots that have one common
candidate, which in the ordered case comes first, it is obvious that both
Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods first elect the common candidate A.
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After that, as is easily seen from the formulation in Sections 3.1 and 9.1,
Phragme´n’s method treats the remaining parts of the two lists as two disjoint
party lists, and thus (see Theorem 11.1) the remaining seats are distributed
as by D’Hondt’s method. Hence, Phragme´n’s method will elect candidates
in the order AB1B2C1B3B4C2B5B6C3. . . .
23
Thiele’s method, on the other hand, reduces the votes of both lists by
the same factor after the election of A. As Tenow [74] comments for a re-
lated example, Thiele’s method here treats A as two different persons; if the
two lists had had two different persons A1 and A2, then, when both were
elected, Thiele’s method would have reduced the votes in the same way. (In
that case, we would have had disjoint party lists and by Theorem 11.1 the
elected would have been A1B1A2B2B3C1B4B5C2B6B7C3. . . .) Consequently,
the candidates are elected in order AB1B2B3C1B4B5C2B6B7C3. . .
We thus see that Thiele’s method favours the larger party. In particular,
with 4 seats, Phragme´n’s method elects AB1B2C1 and Thiele’s method elects
AB1B2B3.
Example 13.6 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered or ordered methods).
Phragme´n [59] considers also (with unordered ballots) the following modifi-
cation of the previous example.
Unordered or ordered ballots.
2000 AB1B2B3. . .
1000 AC1C2C3. . .
550 C1C2C3. . .
A calculation shows that Phragme´n’s method will elect candidates in the
order AB1C1B2C2B3C3B4C4B5B6. . . , while Thiele’s method will elect in the
order AC1B1B2C2B3C3B4C4B5B6. . . . (The next seat that differs is no. 25,
which is a tie for Thiele’s method.)
It is not clear that one of these results is “better” or “more fair” than
the other, but Phragme´n points out that both methods generally give more
seats to B than to C (as they should, because B got more votes), but if there
are 2 seats, then Thiele’s method will give these to AC; Phragme´n concludes
that at least it is not an advantage of Thiele’s method that for 2 seats it
puts C ahead of B, while for larger numbers of seats it puts B ahead of C.24
In this simple example, it is possible to analyse exactly what happens also
for a large number of seats (and candidates, cf. Section 18.4 and [53]). Let
b = b(c) be the number elected from the B party before c candidates are
elected from the C party, for c > 1.
With Phragme´n’s method, the election of A gives a load 2/3 to the first
group of ballots, and 1/3 to the second. Thus, when Cc is elected, the load
on each ballot in the first group is (b(c) + 23 )/2000 and the load on each
23In the unordered case, all B’s are tied, as are all C’s, so the order among them is
arbitrary.
24I do not know whether the same can happen with Phragme´n’s method in another
situation.
PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS 31
ballot in one of the two last groups is (c+ 13 )/1550. Consequently, b = b(c)
is the largest integer such that
b+ 23
2000
6
c+ 13
1550
, (13.1)
i.e.
b(c) =
⌊
2000
1550
(
c+
1
3
)
−
2
3
⌋
=
⌊
40
31
c−
22
93
⌋
. (13.2)
With Thiele’s method, Cc gets elected with 1000/(c + 1) + 550/c votes,
while Bb was elected with 2000/(b + 1) votes. Thus b = b(c) is the largest
integer such that
2000
b+ 1
>
1000
c+ 1
+
550
c
, (13.3)
and thus
b(c) =
⌊
2000
1000
c+1 +
550
c
− 1
⌋
=
⌊
40
31
c−
161
961
−
8800
961(31c + 11)
⌋
. (13.4)
The claims above are easily verified from (13.2) and (13.4). Note that 2293
.
=
0.2366 > 161961
.
= 0.1675. Furthermore, since the last fraction in (13.4) tends
to 0 as c→∞, it follows that except for the first seats, both methods elect
B and C in sequences that are periodic with period 71, with 40 B and 31
C. Moreover, it is easily verified that for c > 1, (13.2) and (13.4) differ if
and only if c ≡ 11 or 18 (mod 31), and hence the two methods differ if and
only if s = 2 or s ≡ 25 or 41 (mod 71); when they differ, except for s = 2,
Phragme´n’s method favours C and Thiele’s method favours B (except that
for s = 25, as said, Thiele’s method gives a tie for the last seat).
Example 13.7 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered or ordered methods).
Cassel [5] gave an example similar to Example 13.5 (using unordered ballots).
Unordered or ordered ballots. 9 seats.
4200 ABCDEFGHI
1710 ABCUVWXYZ
With both Phragme´n’s method and Thiele’s method, the 3 common can-
didates ABC are obviously elected first (in arbitrary order in the case of
unordered ballots).
With Phragme´n’s method, the 6 seats after the 3 first are distributed as
for two disjoint parties (again easily seen from the formulation in Sections
3.1 and 9.1), i.e., as with D’Hondt’s method (see Section 11). The result is
4 of these seats to the larger “party” and 2 to the smaller (since 4200/4 >
1710/2 > 4200/5); i.e., ABCDEFGUV.
With Thiele’s method, however, the last 6 seats go to DEFGHI; thus
the largest party (faction) gets all 9 seats, again as by D’Hondt’s method
regarding ABC as different persons on the two ballots. (The last elected, I,
is elected with 4200/9
.
= 466.67 votes against 1710/4 = 427.5 for U.)
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Example 13.8 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered or ordered methods).
An example from the commission report [6] (there with unordered ballots):
Unordered or ordered ballots. 2 seats.
21 AB
20 AC
12 D
Again there are two parties, with the first split into two factions, both
recognizing the same leader. Note that since the first party gets more than
three times as many votes as the second, an election without splitting the
vote between two lists would give both seats (and also a third, if there were
one) to the first party by any of the methods considered here (since they
would reduce to D’Hondt’s method by Theorem 11.1).
Phragme´n’s method gives the first seat to A (41 votes), and then the
second to B (with C next in line); the reduced votes areWB = 21/(1+
21
41) =
861
62
.
= 13.89, WC = 20/(1 +
20
41) =
820
61
.
= 13.44 and WD = 12.
Thiele’s unordered or ordered method gives the first seat to A, which
reduces the votes for the first two types of ballots so much that the second
seat goes to D, with 12 votes against 10.5 for B and 10 for C. Hence, AD
are elected, and the larger party gets only one seat.
Example 13.9 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered or ordered methods).
Cassel [5, p. 53] gave a similar example (with unordered ballots).
Unordered or ordered ballots.
90 A1A2A3. . .
90 B1B2B3. . .
90 B1C1C2C3. . .
There are three different parties (factions) of equal size, but the C party
supports B1.
With Thiele’s method, evidently B1 is elected first. However, as Cassel
notes, once B1 is elected, the B party has no advantage at all of the partial
support from the C party, and parties A and B will get equally many seats
(possibly tying for the last one), while the C party pays for the support of
B1 as much as if the party had elected one of its own, and will get one seat
less than the others (up to ties for the last place). Hence, the candidates are
elected in order B1A1(A2B2C1)(A3B3C2). . . , where the parentheses indicate
ties. For example, with 5 seats, the elected are 2 A, 2 B and 1 C, and with
6 seats, the additional seat is a tie between all three parties.
With Phragme´n’s method, B1 is still elected first, but this gives only
a place number 12 to each of the last two lists. It follows, e.g. by con-
sidering loads as in Remark 3.1, that the candidates are elected in order
B1A1(B2C1)A2(B3C2)A3. . . . For example, with 5 seats, the elected are 2 A,
2 B and 1 C, as by Thiele’s method, but with 6 seats, the additional seat is
a tie between B and C only; thus B gets some advantage from the partial
support from C, and C does not pay quite as much for it as with Thiele’s
method.
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Example 13.10 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered or ordered methods).
Tenow [74] gave the following example (with unordered ballots):
Unordered or ordered ballots. 8 seats.
21 ABCDH
21 ABCEI
21 ABCFJ
21 ABCGK
12 OPQRS
In this example, there are two disjoint parties, but one party is split into
four different lists. The second party has 12/96 = 1/8 of the votes, so a
proportional representation between the parties would give 7 seats to the
first party and 1 to the second, electing for example ABCDEFGO (with
many equivalent choices, by symmetry, in the unordered case).
This is also the result of Phragme´n’s method.
However, Thiele’s optimization method, addition method and elimination
method in the unordered case and Thiele’s ordered method in the ordered
case all elect ABCDEFOP, with two seats to the second party.25
It seems that Thiele’s methods reduce the votes for lists with common
names too much in the examples above. On the other hand, the opposite
seems to happen with Thiele’s ordered method when two list have a common
name in a lower position; in this case the method does not reduce the votes
enough.
Example 13.11 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods). An example
from the commission report [6]:
Ordered ballots. 3 seats.
34 AC
34 BC
32 D
With Thiele’s ordered method, the three seats go to ABC (34 votes each,
since for the third seat, C has 34/2+34/2 votes), while D is not elected (32
votes).
Phragme´n’s method elects instead ABD; for the third seat, the two first
lists have place number 1 each, so C has reduced vote (34 + 34)/3
.
= 22.67,
while D has 32. This seems to be a more proportional result.
Example 13.12 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods). Another ex-
ample from the commission report [6]:
Ordered ballots. 4 seats.
33 AB
32 AC
25 It is natural that parties that split their votes on several lists may be hurt by this,
and that happens also with Phragme´n’s method in other examples, see e.g. Example 16.7,
so one should perhaps be careful with drawing conclusions from this example.
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18 DF
17 EF
This example combines the features of Examples 13.8 and 13.11.
With Thiele’s ordered method, A is elected first (65 votes), and then D,
E, F are elected to the remaining seats (with 18, 17 and 17.5 votes, against
16.5 for B and 16 for C). Thus the ABC party, with 65% of the votes, gets
only 1 seat, while the smaller DEF party gets 3.
Phragme´n’s method also elects A first (65 votes), but then B and C
are elected with reduced votes WB = 33/(1 +
33
65 ) =
2145
98
.
= 21.89 and
WC = 32/(1 +
32
65 ) =
2080
97
.
= 21.44 against WD = 18 and WE = 17; finally, D
takes the last seat. Elected: ABCD.
Furthermore, in the following examples, Thiele’s methods seem to reduce
the votes too little for candidates that appear both on a list where someone
else already has been elected, and on a list without any elected. Moreover,
and perhaps more seriously, this yields possibilities for tactical voting, where
a party may gain seats by carefully splitting its votes on different lists.
Example 13.13 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered methods). An exam-
ple by Tenow [74]:
Unordered ballots. 3 seats.
37 ABC
13 KLM
In this case, there are two disjoint party lists, so both Phragme´n’s and
Thiele’s methods reduce to D’Hondt’s method (see Theorem 11.1) and, say,
ABK are elected. Thus the larger party gets 2 seats and the smaller 1.
However, with Thiele’s method, the larger party may cunningly split their
votes on five different lists as follows:
1 A
9 AB
9 AC
9 B
9 C
13 KLM
Then A gets the first seat (19 votes), and the next two go to B and C (in
some order) with 13.5 votes each, beating KLM with 13. Thus the large
party gets all seats. The reason is obviously that only some of the ballots
contain A, and thus get their votes reduced for the following seats.
Nevertheless, if news of this scheme is leaked to the small party, they may
thwart it by letting two persons vote BKLM. The resulting election is
1 A
9 AB
9 AC
9 B
9 C
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2 BKLM
11 KLM
Now, still with Thiele’s method, B gets the first seat (20 votes); then C
gets the second (18 votes); finally, K, say, gets the third seat with 12 votes,
beating A (10 votes). Thus, KLM have gained a seat by voting for the
enemy! (Cf. Section 14.)
I do not know whether there are in this example even more cunning
schemes that can not be thwarted, and what the best strategies of the two
parties are if they do not know in advance how the others vote. (Possibly
the best strategies are mixed, i.e. random.) Thiele’s method thus leads to
interesting mathematical problems in combinatorics and game theory, but
for its practical use as a voting method, this example of sensitivity to tactical
voting is hardly an asset.
Phragme´n’s method seems to be much more robust in this respect. In the
example above, KLM can always get one seat by voting KLM, regardless of
how the voters in the other party vote, see Theorem 16.1.
Example 13.14 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods). The oppor-
tunities for tactical voting shown by Thiele’s unordered method in Exam-
ple 13.13 exist for Thiele’s ordered method as well, in a somewhat simpler
and perhaps more obvious form. The following example is (partly) from the
commission report [6].
Ordered ballots. 2 seats.
61 AB
39 CD
Again, there are two disjoint party lists, so both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s
methods reduce to D’Hondt’s method (see Theorem 11.1) and AC are elected.
Thus the parties get 1 seat each. (Since both have more than a third of the
votes.)
However, with Thiele’s method, the larger party may split their votes as
follows:
41 AB
20 B
39 CD
With Thiele’s method, the first seat goes to A (41 votes, against 20 for B
and 39 for C). For the second seat, B has 41/2 + 20 = 40.5 votes, and beats
C. Elected: AB.
In this example, C thus is not elected, in spite of being supported by
39% of the voters. (See further Section 16.) Unlike Example 13.13 with the
unordered method, in this case there is nothing that the CD party can do
to prevent AB from being elected; even if they help B to be elected to the
first seat, A will still beat them to the second seat.
Phragme´n’s method is more robust (as for the unordered methods); using
it, CD will always get (at least) one seat by voting CD, regardless of how the
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others vote, see Theorem 16.1. In the example above, Phragme´n’s method
elects A to the first seat. This gives place number 1 to the first list, and for
the second seat, B has an reduced vote (41 + 20)/2 = 30.5 by (9.1). Hence
C gets the second seat. Elected: AC.
Example 13.15 (Thiele’s ordered method). Consider the following varia-
tion of the second election in Example 13.14.
Ordered ballots. 3 seats. Thiele’s method.
30 AB
15 B
55 CD
C gets the first seat, but then D has only 55/2 = 27.5 votes and the second
and third seats go to A and B with 30 votes each. Elected: ABC.
Thus the CD party gets only 1 seat in spite of a majority of the votes.
Also Phragme´n’s method can behave strangely, as seen in the following
example. Further examples of non-intuitive behaviour are given in Sections
14 and 15.
Example 13.16 (Phragme´n’s ordered method). This example was con-
structed by Lanke [45].
Ordered ballots. 2 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
15 AB
12 BX
14 CY
3 ZW
Phragme´n’s method gives the first seat to A (reduced vote 15) and the second
to C (reduced vote 14, against 27/2 = 13.5 for B and 3 for Z). Elected: AC.
Now suppose that the three ZW voters change their minds and vote AC:
15 AB
12 BX
14 CY
3 AC
Then the first seat goes to A (reduced vote 18). For the second seat, the four
groups of ballots have place numbers 56 , 0, 0,
1
6 , giving B and C the reduced
votes
WB =
15 + 12
1 + 5/6
=
162
11
.
= 14.73 and WC =
14 + 3
1 + 1/6
=
102
7
.
= 14.57;
thus the second seat goes to B.
Thus C lost the seat because of the new votes for AC! (Cf. Section 14, and
note that this example does not contradict Theorem 14.3, since the change
here involves also A and not only C.)
The explanation of this seems to be that Phragme´n’s method implicitly
regards A and B (and X) as a party. The new votes AC help C, but they are
also extra votes for A that help the AB “party”, and thus (since A already is
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elected) B. (In both cases above, the first seat goes to A. The extra votes for
A in the second case, i.e., after the change, means that the place numbers
get smaller so each vote is reduced less, and more votes are counted for B in
the second round.) The calculations above show that, perhaps surprisingly,
the indirect gain for B is larger than the direct gain for C.
Nevertheless, it seems strange that more votes on the winning combina-
tion AC will make someone else elected, and Lanke [45] regards this example
is an argument against Phragme´n’s ordered method. (On the other hand,
as discussed in Section 14, it seems impossible for any election method with
ordered ballots to avoid similar examples.)
The final example involves the combination of methods used in Sweden
1909–1921.
Example 13.17 (Ranking Rule + Thiele’s unordered method). An example
from the commission report [6].
Ordered and unordered ballots.
570 ABC
290 BC
20 C
With ordered ballots, the candidates are obviously elected in order A,
B, C by any method considered here, and with unordered ballots, they are
elected in the opposite order C, B, A. Both results are obviously fair by
all standards, but a problem arises with the combination of ordered and
unordered rules used in Sweden 1909–1921, see Appendix D. With those
rules, A would get the first seat (because of the ordered Ranking Rule in
Appendix D), but then the unordered Thiele’s method would be used, and
the remaining candidates would be elected in order C, B. Thus, if 2 were
elected, it would be AC, which hardly seems fair by any interpretation of
the ballots.
This example illustrates a situation that actually occurred in some cases
[6]. In fact, it could easily happen if the party organization recommends a
list ABC, in order of priority, and most of the voters like this and vote as the
party says, but a sizeable minority prefers B and therefore omits A, but still
keeps C after B on the ballot (perhaps not fully aware of the implications
of keeping C).
Note also that if 20 of the BC voters had voted ABC instead, then the
Ranking Rule (Appendix D) would have applied to both A and B, and thus
with 2 seats, AB would have been elected. Hence, the voters favouring B
have thus in reality eliminated their candidate by voting BC instead of ABC!
In the opposite direction, suppose that there are also 300 votes on other
lists with the same party name but other candidates (other factions, or
another party in electoral alliance, see Appendix D); then the Ranking Rule
would not be applicable at all, and if the lists above still would get 2 seats,
they would go to C and B, while the party’s top candidate A would not be
elected in spite of a majority of these voters preferring A. And if the same
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list only appoints 1 candidate, it would be C and not A. This can be seen
as a form of decapitation, see Section 7. A real example of this type from
the general election in 1917 (Skaraborg County south) is discussed in [75].
14. Monotonicity
It is well-known that no perfect election method can exist. For example,
the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [35; 69] says briefly that every deter-
ministic election method for ordered ballots is susceptible to tactical voting,
i.e., there exist situations where a voter can obtain a result that she finds
better by not voting according to her true preferences.26 A simple and well-
known (also in practice) example of this is when a single candidate is elected
by simple plurality (First-Past-The-Post, Appendix E.1.1); recall that this
includes both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods when s = 1, see
Theorem 12.1. If candidates B and C have equally strong support, and can-
didate A a much weaker, then a voter that prefers them in order ABC may
do better by voting BAC, since this might help getting B elected instead of
C, while the voter’s first choice A is without a chance in any case.
Nevertheless, some election methods are more imperfect than others. Par-
ticularly disturbing are cases of non-monotonicity when a candidate can be-
come elected if some votes are changed to less favourable for the candidate;
equivalently, changing some votes in favour of an elected candidate A might
result in A losing the election. Unfortunately, this can happen in Thiele’s
ordered method.27
Example 14.1 (Non-monotonicity for Thiele’s ordered method).
Ordered ballots. 2 seats. Thiele’s method.
5 ABC
2 ACB
9 BCA
8 CAB
With Thiele’s method, first B is elected (9 votes), and then C is elected
to the second seat (with 12.5 votes against 7 for A), so the result is BC.
However, suppose that the two ACB voters move A to the second place
(although they really favour A):
26Assuming only that there are at least three candidates that can win, and that the
election method is not a dictatorship where the result is determined by a single voter. See
also the related Arrow impossibility theorem [10].
27This type of non-monotonicity is also a well-known problem with STV (Appen-
dix E.2.1), where it may occur in particular because of the eliminations. This can happen
even in a single-seat election, when STV reduces to Alternative Vote (regardless of the
version used for transfering surplus, since there is no surplus when s = 1). A simple
example is 6 ABC, 6 BCA, 5 CAB, where C is eliminated and A is elected; however, if A
attracts more support from two voters that change from BCA to ABC, so that the votes
are 8 ABC, 4 BCA, 5 CAB, then B is eliminated and C is elected instead of A, see further
[81]. See also the impossibility theorem by Woodall [79], but note that Phragme´n’s and
Thiele’s methods do not satisfy property (4) there.
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5 ABC
9 BCA
10 CAB
Then C will be elected first (10 votes), followed by A (10 votes, against 9 for
B), so the result is AC. Hence, these voters have got A elected by moving A
to a lower place.
The type of non-monotonicity in Example 14.1 cannot happen with Phrag-
me´n’s ordered method, or by any of Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered
methods. For the unordered methods, this was shown by Phragme´n [58]
for a class of methods that includes his method, see Theorem 18.4; he did
not consider Thiele’s methods, but the same proof applies to them too,
and yields the following result for the unordered methods considered so far.
(The proof applies also to Thiele’s methods with other satisfaction func-
tions, except that a minor complication may occur with ties if some wn = 0
as for the weak method.) However, note that there may be other types of
non-monotonicity; for Thiele’s unordered method, one example is given in
Example 13.13.
Theorem 14.2 (partly Phragme´n [58]). Phragme´n’s unordered method and
Thiele’s three unordered methods satisfy the following: Consider an election
and let A be one of the candidates. Suppose that the votes are changed such
that A gets more votes, either from new voters that vote only for A, or from
voters that add A to their ballots (thus changing the vote from some set
σ to σ ∪ {A}), but no other changes are made (thus all other candidates
receive exactly the same votes as before). Then this cannot hurt A; if A
would have been elected before the change, then A will be elected also after
the change.28 29
Proof. For Thiele’s optimization method, note that the total satisfaction is
unchanged for every set S of candidates that does not include A, but it
is increased for every set of candidates that includes A. Hence, if one set
including A maximized the total satisfaction before the change, then the
same holds after the change.30 Thus A will still be elected.
For Phragme´n’s unordered method and Thiele’s addition method, we note
that as long as A is not elected, then all other candidates have exactly the
same voting power or vote count before and after the change, while this has
increased for A. Hence, if A would have been elected in round ℓ before the
28There is no problems with ties. The proof shows that there are strict improvements,
so if A was tied before the change, then A will certainly win after the change. (This is
called positive responsiveness, see e.g. [49].)
29Note that the elected set is not necessarily the same. Adding A to some ballots can
affect, for example, whether B is elected or not together with A. This applies to all the
methods. For example, if we modify Examples 14.4 and 14.5 below by adding only a vote
on A1, then this results in replacing A2 by C or B.
30The maximum set is not necessarily the same.
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change, then after the change either A has already been elected, or A will
be elected in the same round ℓ.
Finally, for Thiele’s elimination method, note that if there are N candi-
dates, the elimination method can be seen as repeatedly using the optimiza-
tion method to select s = N − 1, N − 2, . . . candidates, until the desired
number remains, after each round eliminating the non-selected candidate
from all further consideration. The result just proved for the optimization
method shows that if A survives all rounds before the change, then A sur-
vives all rounds also after the change. 
For Phragme´n’s ordered method we have the following corresponding re-
sult. Note that, as shown by Example 14.1, this theorem fails for Thiele’s
ordered method.
Theorem 14.3. Phragme´n’s ordered method satisfies the following: Con-
sider an election and let A be one of the candidates. Suppose that some votes
are changed in favour of A, either by adding a new ballot containing only A,
by adding A to an existing ballot at an arbitrary place (if A did not already
exist on the ballot), or by moving A to a higher position (if A already existed
on the ballot); in all cases without changing the other candidates and their
order. Then the change cannot hurt A; if A would have been elected before
the change, then the same is true after the change.
Proof. We use the formulation in Section 9.1 and Remark 9.1 with increasing
time; thus, at time t, each ballot has voting power t. Let fi(t) and fˆi(t) be
the total voting power for candidate i at time t for the original set of ballots
and for the changed ballots, respectively. Note that 0 6 fi(t) 6 1 and that
i has been elected (with the original ballots) at time t or earlier if and only
if fi(t) = 1, and similarly for fˆi(t). We claim the following:
If fˆA(t) < 1, then fA(t) 6 fˆA(t) and fi(t) > fˆi(t) for i 6= A. (14.1)
To prove this, we let {tℓ}
L
ℓ=1 be the set of times when some candidate is
elected for either the original or the changed ballots, ordered in increasing
order. We let tˆA be the time that A is elected for the changed ballots, so
the assumption fˆA(t) < 1, meaning that A is not yet elected, is equivalent
to t < tˆA. We also let t0 = 0. We prove the claim (14.1) by induction,
assuming that it is true for 0 6 t 6 tℓ, for some ℓ > 0 with tℓ < tˆA, and
show that (14.1) holds also for t ∈ Iℓ := [tℓ, tℓ+1].
To show this induction step, note that by the inductive assumption, for
every candidate i 6= A that has not yet been elected at tℓ for the original
ballots, we have 1 > fi(tℓ) > fˆi(tℓ), and thus i is also not elected for the
changed ballots. Furthermore, tℓ < tˆA, so A has not been elected at tℓ
for the changed ballots. Consequently, every candidate that at tℓ has been
elected for the changed ballots has also been elected for the original ballots.
Consider now a candidate i 6= A. If i has been elected for the original
ballots at tℓ, then fi(tℓ) = 1 and thus fi(t) = 1 > fˆi(t) for all t > tℓ. On the
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other hand, suppose that i has not been elected yet for the original ballots
at tℓ, so fi(tℓ) < 1. Consider a ballot that, after the change, is valid for i
immediately after tℓ; this means that i is on the ballot and any candidate j
before i on the ballot has been elected, i.e., fˆj(tℓ) = 1. In particular, j 6= A.
Hence, before the change, this ballot had the same names before i, and we
have seen that they have been elected for the original ballots too at tℓ; thus
the ballot is valid for i also in the original set of ballots. If we increase time
(i.e., voting power) from tℓ to tℓ+1, then, because there are no elections inside
this interval, the voting power of i increases linearly, with a derivative equal
to the number of ballots valid for i. Hence we have shown that f ′i(t) > fˆ
′
i(t)
for t ∈ (tℓ, tℓ+1), and we see that fi(t) > fˆi(t) for t ∈ [tℓ, tℓ+1] because, by
the induction hypothesis, this holds for t = tℓ.
We have verified the last part of the claim (14.1). Now, the total voting
power assigned or available from a ballot b at time t equals min(t, tb), where
tb is the time the last candidate on the ballot is elected. We have seen that
if the last candidate on the ballot is elected at some time tˆb for the set of
changed ballots, and tˆb 6 tℓ < tˆA, then at time tˆb all candidates on the ballot
have been elected also for the original set of ballots, so tb 6 tˆb. Consequently,
for each ballot, and each time t < tℓ+1, the total voting power that is used
from a ballot is at least as large after the change as before. Summing over
all ballots (and noting that some ballots may have been added, but none
removed), we find that the total voting power used for all candidates is at
least as large after the change as before, i.e.,
∑
i fˆi(t) >
∑
fi(t), t < tℓ+1.
For t ∈ [tℓ, tℓ+1), we have also shown that fˆi(t) 6 fi(t) for every i 6= A,
and it follows that fˆA(t) > fA(t). By continuity, this holds for t = tℓ+1 too,
which completes the inductive step verifying (14.1).
Finally, (14.1) says that the conclusion of (14.1) holds when fˆA(t) < 1,
i.e., when t < tˆA. By continuity, the conclusion holds also for t = tˆA. Now
suppose that A is not elected with the changed ballots; then a set Ê of s
other candidates have been elected at time tˆA. This together with the claim
(14.1) implies that for each i ∈ Ê , fi(tˆA) > fˆi(tˆA) = 1, and thus i has at
time tˆA been elected also for the original ballots. On the other hand, for
any t < tˆA, by (14.1), fA(t) 6 fˆA(t) < 1, so A has not been elected earlier.
Consequently, A is not in the set E of the s first elected with the original
ballots, which completes the proof. (In the case of A tying the last place
both for the original and changed ballots, we have to assume that the tie is
resolved in the same way.) 
However, also Phragme´n’s methods are liable to non-monotonicity of
other types. One such case for Phragme´n’s ordered method is shown by
Example 13.16. We give two examples for Phragme´n’s unordered method,
taken from Mora and Oliver [53, Section 7.5], which show that Theorem 14.2
does not extend to sets of more than one candidate, even if they always ap-
pear together (and thus are tied).
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Example 14.4 (Non-monotonicity for Phragme´n’s unordered method). An
example from Mora and Oliver [53, (43)].
Unordered ballots. 3 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
10 A1A2
3 B
12 C
21 A1A2B
6 BC
A calculation shows that Phragme´n’s method elects A1, C, A2. (For the
second seat, C has reduced vote 18 against 30/(1+ 2131) = 465/26
.
= 17.88 for
B and 31/2 = 15.5 for A2. Then A2 is elected with reduced vote 31/2 = 15.5
against 2790/187
.
= 14.92 for C.)
Now add another vote for A1A2:
11 A1A2
3 B
12 C
21 A1A2B
6 BC
The first seat still goes to A1, but its load on each ballot A1A2B is changed
from 1/31 to 1/32, and as a consequence, for the second seat, B’s reduced
vote is increased to 30/(1+ 2132) = 960/53
.
= 18.11, and thus B gets the second
seat. This, in turn, increases the load on each ballot A1A2B to 53/960, and
thus for the third seat, the reduced vote of A2 is only 10240/801
.
= 12.78
against 960/71
.
= 13.52 for C, so C gets the third seat. Thus the elected are
A1, B, C.
Consequently, the extra vote on A1A2 means that one of them loses a
seat.
Example 14.5 (Non-monotonicity for Phragme´n’s unordered method). An
example from Mora and Oliver [53, (42)].
Unordered ballots. 3 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
4 A1A2
7 B
1 A1A2B
16 A1A2C
4 BC
A calculation shows that Phragme´n’s method elects A1, B, A2.
Now suppose that one of the voters for B adds A1 and A2 to the ballots.
Thus the ballots are:
4 A1A2
6 B
2 A1A2B
16 A1A2C
4 BC
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A1 still gets the first seat, but now the second seat goes to C, and then the
third seat goes to B; the elected are thus A1, C, B.
Consequently, also in this example, the extra vote on A1A2 means that
one of them loses a seat.
15. Consistency
Consistency [83] of an election method is the property that if there are
two disjoint sets V1 and V2 of voters voting such that the votes from only V1
would elect a set E of candidates, and the votes from only V2 would elect the
same set E , then the combined set of votes from V1 ∪ V2 elects the same set
E . To be precise (to allow for ties), we require that if E is a possible outcome
for the votes from only V1, and also a possible outcome for the votes from
only V2, then E is a possible outcome for the combined set of votes from
V1 ∪ V2.
31
Remark 15.1. Consistency implies, in particular, that multiplying the
number of ballots of each type by some integer will not affect the outcome
of the election; in other words, the election method is homogeneous, see
Remark 2.1. We assume that all voters are equal, so that only the number
of ballots of each type matters.32 Then the input to the election method, for
a given set C of candidates, can be seen as a vector of non-negative integers,
indexed by subsets of C in the unordered case and by ordered subsets of C
in the ordered case. Homogeneity means that we can extend the method
(uniquely) to vectors of non-negative rational numbers, such that the set CE
of such vectors that (may) elect a set E is a cone (or empty), for any set E of
s candidates. Furthermore, as is easily seen, consistency is equivalent to the
cone CE being convex, for every possible outcome E . (Hence the property is
also called convexity [80].)
Consistency is a very natural property. Unfortunately, it is not com-
patible with some other natural properties, and it is not satisfied by most
election methods. In fact, Young [83] showed that (assuming some technical
conditions) the only consistent election methods for ordered ballots are the
scoring rules (Borda methods) (Appendix E.2.3). Similarly, Lackner and
Skowron [44] show that (again assuming some technical conditions) every
consistent method for unordered ballots equals Thiele’s optimization me-
thod for some satisfaction function. We record the easy part of this as a
theorem.
Theorem 15.2. Thiele’s optimization method is consistent (for any satis-
faction function).
31In the case of ties, [83] also requires that, conversely, if there exists a set E that is a
possible outcome for both V1 and V2, then any other possible outcome E
′ of V1 ∪ V2 (so
E
′ ties with E) is a possible outcome for both V1 and V2. We will not consider this, more
technical, condition.
32A property called anonymity.
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Proof. Obvious from the definition of the method in Section 4.1. 
By the theorems just mentioned, Phragme´n’s unordered and ordered
methods and Thiele’s unordered (addition) and ordered methods are not
consistent. We give some explicit counterexamples.
Remark 15.3. In the case s = 1, Theorem 12.1 says that Phragme´n’s
method and Thiele’s optimization and addition methods for unordered bal-
lots reduce to Approval Voting, while Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods
for ordered ballots reduce to Single-Member-Plurality; Approval Voting and
Single-Member-Plurality are both obviously consistent, so all of Phragme´n’s
and Thiele’s methods (in the latter case for any satisfaction function), except
possibly Thiele’s elimination method, are consistent for s = 1.
Example 15.4 (Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered methods are not con-
sistent).
Unordered ballots. 2 seats. Phragme´n’s or Thiele’s method.
First set of voters:
12 AB
1 B
9 C
For both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s (addition) methods, first B is elected and
then C. Elected: BC.
Second set of voters:
12 AC
9 B
1 C
This is the same with B and C interchanged, so the elected are again BC.
(They are elected in different order, but that is irrelevant for the outcome
of the election.)
Combined election:
12 AB
12 AC
10 B
10 C
This is the same as Example 13.4. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s method both
elect first A, and then B or C (a tie, by symmetry). Elected: AB or AC.
Thus neither of the methods is consistent.
Example 15.5 (Thiele’s ordered method is not consistent).
Ordered ballots. 2 seats. Thiele’s method.
First set of voters:
12 A
10 BC
9 C
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Thiele’s (ordered) method elects A and B.
Second set of voters:
11 B
10 AC
9 C
Thiele’s method elects B and A.
Combined election:
12 A
10 AC
11 B
10 BC
18 C
Thiele’s method elect A first (22 votes), but then C gets the second seat (23
votes, against 21 for B). Elected: AC.
Thus Thiele’s ordered method is not consistent.
In these examples, the same candidates were elected by the two sets of
voters V1 and V2, but in different order. It is also possible to find counterex-
amples where the candidates are elected in the same order.
Example 15.6 (Phragme´n’s ordered method is not consistent). We modify
Example 13.16.
Ordered ballots. 2 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
First set of voters:
15 AB
12 BX
14 CY
Phragme´n’s method gives, just as in Example 13.16, the first seat to A and
the second to C. Elected (trivially): AC.
Second set of voters:
3 AC
Elected: AC.
Combined election:
15 AB
12 BX
14 CY
3 AC
As seen in Example 13.16, now the elected are A and B.
Hence, Phragme´n’s ordered method is not consistent.
15.1. Ballots with all candidates. Consider unordered ballots and the
case when the voters in a subset V1 of all voters V vote for all candidates.
Will their votes affect the outcome at all, or will the result of the election
be the same as if only V2 := V \ V1 had voted? We call a ballot containing
all candidates a full ballot, and we say that an election method ignores full
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ballots if it always gives the same result (including ties) if we add or remove
full ballots.33
This is a special case of consistency; if only V1 had voted, with full ballots,
then the result would have been a tie between any set of s candidates.
Hence any consistent method will ignore full ballots. In particular, Thiele’s
optimization method ignores full ballots by Theorem 15.2. Moreover, the
following holds.
Theorem 15.7. Thiele’s unordered methods all ignore full ballots (for any
satisfaction function).
Proof. Obvious from the definitions in Section 4, since a ballot with all
candidates gives the same contribution to each candidate at every step of
the calculations. 
On the other hand, Phragme´n’s method does not ignore full ballots. This
follows from the study of party versions by Mora and Oliver [53, Section
7] (discussed in Section 18.4 below); we give two explicit examples below.
(See [53] for further strange behaviour of Phragme´n’s method in situations
where some voters vote for all candidates.)
Example 15.8 (Phragme´n’s method does not ignore full ballots). This
example is based on general results in Mora and Oliver [53, Section 7.7].
Unordered ballots. 4 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
5 A1A2A3A4
3 B1B2B3B4
This is a case with party lists, so by Theorem 11.1, the candidates are elected
as by D’Hondt’s method, which gives A1B1A2A3. (For example, the last seat
goes to A3 because 5/3 > 3/2.
Now add a large number of votes for all candidates:
5 A1A2A3A4
3 B1B2B3B4
10 A1A2A3A4B1B2B3B4
A calculation shows that the elected will be A1B1A2B2. (For example, for
the fourth seat, the three types of ballots have already loads 34195 ,
25
195 ,
34
195
and thus the three groups of ballots have place numbers 3439 ,
15
39 ,
68
39 , and the
reduced votes of the A’s and B’s (which of course tie among themselves) are
195
47
.
= 4.1489 and 507122
.
= 4.1557, so the last seat goes to B.)
Example 15.9 (Phragme´n’s method does not ignore full ballots). Another
example, showing that already the second seat can differ.
Unordered ballots. 2 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
33 Whether this is a natural, and perhaps important, property or not is a philosphical
question rather than a mathematical, and is left to the reader; however, it seems natural to
argue that full ballots with all candidates do not express any real preference, and therefore
ought to be ignored just as blank ballots with no names.
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10 A
3 AB
2 C
The first seat goes to A (13 votes). The second seat goes to B (reduced vote
3/(1 + 313 ) = 39/16 = 2.4375 against 2 for C). Elected: AB.
Now add a large number of votes for all candidates:
10 A
3 AB
2 C
10 ABC
A still gets the first seat. A calculation shows that for the second seat, B
has reduced vote 13/(1 + 1323) = 299/36
.
= 8.31 while C has reduced vote
12/(1 + 1023) = 92/11
.
= 8.36; thus C gets the second seat. Elected: AC.
Since the result of Phragme´n’s method thus can be affected by adding
full ballots, it is (mathematically) interesting to ask for the result if we add
a very large number N of full ballots.
Theorem 15.10. Consider an election with Phragme´n’s unordered method.
If we add N full ballots, then for all sufficiently large N , the outcome of the
new election will be the same as for the original ballots with the following
election method, at least providing that there are no ties for the latter:
A limit of Phragme´n’s unordered method. Seats are given to candi-
dates sequentially, until the desired number have been elected. In round k
(i.e., for electing to the k-th seat), a ballot β is counted as 1− ℓβ/k votes for
each candidate on the ballot (except the ones already elected), where ℓβ is
the last round where some candidate from the ballot was elected, with ℓβ = 0
if no candidate on the ballot has been elected yet. The candidate with the
largest number of votes is elected.
Remark 15.11. Equivalently, we may count ballot β as k − ℓβ votes. We
can thus also describe the method as follows:
Elect the candidate with the largest number of votes. Discard all ballots
with the elected candidate; then add a new copy of each original ballot. Re-
peat s times.
Proof. We consider an election with s seats and V ’real’ votes, to which we
addN full ballots. We use the formulation in Section 3.1; in particular, t(n) is
the woting power required to elect n candidates. Since an additional voting
power 1/N gives each candidate voting power 1 just from the full ballots,
which is enough to elect any of them, t(n+1) 6 t(n)+1/N . In particular, for
every n 6 s, t(n) 6 n/N 6 s/N . This implies that at time t(n), the elected
candidate gets voting power at most V s/N from the real votes, and thus at
least 1− V s/N from the full votes. Hence, 1/N − V s/N2 6 t(n) − t(n−1) 6
1/N , and thus
t(n) − t(n−1) = N−1 +O
(
N−2
)
. (15.1)
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When the k-th candidate is elected, a ballot where the last round that
someone was elected was ℓ thus has a free voting power t(k) − t(ℓ) = (k −
ℓ)N−1 +O
(
N−2
)
. The total voting power available for candidate i is thus
Ti =
∑
β∋i
(k − ℓβ)N
−1 +O
(
N−2
)
+N(t(k) − t(k−1)), (15.2)
summing over all real ballots containing i. Since the total voting power Ti
is 1 for the elected candidate, and at most 1 for every other, we see that if
ik is the elected in round k, then for every i, Ti 6 Tik , and thus by (15.2)∑
β∋i
(k − ℓβ)N
−1
6
∑
β∋ik
(k − ℓβ)N
−1 +O
(
N−2
)
(15.3)
for every i, and thus∑
β∋i
(k − ℓβ) 6
∑
β∋ik
(k − ℓβ) +O
(
N−1
)
. (15.4)
It follows by induction on k, that for all large N , ik is the winner of the
k-th seat by the method defined above, provided there are no ties in that
method. 
This limit method seems more interesting theoretically than for practical
use. In particular, the following example shows that in the party list case,
the limit method does not reduce to D’Hondt’s method.
Example 15.12 (The limit method in a party list case). Consider the
simplest case with two parties.
Unordered ballots. The limit of Phragme´n’s method defined above.
a A1A2A3. . .
b B1B2B3. . .
Suppose that a > b, and let k := ⌊a/b⌋. Furthermore, to avoid ties,
suppose that a/b is not an integer, so kb < a < (k + 1)b. It is easy to see
that the limit method above will elect in the periodic order A1,. . . ,Ak,B1,
Ak+1,. . . ,A2k,B2,. . . with k A’s followed by a single B, repeatedly.
In particular, if b < a < 2b, and the number of seats is even, then the two
parties get an equal number of seats, in spite of the fact that one party has
more votes than the other. For example, with a = 5, b = 3 and s = 4 as in
Example 15.8, the elected are A1B1A2B2, while D’Hondt’s method would
give A1B1A2A3.
16. Proportionality
There is no precise definition of proportionality for an election method,
and whether a method is proportional or not is partly a matter of degree
(and perhaps taste). The general idea of proportionality is that a sufficiently
large group of voters gets a “fair” share of the elected. When there are no
formal parties, as in the election methods considered here, we should here
consider arbitrary groups of voters, possibly with some restriction on how
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they vote. This can be made precise in many different ways. We study
in this section some such properties relevant for Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s
methods.
Phragme´n’s methods satisfy the following proportionality criteria.
Theorem 16.1. Phragme´n’s methods satisfy the following properties, where
V is the number of votes, s the number of seats and ℓ is an arbitrary integer
with 1 6 ℓ 6 s.
(i) For Phragme´n’s unordered method: If a set of more than ℓ
s+1V voters
vote for the same list containing at least ℓ candidates, then at least ℓ
candidates from this list are elected.
(ii) For Phragme´n’s ordered method: If a set of more than ℓ
s+1V voters vote
with the same ℓ candidates first on their ballots, but not necessarily in
the same order, then these ℓ candidates are elected. In particular,
if at least ℓ
s+1V voters vote for the same list (containing at least ℓ
candidates), then the ℓ first candidates on this list will be elected.
Proof. Let A be such a set of |A| > ℓ
s+1V voters, and let C in case (i) be the
set of candidates on the list voted for by A (thus |C| > ℓ), and in case (ii)
the set of the ℓ candidates that are first on the ballots from A (thus |C| = ℓ).
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that only k < ℓ of the candidates in C
are elected.
We use the formulation with voting power in Sections 3.1 and 9.1, and let
t = t(s) be the final voting power of each ballot.
In the unordered case (i), the k elected candidates from C are together
assigned voting power k, of which some part may come from voters not in
A. The total free (unassigned) voting power of the ballots in A is at most
1, since otherwise another candidate from C would have been elected. (This
free voting power may equal 1 if there was a tie for the last seat.) Hence,
the total voting power of the ballots in A is at most k + 1 6 ℓ,
In the ordered case (ii), since at least one candidate in C is not elected,
each ballot in C has when the election finishes a current top candidate that
belongs to C. Hence, if we regard the free voting power of a ballot as assigned
to its current top candidate, then the voting power of each ballot in A is
fully assigned to one or several candidates in C (elected or not). Since each
candidate is assigned a total voting power at most 1, and |C| = ℓ, the total
voting power of the ballots in A is at most ℓ in this case too.
Since there are |A| ballots in A and each has voting power t, this shows
that in both cases
ℓ > |A|t >
ℓ
s+ 1
V t (16.1)
and thus
V t < s+ 1. (16.2)
On the other hand, s− k candidates not in C have been elected, and thus
a total voting power s− k > s+ 1− ℓ has been assigned to them. Since the
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ballots in A do not contribute to this, all this voting power comes from the
V − |A| other ballots, and thus
s+ 1− ℓ 6 (V − |A|)t <
(
V −
ℓ
s+ 1
V
)
t =
s+ 1− ℓ
s+ 1
V t. (16.3)
However, this contradicts (16.2). 
Corollary 16.2. Phragme´n’s unordered and ordered methods satisfy: If
more than half of the voters vote for the same list containing at least s/2
candidates, then at least s/2 of these are elected.
Proof. By Theorem 16.1 with ℓ = ⌈s/2⌉ 6 (s+ 1)/2. 
In particular, if s is odd, a majority of the voters will, if they vote coher-
ently, get a majority of the seats.
Note that Theorem 16.1 does not hold for Thiele’s unordered and ordered
methods, as is seen by Example 13.13 (the second election, where KLM has
13 > V/(s+ 1) = 50/4 votes but does not get any seat) and Example 13.14
(the second election, where CD has 39 > V/(s + 1) = 100/3 votes but does
not get any seat). Also Corollary 16.2 does not hold for Thiele’s unordered
and ordered methods, as is seen by the Example 13.15 and the following
example:
Example 16.3. Consider the following election:
Unordered ballots. 5 seats. Thiele’s method.
9 A1A2A3
2 X1X2
2 X1X3
2 X2
2 X3
The first two seats go to A1 and A2 (say). Then X1, X2 and X3 tie for the
third seat (4 votes each), and if X1 is elected, then A3, X2 and X3 tie for
the remaining 2 seats (3 votes each). Hence, depending on tie-breaks, X1,
X2 and X3 may be elected to the last 3 seats, and thus the A party, which
has a majority of the votes (9 of 17) may end up with only 2 seats. (In
this and similar examples, it is easy to modify the example to avoid ties by
multiplying all votes by some large number and then adding a few votes on
suitable ballots, giving an arbitrarily small change of the proportions.)
Remark 16.4. The proportion of (more than) ℓ
s+1 of the voters is exactly
the proportion required to get ℓ seats of s in an election with two parties by
D’Hondt’s method, as is easily seen. Hence, by Theorem 11.1, this propor-
tion in Theorem 16.1 is the best possible.
Remark 16.5. The proportion ℓ
s+1 is less that
ℓ
s
, which often is regarded
as a proportion that ought to guarantee at least ℓ seats. The proportion ℓ
s
might be more intuitive, but as pointed out already by Droop [28], in an
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election of s representatives using simple plurality34, if some candidate A
has more than 1
s+1 of the votes, then there cannot be s other candidates
that have at least as many votes, and thus A is elected. The proportion 1
s+1
of the votes (called the Droop quota, see Appendix E.3) is thus a reasonable
requirement for having the “right” to be elected. And a party with more
than ℓ
s+1V votes could in principle split them on ℓ candidates that would be
elected. Note also that in the case ℓ = s = 1, 1
s+1 =
1
2 , so the criterion, and
Theorem 16.1, reduces to saying that a candidate supported by a majority
is elected.
Remark 16.6. STV (Appendix E.2.1) satisfies a property similar to Theo-
rem 16.1, called the Droop Proportionality Criterion by Woodall [80]. The
version in [80] assumes that the Droop quota QD := V/(s+1) is used without
rounding,35 and then says:
If m > ℓ and a set of more than ℓV/(s+1) voters put the same m names
first on their ballots, but not necessarily in the same order, then at least ℓ
of these will be elected.
Note that Theorem 16.1(ii) is this property in the special case m = ℓ. (So
the Droop Proportionality Criterion is stronger.) The fact that the property
holds for STV also for arbitrary m > ℓ depends on the eliminations of weak
candidates, which will concentrate the votes of this set of voters to smaller
sets of candidates until at least ℓ of them are elected. For Phragme´n’s
ordered method there is no similar mechanism, and splitting the votes on
more than ℓ candidates can lead to less than ℓ of them being elected; one
example is given in Example 16.7 below. This is in contrast to the unordered
method, see Theorem 16.1(i), where splitting the vote on several candidates
does not decrease the support of any of them (except when one of them is
elected).
Example 16.7 (Phragme´n’s ordered method).
Ordered ballots. 3 seats. Phragme´n’s method.
9 ABC
9 ACB
9 BAC
9 BCA
9 CAB
9 CBA
46 XYZ
34E.g. by SNTV (Appendix E.1.4); Droop really discussed Cumulative Voting (Ap-
pendix E.1.5), but SNTV can be seen as a special case, and the difference between the
methods does not matter here.
35 For STV with a quota Q > QD (recall that Q > QD almost always holds in practice),
the property still holds in the case ℓ = 1, but not in general; however, it holds for sets of
at least ℓQ voters. See e.g. [40, Section 12.5.1].
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With Phragme´n’s ordered method, the first two seats go to X and Y (reduced
votes 46 and 23), while the third to any of A, B or C (reduced vote 18).
Elected: AXY.
The ABC party has together 54 of the 100 votes, and if they all voted,
say, ABC, then they would be guaranteed two seats by Theorem 16.1 (with
ℓ = 2 and s = 3) or by Corollary 16.2. (In fact, it suffices that they all vote
with ballots beginning with AB or BA.) However, by splitting their votes,
they lose one seat, and thus the majority.
For election methods with unordered ballots, Aziz et al. [11] defined two
properties JR (justified representation) and (stronger) EJR (extended justi-
fied representation); Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [68] then defined a related
property PJR (proportional justified representation) such that EJR =⇒
PJR =⇒ JR. These are defined as follows, where V is the total number
of votes, and A is a set of voters.
PJR: Let 1 6 ℓ 6 s and suppose that |A| > ℓ
s
V and that
∣∣∣⋂σ∈A σ∣∣∣ > ℓ,
i.e., the voters in A all vote for a common set C of at least ℓ candidates, but
may also vote for other candidates. Then ℓ candidates that some voter in A
has voted for are elected, i.e.
∣∣∣E ∩⋃σ∈A σ∣∣∣ > ℓ.
EJR: Let 1 6 ℓ 6 s and suppose that |A| > ℓ
s
V and that
∣∣∣⋂σ∈A σ∣∣∣ > ℓ,
i.e., the voters in A all vote for a common set C of at least ℓ candidates, but
may also vote for other candidates. Then some voter in A has voted for ℓ
candidates that are elected, i.e.
∣∣E ∩ σ∣∣ > ℓ for some σ ∈ A.
JR: The condition above for PJR (or EJR) holds for the special case ℓ = 1.
(Note that the difference between PJR and EJR disappears for ℓ = 1.)
We state some results from the papers above (and [19]) without proofs.
Theorem 16.8 ([11]). Thiele’s optimization method satisfies EJR.
However, with any other satisfaction function instead of the proportional
(4.4), EJR fails.
Thiele’s optimization method with a general satisfaction function (4.1)
with w1 = 1 satisfies JR if and only if wj 6 1/j for every j > 1.
Theorem 16.9 ([68]). Thiele’s addition method satisfies JR for s 6 5, but
not for s > 6.
Theorem 16.10 ([11]). Thiele’s addition method with a general satisfaction
function f(n) satisfies JR if and only if f(n) is the weak satisfaction function
(4.3).
Theorem 16.11 ([19]). Phragme´n’s unordered method satisfies PJR, but
not EJR.
17. Phragme´n’s ordered method and STV
Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods use ordered ballots just as the
more well-known election method STV (Appendix E.2.1). Both methods are
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clearly different from STV, which is seen already in the case s = 1 of electing
a single person, when they reduce to simple plurality (Theorem 12.1), while
STV reduces to Alternative Vote. Nevertheless, there are strong connections
between Phragme´n’s method and STV; both methods can be regarded as
giving each ballot a certain voting power that can be used to elect the
candidates on the ballot (one at a time, in order), and when the voting
power of a candidate is more than enough to elect the candidate, the surplus
is transfered to the next candidate. Thiele’s method seems to be founded
on different principles and will not be considered further in this section.
To see the connection in more detail, consider an election of s seats by
Phragme´n’s ordered method, using the formulation in Section 9.1 (and the
notation in Section 3.1). We thus give each ballot voting power t(s) (found
at the end of the calculations). We obtain an equivalent formulation of the
method where each ballot has voting power 1 if we define Q := 1/t(s) and
multiply every voting power by Q. This means that every ballot has voting
power 1, and that a candidate needs voting power Q to be elected, just as
in STV if the quota is Q. Note that by (3.6), Q =W (s) is the reduced vote
for the last elected candidate if we use the formulation in Sections 9.2–9.3.
Let us use the algorithm in Section 9.2, and let ij be the candidate elected
in round j, j = 1, . . . , s. Consider a ballot β in some round k > 1, and let
ℓ < k be the latest round before k when the ballot participated in the election
of a candidate (meaning that the elected candidate iℓ was the current top
name on the ballot that round); if the ballot has not yet participated in
the election of any candidate let ℓ = 0. Then the place number of the
ballot in round k, which is the voting power assigned to the already elected
candidates, is t(ℓ), with t(0) = 0 (see Remarks 3.5–3.6). In the new scale, the
ballot has used Qt(ℓ) of its value to the already elected, and its remaining
value is 1−Qt(ℓ). (Note that Qt(ℓ) = t(ℓ)/t(s) 6 1.)
In round k, ik is elected. Suppose that then there are nk ballots currently
valid for ik (i.e., with ik as the current top name), and that of these nkℓ have
participated in the election of iℓ, but not in the election in any later round,
ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1, while nk0 of them have not participated in the election of
any candidate before ik. Thus, the number of ballots valid for ik is
nk =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
nkℓ, (17.1)
and their total place number is
Pk :=
k−1∑
ℓ=1
nkℓt
(ℓ) =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
nkℓt
(ℓ). (17.2)
By the formulation of Phragme´n’s method in Section 9.1, if each ballot has
voting power t(k), then the elected candidate ik will have voting power 1
from the nk ballots valid for ik, i.e., subtracting the voting power assigned
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to previously elected candidates,
1 = nkt
(k) − Pk. (17.3)
On the other hand, if we consider the values of the ballots in the new
scale defined above, then the total remaining value of the nk ballots valid
for ik is, using (17.1) and (17.2),
k−1∑
ℓ=0
nkℓ(1−Qt
(ℓ)) =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
nkℓ −Q
k−1∑
ℓ=0
nkℓt
(ℓ) = nk −QPk. (17.4)
Let us, as in STV, subtract Q (which is used to elect ik); then there remains
a surplus, using (17.3),
nk −QPk −Q = nk −Q(Pk + 1) = nk −Qnkt
(k) = nk(1−Qt
(k)). (17.5)
(Since Qt(k) = t(k)/t(s) 6 1, this surplus is > 0, which shows that the total
value (17.4) is at least Q.) After the election of ik, these ballots have, as we
have seen, the value 1−Qt(k) each, which equals the surplus (17.5) divided
equally between the nk ballots that participated in the election of ik. This
is exactly as in the inclusive Gregory method for STV (Appendix E.2.1(iv)).
We summarize in a theorem.
Theorem 17.1. Consider an election with ordered ballots. and let Q :=
W (s), the reduced vote for the last elected using Phragme´n’s method. Then
Phragme´n’s method yields the same result as STV with the inclusive Gregory
method and this quota Q, provided that the surpluses are transfered in the
order the candidates are elected by Phragme´n’s method.
We see also that every elected will reach the quota Q, so that there will
be no eliminations; in fact, the final surplus ns(1−Qt
(s)) = 0, and thus Q is
the largest quota that allows s candidates to be elected without eliminations
(still provided the surpluses are transfered in the prescribed order).
Consequently, Phragme´n’s ordered method can be seen as a variant of
STV without eliminations, and with a quota Q that is calculated dynami-
cally instead of as a fixed proportion of the number of votes. (The latter
difference is the same as the difference between divisor and quota methods
for list election methods, see Footnote 76 in Appendix E.3. Thus Phragme´n’s
method can be seen as a variant of STV related to divisor methods, which is
not surprising since Phragme´n’s method was conceived as a generalization
of D’Hondt’s method.)
However, this correspondence with STV is not perfect, since STV is sensi-
tive to the order the surpluses are transfered, and standard versions of STV
may do this in a different order than Phragme´n’s method yields.
Example 17.2 (Phragme´n’s method and STV).
Ordered ballots. 4 seats.
22 ABCD
11 ABE
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Using Phragme´n’s method, candidates are elected in the following order:
(1) A is elected with reduced vote WA = 33.
(2) B is elected with reduced vote WB =
33
2 .
(3) The three groups of ballots now have the place numbers 43 ,
2
3 , 0 (with
sum 2), which give C and E the reduced votes
WC =
22 + 11
1 + 4/3
=
99
7
and WE =
11
1 + 2/3
=
33
5
.
Thus C is elected.
(4) The three groups of ballots now have the place numbers
22
WC
=
22
99/7
=
14
9
,
11
WB
=
11
33/2
=
2
3
=
6
9
,
11
WC
=
11
99/7
=
7
9
(with the sum 3), which gives D and E the reduced votes
WD =
22
1 + 14/9
=
22 · 9
23
and WE =
22
1 + 13/9
=
22 · 9
22
= 9.
Thus E is elected.
Elected: ABCE.
Consider now instead STV with the inclusive Gregory method and quota
Q =WE = 9 as in Theorem 17.1. (Q happens to be the Droop quota rounded
upwards in this example. We could also obtain the Droop quota without
rounding by adding a single vote on F. In general, there is no direct relation
between Q in Theorem 17.1 and the Droop quota.) By Theorem 17.1, we
will obtain the same elected ABCE if the surpluses are transfered in this
order. This is also easy to see directly: A has surplus 24, which is transfered
to B. B has surplus 15 which is transfered with 10 to C and 5 to E. C has
surplus 12 of which is 8 is transfered to D and 4 to E. E now has exactly
Q = 9 votes and gets the fourth seat, while D only has 8 votes.36
However, in standard versions of STV, such as the inclusive Gregory me-
thod used for the Australian Senate, the surpluses are transfered in a differ-
ent order: A and C reach the quota on their first-preference votes and are
elected. Their surpluses 24 and 2 are transfered to B and E, respectively.
This makes B reach the quota, so B is elected to the third seat, with a
surplus 15 that is transfered with 10 to D and 5 to E. Consequently, D gets
the final seat with 10 votes against 7 for E. Elected: ABCD.
Remark 17.3. Theorem 17.1 yields also the following (rather complicated)
description of Phragme´n’s method purely in terms of STV: With s seats, do
s distributions of seats by STV with the inclusive Gregory method, the first
time for 1 seat, the second for 2 seats, and so on. In the k-th distribution,
36 In this example, and assuming that the surpluses are transfered in this order, the
result will be the same for every quota Q 6 99/7 = 14 1
7
, although if Q > 9 then E will
not reach the quota and if Q 6 198/23
.
= 8.61 then both D and E will reach the quota,
although E wins.
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the surpluses of the k − 1 already elected shall be transfered in the order
that these have been elected, and the quota Qk shall be chosen such that
these k − 1 will reach the quota, and that (after all transfers), there will be
another candidate that reaches exactly Qk, so this candidate is elected to
seat k.
18. Some variants of Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods
18.1. Unordered ballots with two groups. As said in Section 7, a prob-
lem with unordered ballots is the risk of decapitation, which led to the in-
troduction of the ordered versions of Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods.
Another modification to avoid decapitation is to let the names on each
ballot be separated into two groups (instead of a complete ranking), with
preference to the first group but no ordering inside each groups. (This
modification too applies to both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods, as well
as to some other similar methods with unordered ballots.)
Unordered ballots with two groups. Each ballot has two groups of
names. The orders inside the two groups do not matter. A ballot is regarded
as a vote for only the names in the first group as long as at least one of these
names remains unelected; when all names in the first group are elected, the
ballot is regarded as a vote for all remaining names. (The second group
might be empty; equivalently, ballots with a single group are also accepted.)
The names in the second group can thus be seen as reserves, that are not
used until required.
This modification was described for Phragme´n’s method (and attributed
to Phragme´n) by Cassel [5] in 1903, and was proposed for Thiele’s method
in parliament in 1906 (by Petersson in P˚aboda) [6, p. 20].
In practice, the groups might be shown on the ballot by, for example
drawing a line between the two groups of names [5], or by underlining the
names in the first group [6].
18.2. Weak ordering. To have two groups on a ballot is an intermediary
between unordered and ordered voting. More generally, a ballot could be
allowed to have a set of candidates with an arbitrary weak ordering (= total
preorder), i.e., a list of groups of candidates, with the different groups in
order of preference but ignoring the order inside each group.37
Weakly ordered ballots. Each ballot contains a weakly ordered set of
names. In practice, this could be a list of names separated into groups by
one or several lines (or a single group without a line); the orders inside the
groups are ignored. A ballot is regarded as a vote for only the names in the
first group where there is someone that is not yet elected.
37This version was, as far as I know, not proposed by Phragme´n, Thiele or any of their
contemporaries.
PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS 57
Note that this version includes (as extreme cases) both the unordered
version (every ballot contains only a single group) and the ordered version
(every ballot contains a total ordering), as well as the version with two
groups in Section 18.1. The commission report [6, p. 20] briefly mentions
(and dismisses as impractical) also the possibility of having some names on
a ballot ranked, and the remaining names coming after these but unordered
among themselves.
Ballots with weakly ordered sets of candidates have been discussed in the
context of STV (Appendix E.2.1), see e.g. Meek [50] and Hill [37], and such
ballots have been used in STV elections in some organizations [37]. However,
the method discussed in [50] and [37] to handle weak orderings differs from
Phragme´n’s: they regard a weak ordering as a vote split equally between
all total orderings compatible with the weak ordering. On the other hand,
Phragme´n’s version in Section 18.1, extended to weak orderings as above,
means that each ballot is counted as a full vote for each candidate in its
first group, as long as none of them is elected, cf. the principle in (U2). For
example, a ballot beginning with the group (AB) is, as long as neither A nor
B is elected, regarded as 12 vote for A and
1
2 for B by [50] and [37], but as
1 vote for A and 1 vote for B by Phragme´n. (If A or B is elected, then the
value of the ballot is reduced for the remaining candidate in both systems,
by different mechanisms.)
It would be interesting to compare the two ways to handle weakly ordered
list. It seems that Phragme´n’s principle can be applied to STV elections too,
and it might have some advantages over splitting the vote between total
orderings as described above. (Cf. Section 18.5 for the case of unordered
ballots.)
18.3. Phragme´n’s method recursively for alliances and factions. In
Swedish elections 1924–1950, ballots could (but did not have to) contain
not only a party name but also an alliance name and a faction name (in
addition to the names of the candidates), see Appendix D; a ballot could
thus be labelled in up to three levels. (Only the party name was compul-
sory.) When ballots with alliance and faction names were used, Phragme´n’s
method was used recursively in up to three steps: (D’Hondt’s method was
used to distribute seats between alliances and parties outside alliances.)
Phragme´n’s method with alliances and factions. Ballots are or-
dered, and contain a party name and possibly an optional alliance name and
an optional faction name.
First, Phragme´n’s method is applied to each faction separately. Thus, for
each faction name, the method is used to determine an ordering of the candi-
dates on the ballots with that faction name; call this ordering the faction list.
In the sequel, all ballots with this faction name are regarded as containing
the faction list instead of their original lists of names.
Secondly, Phragme´n’s method is applied to each party. For each party
name, the method is used to determine an ordering of the candidates on the
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ballots with that party name; call this ordering the party list. In the sequel,
all ballots with this party name are regarded as containing this party list
instead of their original lists of names (or the faction list).
Thirdly, Phragme´n’s method is applied to each alliance. For each alliance
name, the method is used to determine an ordering of the candidates on the
ballots with that alliance name: call this ordering the alliance list.
Seats given to an alliance or a separate party are assigned to candidates
according to the alliance list or party list.
This means that if no candidate appears on the lists for more than one
party or faction, then (by Theorem 11.1) the seats given to an alliance
are distributed between the participating parties according to D’Hondt’s
method, and similarly the seats given to a party are distributed between
the factions according to D’Hondt’s method; finally Phragme´n’s method is
applied for each faction (if there are different ballots within the faction).
(Since D’Hondt’s method also was used for the distribution of seats between
alliances and separate parties, this gives a nice consistency.) However, the
method above in an elegant way handles also case where the same name
appears on ballots from different factions, or even different parties. More-
over, the method above handles cases where some but not all ballots have a
faction name.
18.4. Party versions. Mora and Oliver [53] discuss a variant of Phrag-
me´n’s unordered method where each ballot contains a set of parties instead
of candidates. The seats are distributed to the parties one by one as in
Phragme´n’s method, with the difference that a party can receive more than
one seat, and thus parties that have received a seat are not ignored in the
sequel.
Phragme´n’s method for parties. Each ballot contains a set of parties.
The seats are distributed as in Section 3.1 or 3.2, but parties that have
received seats continue to participate.
It is easily seen that this extension of Phragme´n’s method also can be
seen as a special case of it: if each party has a set of (at least) s candidates,
with these sets disjoint, and we on each ballot replace each party by its set
of candidates, then an election by Phragme´n’s (unordered) method will give
the same number of seats to each party as the party version above for the
original ballots with parties. (All candidate within the same party would
obviously tie, so the choice of elected within each party would be uniformly
random.) Hence the party version is equivalent to assuming that each party
has a list of candidates (with at least s names), and that each voter votes for
some union of party lists, i.e., if the voter votes for one candidate from some
party, he or she also votes for all other from the same party. (We ignore here
that in the case of a tie, the probabilities for the different possible outcomes
may be different.)
A party version of Thiele’s method can be defined in the same way.
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The party version of Phragme´n’s method has interesting and surprising
mathematical properties, see Mora and Oliver [53]; these will be further
studied elsewhere. (The corresponding party version of Thiele’s method is
much better behaved.)
18.5. Phragme´n’s first method (Enestro¨m’s method) – STV with
unordered ballots. Cassel [5, pp. 47–50] describes what he calls “Phrag-
me´n’s first method”, which is a version of STV (Appendix E.2.1), but much
resembles Phragme´n’s later method described above (which is called “Phrag-
me´n’s second method” in [5]). The same method was earlier described by
Enestro¨m [30] in 1896.38 Note that the method, unlike all other versions of
STV that I know of, older and newer, uses unordered ballots; it follows the
principles (U1)–(U2) in Section 6.
Phragme´n’s first method (Enestro¨m’s method). Unordered ballots.
Each ballot has initially voting power 1. Each ballot is counted fully, with its
38The history is murky. Phragme´n seems to have invented this method c. 1893; it
is similar to his discussion and examples in the newspaper article [55] from 1893, which
clearly describes the weighted inclusive Gregory method, but of his two examples in [55]
one uses unordered ballots and the other ordered ballots (without comment), and at
least one uses the Droop quota, so the method was presumably not completely developed
yet. As far as I know, Phragme´n never published anything about his “first method”.
On the other hand, the method is described in detail (including examples) by Enestro¨m
[30] in 1896, together with Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods; Enestro¨m calls it “my
method”, and does not mention Phragme´n in connection with this method. He had also
a few months earlier briefly described the method in a letter to a newspaper [29], as a
simpler alternative to Phragme´n’s method. Flodstro¨m [34, pp. 29–31] calls it “Enestro¨m’s
method”. Nevertheless, in 1903, Cassel [5] attributes the method to Phragme´n, without
mentioning or giving a reference to Enestro¨m. It seems improbable that this is a mistake
by Cassel, since [5] is an appendix to the commission report [4], and Phragme´n was one
of the members of the commission. Moreover, it seems obvious that Phragme´n and Cassel
must have seen [30], which was published in the proceedings of the Royal Academy of
Science in the same volume as [58]. It is perhaps possible that Cassel regarded Phragme´n
as having invented the method first and deliberately ignored Enestro¨m [30]. Note also that
Enestro¨m [30] and Cassel [5] illustrate the method by the same example (Example 18.1
below), earlier used by Phragme´n [56, 57, 59] for his method; Enestro¨m [30] and Cassel [5]
even round the numbers in the calculations in the same way, but they use different labels
for the candidates.
Maybe the method ought to be called Enestro¨m’s method? At least Enestro¨m [30]
seems to be the first publication of it.
Gustaf Enestro¨m (1852–1923) was a Swedish mathematician. He did (as both Phrag-
me´n and Thiele, see Appendix A) work in Actuarial Science, but his main contributions
are to the history of mathematics, where he published Bibliotheca mathematica, initially
an appendix to Mittag-Leffler’s Acta Mathematica, but 1888–1913 his own independent
journal. (Enestro¨m was assistant to Mittag-Leffler, helping with Acta Mathematica, but
there occured a break between them in 1888, and Enestro¨m was replaced by Phragme´n,
who became a coeditor.) Enestro¨m did not have a university position and worked as
a librarian. I do not know anything about his personal relations with Phragme´n, but
they were possibly strained. Enestro¨m was an outsider in Swedish mathematics and was
disappointed that Mittag-Leffler and other established mathematicians looked down upon
his work on the history of mathematics. [27], [71, Gustaf Hjalmar Enestro¨m].
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present voting power, for each unelected candidate on the ballot. Let Q be
the Hare quota (see Appendix E.3). For each seat, the candidate is elected
that has the largest sum of voting powers (from all ballots that contain the
candidate’s name). If this total voting power is v, and v > Q, then each of
these ballots has its voting power multiplied by (v − Q)/v. If v 6 Q, then
these ballots all get voting power 0 (and are thus ignored in the sequel). This
is repeated until the desired number of candidates are elected.
Note that the total voting power of all ballots is decreased by (Q/v)·v = Q
each time, as long as someone reaches the quota.
The method is presented in [5] as Phragme´n’s improvement of Andræ’s
method (Appendix E.2.1), resolving two major problems with the latter:
First, since Andræ’s method uses ordered ballots, and only counts the first
unelected candidate on each (except possibly at the end), as in (O1)–(O2)
above, a party that gets many votes (maybe several times the quota) but
with its candidates in different orders may not get any seat at all. Phrag-
me´n thus solves this by using unordered ballots. (In modern versions of
STV, with ordered ballots, this problem is solved by eliminations, see Ap-
pendix E.2.1.)39
Secondly, Andræ’s method uses effectively a random selection of the bal-
lots that are transferred from a successful candidate, so the outcome may be
random. (This is still true for some versions of STV, see Appendix E.2.1(i)–
(ii).) Phragme´n resolves this by transferring all ballots but reducing their
voting power proportionally, by what is now known as the weighted inclu-
sive Gregory method, see Appendix E.2.1(v), which thus was invented by
Phragme´n (and then forgotten for until reinvented almost a century later).
Phragme´n seems to have invented this method c. 1893, see Footnote 38,
but then he instead developed the ideas further to the method described
in Section 3 by eliminating the fixed quota Q and instead using a variable
quota (or, equivalently, as in the description in Section 3, a variable voting
power); note also that there are other modifications, and that the weighted
inclusive Gregory method is gone, and replaced by something similar to the
unweighted inclusive Gregory method in Appendix E.2.1(iv), although the
mechanism is different, see Section 17.
Phragme´n seems to have returned to new versions of the quota-based
method (with a simplified method for reducing the votes) in 1906, according
to some unpublished notes and drafts, see [53, Appendix B.1].
Example 18.1. Phragme´n’s first method (Enestro¨m’s method) was illus-
trated by both Enestro¨m [30] and Cassel [5, p. 49] by the example used
by Phragme´n [56, 57, 58] for his method described in Section 3, and used
39There is no point in adding eliminations to Phragme´n’s version with unordered bal-
lots, since every candidate on a ballot gets its full remaining voting power, regardless of
whether there are other remaining candidates on the ballot or not; hence eliminations
would not change the sum of voting powers for the remaining candidates.
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above in Examples 3.7, 4.4, 9.3, 10.2. We follow [30] and [5], and present
the calculations using decimal approximations.
Unordered ballots. 3 seats. Phragme´n’s first method (Enestro¨m’s me-
thod).
1034 ABC
519 PQR
90 ABQ
47 APQ
1690 votes. The Hare quota Q = 1690/3
.
= 563.3.
The total numbers of votes for each candidate are
A 1171
B 1124
C 1034
P 566
Q 656
R 519.
The first seat goes to A, who has the largest number of votes. Since A
has 1171 votes, which exceed the quota Q, each ballot containing A has its
voting power (value) reduced from 1 to 1− Q1171 = 1−
563.3
1171
.
= 0.519.
The total voting power of each group of ballots is now
ABC 1034 · 0.519
.
= 536.6
PQR 519
ABQ 90 · 0.519
.
= 46.7
APQ 47 · 0.519
.
= 24.4
(The sum is V −Q = 2Q
.
= 1126.7.)
By summing these values for the ballots containing a given candidate, the
voting power that each candidate can collect is: B 583.3; C 536.6; P 543.4;
Q 590.1; R 519. Since Q has the highest voting power, Q is elected to the
second seat.
The voting power 590.1 of Q exceeds the quota Q=563.3, and thus the
ballots PQR, ABQ and APQ get their voting power multiplied by 1− 563.3590.1
.
=
0.045. The total voting power of each group of ballots is now
ABC 536.6
PQR 519 · 0.045
.
= 23.5
ABQ 46.7 · 0.045
.
= 2.1
APQ 24.4 · 0.045
.
= 1.1
(The sum is V − 2Q = Q
.
= 563.3.)
The voting powers available to the remaining candidates are thus: B
538.7; C 536.6; P 24.6; R 23.5. Thus B is elected to the third seat.
Elected: ABQ.
This is the same result as produced by both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s
methods, see Examples 3.7 and 4.4.
See further examples in [30].
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18.6. Versions of Phragme´n’s method based on optimization crite-
ria. Phragme´n [58] discusses election methods (for unordered ballots) from
the general point of view that each voter should, as far as possible, obtain
the same representation as everyone else.40 More precisely, each elected can-
didate is counted as one unit, which is divided between the voters that have
voted for that candidate. This gives each voter a measure of the voter’s
representation, and the goal is to keep these as equal as possible.
This “amount of representation” is the same as load in Remark 3.1 and
for convenience we use the latter term here. (Recall that load also equals
voting power in Section 3.) The methods obtained by this approach can
thus be described as: For each set of s candidates, compute the loads for
each voter. Elect the set of candidates that minimizes the “inequality” of the
load distribution.
In the paper, Phragme´n discusses several alternatives, as follows. We
use the notation that there are V voters, and that the load of voter k is
ξk; thus
∑V
k=1 ξk = s, the number of elected candidates, and we define
ξ¯ :=
∑V
k=1 ξk/V = s/V , the average load per voter; note that ξ¯ is the same
for all sets of elected (with s fixed) and for all distributions of their loads.
(a) The total load 1 of each candidate can be:
(a1) divided equally between all voters voting for that candidate,
(a2) divided arbitrarily between the voters voting for that candidate
(in a way that minimizes the final inequality).
(b) The “measure of inequality” (that is to be minimized) for a set {ξk}
of loads can be taken as:
(b1) The sum of squares
∑
k,l(ξk − ξl)
2. (This choice is thus an in-
stance of the general method of least squares.) Equivalently, as
is well-known (and noted by Phragme´n [58]), we can minimize
the variance V −1
∑
k(ξk − ξ¯)
2 (or just
∑
k(ξk − ξ¯)
2), or simply
(because ξ¯ is fixed) the sum of squares
∑
k ξ
2
k.
(b2) The maximum difference maxk(ξk− ξ¯). This is equivalent to min-
imizing the maximum load maxk ξk.
(c) Furthermore, Phragme´n discussed two versions for the optimization
(the same as two of the three versions discussed by Thiele [76], see
Section 4):
(c1) The set of s candidates that minimizes the inequality is elected.
We call these methods optimization methods.
(c2) The candidates are elected sequentially. In each round, the ex-
isting loads for the previously elected are kept fixed and for each
remaining candidate, the loads for that candidate, if elected, are
added to the previous loads. The candidate that minimizes the
40It seems likely that this was a kind of response to Thiele [76], which also tries to
derive an election method from general principles by some optimization criterion. Phrag-
me´n notes that his classification according to “inequality” is different from from Thiele’s
based on “satisfaction”, but does not compare the two approaches.
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inequality of the resulting set of loads is elected. (This is thus a
greedy version of the optimization method.) We call these meth-
ods sequential.
This gives 2 · 2 · 2 = 8 possible combinations (we shall see below that they
all yield different methods), but Phragme´n does not discuss all of them.
Phragme´n first says that it is natural to divide the load of a candidate
equally between the voters (i.e., (a1) above), but that this cannot be re-
garded as the definitive answer; he gives the following example.
Example 18.2. From Phragme´n [58].
Unordered ballots. 2 seats.
100 AB
100 AC
An optimization method (c1) is assumed. BC will give a uniform distribution
of the load, while with (a1), this is impossible if A is elected. Thus the
outcome is BC (for any inequality measure), in spite of the fact that everyone
has voted for A.
We may also note that (a2) would enable all three choices AB, AC and
BC to have uniform load distributions, so although this would enable A to
be elected, the result would be a tie which hardly is satisfactory in this case,
see also Example 18.5 below. Finally, note that any sequential method (c2)
would elect A first.
Phragme´n nevertheless continues to study (a1), and says that it is natural
to measure the inequality of the loads by the sum of the squared differences,
i.e. (b1) above. He shows that this is equivalent to minimizing the sum∑
k ξ
2
k, and that if there are vi votes for candidate i, of which vij also are
for j, then, if we elect a set S,∑
k
ξ2k =
∑
i∈S
1
vi
+
∑
i,j∈S, i<j
2vij
vivj
. (18.1)
Phragme´n then continues to study the sequential version (a1)(b1)(c2),
which avoids the problem in Example 18.2, but shows by another example
that this too suffers from undesirable non-monotonicity, see Example 18.3
below.
We may note (although Phragme´n did not do so) that the election method
(a1)(b1)(c2) can be given an algorithmic description similar to the one in
Section 3.2. The proof follows from (18.1) by noting that the increase of the
sum in (18.1) if candidate i is added the elected set S equals 1/Wi in (18.2).
Sequential version with equipartitioned loads and least squares
criterion. Seats are given to candidates sequentially. Let vi be the num-
ber of votes for candidate i. If a set S of candidates already has been
elected, then each ballot with a set σ of candidates is given a place num-
ber q′σ :=
∑
i∈σ∩S 1/vi, i.e. each elected candidate i contributes 1/vi to the
place number on each ballot containing i. Let further vσ be the number of
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ballots with the set σ, and let qσ := vσq
′
σ, their total place number. The
reduced vote for candidate i is then defined as
Wi :=
vi
1 + 2
∑
σ∋i qσ
=
∑
σ∋i vσ
1 + 2
∑
σ∋i qσ
. (18.2)
The candidate with the largest reduced vote is elected.
As said above, (a1)(b1)(c2) suffers from non-monotonicity, as shown by
the following example. (See Example 14.1 for a similar example for Thiele’s
method.)
Example 18.3. This example is in principle from Phragme´n [58], but
Phragme´n’s numerical example is incorrect; the following corrected version
is due to Xavier Mora (personal communication).
Unordered ballots. 2 seats.
1145 A
885 B
900 C
55 AB
100 AC
Using (a1)(b1)(c2), the first elected is A (who has most votes), and a calcu-
lation, e.g. using (18.2), shows that the second place is tied between B and
C. However, if some of the voters for A change their mind and add B, so
that the numbers of votes instead are
1145 − x A
885 B
900 C
55 + x AB
100 AC
for some x > 0 (with x < 360 to ensure that A still is elected first), then C
will be elected; conversely, with a change in the opposite direction (x < 0),
B is elected. The election of B can thus be prevented by more voters voting
for B!
Phragme´n draws the conclusion that (a1) has to be abandoned, and re-
placed by (a2), which does not have this kind of non-monotonicity as shown
by the following result. (See also Section 14 and in particular the overlapping
Theorem 14.2.)
Theorem 18.4 (Phragme´n [58]). Every election method based on (a2), for
any measure of inequality, satisfies the following: Consider an election and
let A be one of the candidates. Suppose that the votes are changed such that
A gets more votes, either from new voters that vote only for A, or from
voters that add A to their ballots (thus changing the vote from some set σ to
σ ∪ {A}), but no other changes are made (thus all other candidates receive
exactly the same votes as before). Then this cannot hurt A; if A would have
been elected before the change, then A will be elected also after the change.
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Proof. Consider first an optimization method. Each set of candidates not
containing A has the same possible distributions of loads, and thus the
same minimum inequality as before the change. On the other hand, a set
containing A still has all possible distributions of loads that existed before
the change, and possibly some new ones; hence the minimum inequality
for such a set is at most the same as before. If A would be elected before
the change, then a set of the latter type had smaller (or possibly equal)
minimum inequality than every set of the former type, and then the same
holds after the change, so A will still be elected.
Consider now a sequential method.41 Consider the round when A would
have been elected, if there was no change. After the change, either A already
has been elected before this round, and we are done, or the preceding rounds
have elected the same candidates as before the change, and then A will be
elected in this round, by the same argument as in the optimization case. 
Having thus argued for (a2), Phragme´n says that the election method is
determined by the measure of inequality.42 He notes that this measure can
be chosen in different ways, and continues that in order to obtain as simple
calculations as possible, it is recommended to use the difference between
maximum and average load (b2) and the sequential version (c2).
Phragme´n thus has finally come to the election method (a2)(b2)(c2), and
notes that this is the method that he earlier has proposed in [56; 57], which is
described in Section 3; it is easily seen that the optimal distribution of loads
is the same as the voting powers assigned in the formulation in Section 3.1.43
Although Phragme´n thus favoured the method (a2)(b2)(c2), one might
consider also other combinations than the ones he studied. In particular, the
other three versions with (a2) also seem interesting, at least from a mathe-
matical point of view; they are (a2)(b2)(c1), (a2)(b1)(c1) and (a2)(b1)(c2)
above:
Optimization version of Phragme´n’s method. Elect the set of s can-
didates such that, with loads distributed optimally, the maximum load is
minimal.
41Phragme´n did not mention this case explicitly.
42 Phragme´n did not explicitly discuss the difference between optimization and sequen-
tial methods, or the computational problems with the former.
43 This was obviously the intention of the paper [58]. It seems that one of the main
objections to Phragme´n’s method (from its proposal in 1894 to the adoption of the ordered
version 27 years later) was that, regardless of whether it had mathematical advantages
or not, it was too complicated to be understood and to be used in practice. Phragme´n
tried varying formulations and motivations in different papers, and in [58] he thus tries to
present the method as simple by giving even more complicated alternatives. (He does not
explicitly say that the method is the simplest possible among the acceptable alternatives,
but he possibly wanted to give that impression.) However, in retrospect, this attempt to
present the method as simple does not seem succesful, since Phragme´n later did not use
this argument again.
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Optimization least squares version of Phragme´n’s method. Elect
the set of s candidates such that, with loads distributed optimally, the sum
of the squares of the loads is minimal.
Sequential least squares version of Phragme´n’s method. Seats
are given to candidates sequentially. When a candidate is elected, each ballot
with this candidate is given a load for that candidate, in addition to any load
that might exist from previously elected candidates; the additional loads are
chosen such that their sum is 1 and the sum of the squares of the total loads
of the ballots is minimal. In each round, the candidate is elected such that
the resulting sum of squares of loads after electing the candidate is smallest.
The two optimization methods are studied by Mora and Oliver [53, Sec-
tion 8] (together with their party versions as in Section 18.4) and in [19]
(under the names max-Phragme´n and var-Phragme´n). The sequential least
squares version is studied by Mora [52].
The optimization methods, although optimal in the mathematical sense
of optimizing some function, do not always yield results that seem optimal
from other points of view. This was seen in Example 18.2, and we can
modify the example to make it more striking.
Example 18.5.
Unordered ballots. 2 seats.
100 AB
100 AC
1 B
1 C
For any optimization method (c1), using either (a1) or (a2), and either (b1)
or (b2) or any other method of inequality, BC will be elected, since this gives
a perfectly uniform load distribution, while any other combination leaves one
voter with load 0.
Since every voter but two votes for A, this result seems questionable.
Indeed, any sequential method (of the types considered here) begins by
electing the candidate with most votes, so A is elected (and the second seat
is a tie between B and C).
This example also shows that the optimization methods (c1) considered
in this subsection differ from the sequential ones (c2).
Cf. the similar Example 13.4, showing the difference between the opti-
mization and the sequential versions of Thiele’s method. That example
would work here too, but not conversely. (In this type of example, with the
four ballot types above and symmetric in B and C, Thiele’s optimization
and addition methods yield the same result unless at least a third (and at
most half) of the votes are on B or C only, while for the methods studied
here, the fraction of such votes can be arbitrarily small.)
Mora [52] found a technical problem with the sequential least squares
method (a2)(b1)(c2), shown in the following example.
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Example 18.6 (Mora [52]). The sequential least squares method (a2)(b1)(c2).
Unordered ballots. 3 seats.
9 AB
1 ABC
3 CD
The first seat goes to A, and the loads on the three types of ballots are
(0.1, 0.1, 0). The next seat goes to C, and then the loads are (0.1, 0.275, 0.275).
The third seat goes to B. However, if we would distribute the total loads of
the ballots containing B (including one unit for the election of B) uniformly,
we would get the load distribution (0.2175, 0.2175, 0.2750), where the load on
the ballot has decreased. This is not allowed by the formulation above, and
instead we have to distribute the load of B on the 9 ballots AB only, giving
the loads (0.2111, 0.275, 0.275). So either we have to accept this behaviour,
which complicates the implementation and reduces the usual advantage of
least squares methods, or the method has to be modified by allowing the
load of a ballot to decrease.44
Consider now the party list case (see Section 11). In this case, there is
no difference between (a1) and (a2), since an equidistribution of loads is
optimal; if a party has v votes and m candidates elected, then each of its
v ballots thus has load m/v. The problem of optimizing these quotients
for party lists by the method of least squares was considered in 1910 (thus
after Phragme´n’s paper, but presumably independent of it) by Sainte-Lague¨
[65], who showed that this leads to the method now named after him, see
Appendix E.3.2. In particular, since Sainte-Lague¨’s method is sequential,
the optimization problem can in this case be solved sequentially (greedily).
Sainte-Lague¨ [65] also more briefly, again for party lists, considered min-
imizing the maximum load, i.e., (b2) above, and showed that this leads to
D’Hondt’s method (Appendix E.3.1); this had also earlier been shown by
Rouyer [64] and Equer [31], see Mora [51].45
We thus can conclude the following, cf. Theorem 11.1.
Theorem 18.7. In the party list case, the following holds:
(i) The least squares methods using (b1), with either (a1) or (a2) and
either optimizational (c1) or sequential (c2), all yield the same result
as Sainte-Lague¨’s method.
44 An analogous phenomenon occurs in the version of STV that uses the inclusive
Gregory method (Appendix E.2.1(iv)), where the voting value of a ballot can increase
when the surplus is transferred, see [33].
45As said in Section 11, Phragme´n showed this for his sequential method (c2); it is
easy to see that in the party list case, there is no difference between the optimization and
sequential versions, so both yield D’Hondt’s method, but I do not know whether Phrag-
me´n did observe this; he did not consider the optimization version at all except implicitly
in [58] as discussed above.
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(ii) The maximum load methods using (b2), with either (a1) or (a2) and
either optimizational (c1) or sequential (c2), all yield the same result
as D’Hondt’s method.
Example 18.8.
Unordered ballots. 2 seats.
5 AB
2 CD
This is a party list case, and by Theorem 18.7, every least squares method
(b1) (of the types considered above) will elect (e.g.) AC, while every maxi-
mum load method (b2) will elect AB.
This example shows that the least squares methods differ from the max-
imum load methods.
Remark 18.9. Sainte-Lague¨ [65] also considered (for party lists) maximiz-
ing the minimum load (we might call this (b3)); this yields Adams’ method
(see [13]), which is equivalent to giving every party 1 seat and distributing
the rest by D’Hondt’s method. In the context of general unordered ballots
(instead of party lists), in typical cases there will always be some ballots
that do not vote for any of the elected candidates, so their load is 0 and the
minimum load is 0, which seems to make (b3) less interesting.
Sainte-Lague¨ [65] also considered optimizing the distribution of votes per
elected candidate, again using the least squares method, showing that (at
least assuming that each party gets at least one seat), this yields a method
that is now known as Huntington’s method (proposed by Huntington in
1921), which since 1941 is used for the allocation of seats in the US House
of Representatives among the states, see [13]. This version of optimization
could perhaps be extended to general unordered ballots, using a dual of
(a2) where each voter has 1 vote which is divided between the names on the
ballots in an arbitrary way, and the goal is to make the resulting total votes
on the elected candidates high and close to equal. However, it is not clear
how to treat candidates that are not elected, and how to define the quantity
that should be optimized.
Examples 18.5 and 18.8 thus show that of the 8 election methods obtained
by combining the alternatives above, the only ones that possibly could be
equal (in the sense of always giving the same outcome) would be two that
differ only in using (a1) or (a2). For the combination (b1)(c2) (sequential
least squares), Example 18.3 and Theorem 18.4 show that the two methods
differ. For completeness, we give another example to show that also in the
other cases, (a1) and (a2) give different methods, and thus all 8 methods
are different.
Example 18.10.
Unordered ballots. 2 seats.
1 AB
1 A
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1 B
c C
Here c is a positive rational number with c < 2; we can obtain integer
numbers of votes by multiplying all numbers by the denominator of c.
By symmetry, there will be ties; we may suppose that these are resolved
lexicographically, with A before B. In the sequential versions (c2), then A
will be elected first (because c < 2); thus for the second seat we consider AB
and AC. In the optimization versions (c1), by symmetry we also consider
AB and AC.
For AC, the loads on the four types of ballots will in all cases ((a1) or
(a2), (b1) or (b2), (c1) or (c2)) be
(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0,
1
c
)
, with maximum 1
c
and sum of
squares (recalling that we have c ballots of the last type) 12 +
1
c
.
For AB, we obtain using (a1), in both the optimization and sequential
versions, the loads
(
1, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
with maximum 1 and sum of squares 32 ; thus,
for all four methods using (a1), C will get a seat if c > 1.
Using (a2), we instead find that in the optimization version (c1), the loads
for AB will be
(
2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 , 0
)
, with maximum 23 and sum of squares
4
3 . Hence,
C wins a seat if c > 32 for method (a2)(b2)(c1), and if c >
6
5 for method
(a2)(b1)(c1).
Using (a2) and the sequential version (c2), the loads for AB will be(
3
4 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 , 0
)
, with maximum 34 and sum of squares
11
8 . Hence, C wins a
seat if c > 43 for method (a2)(b2)(c2), and if c >
8
7 for method (a2)(b1)(c2).
Together with the examples above, this shows that all 8 combinations
discussed above yield different methods.
18.7. Recent STV-like versions of Phragme´n’s method. Olli Salmi
[66; 67] has proposed a modification of Phragme´n’s method to something
similar to STV by introducing the Droop quota as a criterium for election
and eliminations when no-one reaches the quota. This has been further
developed by Woodall [82] and, in several versions, Hyman [38].
However, it seems doubtful whether it is possible to modify Phragme´n’s
method in some way without losing some of its advantages.
19. Some conclusions
As said in the introduction, our purpose of is not to advocate any partic-
ular method. Nevertheless, we draw some conclusions for practical applica-
tions.
It seems that Thiele’s unordered (addition) and ordered methods both
have serious problems in some situations, shown by several of the examples
in Section 13 and by further results in Section 16, and that these methods
therefore are not satisfactory in general. (This was also the conclusion of
Cassel [5], Tenow [74] and the commission reports [6] and [7, pp. 213–220].)
On the other hand, these methods are simple and may be useful in some
situations, and Thiele’s ordered method has been used for a long time inside
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local councils in Sweden, see Appendix D.1, as far as I know without any
problems.
Thiele’s optimization method is computationally difficult, but might be
used in some (small) situations. It is perhaps not sufficiently investigated,
but note the property in Theorem 16.8. On the other hand, this method
is likely to have at least some of the same problems with tactical voting as
Thiele’s other methods.
Phragme´n’s unordered and ordered methods seem quite robust in many
situations, and they have good proportionality properties (see Section 16),
but they have the disadvantage of leading to rather complicated calculations
that only in simple cases can be made by hand.
Phragme´n’s unordered method does not ignore full ballots, but that is
perhaps more a curiosity than a real problem in practice.
Note also the general problems with unordered methods discussed in Sec-
tion 7. Nevertheless, unordered ballots seem to work well in practice in many
situations without organized parties, for example in elections in non-political
associations and organizations.
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Appendix A. Biographies
A.1. Edvard Phragme´n. Lars Edvard Phragme´n (1863–1937) was a Swe-
dish mathematician, actuary and insurance executive. He was born in
O¨rebro 2 October 1863, and died in Djursholm (outside Stockholm) 13
March 1937.
Edvard Phragme´n began his university studies in Uppsala in 1882, but
transferred in 1883 to Stockholm, where Go¨sta Mittag-Leffler had become
professor in 1881. Phragme´n obtained a Licentiate degree in 1889, and was
awarded a Ph.D. h.c. by Uppsala University in 1907.
In 1888, Edvard Phragme´n was appointed coeditor of Mittag-Leffler’s
journal Acta Mathematica, where he immediately made an important con-
tribution by finding an error in a paper by Henri Poincare´ on the three-
body problem. The paper had been awarded a prize in a competition that
Mittag-Leffler had persuaded King Oscar II to arrange, but Phragme´n found
a serious mistake when the journal already had been printed; the copies that
had been released were recalled and a new corrected version was printed.
Phragme´n continued to be an editor of Acta Mathematica until his death
in 1937.
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In 1892, Edvard Phragme´n became professor of Mathematics at Stock-
holm University (at that time Stockholm University College). In 1897, he
became also actuary in the private insurance company Allma¨nna Liffo¨rsa¨k-
ringsbolaget. His interest in Actuarial Science and insurance companies
seems to have grown, and in 1904 he left his professorship to become the
first head of the Swedish Insurance Supervisory Authority. He left that post
in 1908 to become director of Allma¨nna Liffo¨rsa¨kringsbolaget, a post that
he held until 1933.
Edvard Phragme´n became a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences in 1901. He was President of the Swedish Society of Actuaries
1909–1934.
His best known mathematical work is the Phragme´n-Lindelo¨f principle
in complex analysis, a joint work with the Finnish mathematician Ernst
Lindelo¨f which was published in 1908.
His interest in election methods is witnessed by his publications [55; 56;
57; 58; 59]. Moreover, he was a member of the Royal Commission on a Pro-
portional Election Method 1902–1903 [4], and of a new Royal Commission
on the Proportional Election Method 1912–1913 [6]. He was also a local
politician and chairman of the city council of Djursholm 1907–1918.
See further [71, L Edward Phragme´n], [27] and [54, Lars Edvard Phragme´n].
A.2. Thorvald Thiele. Thorvald Nicolai Thiele (1838–1910) was a Danish
astronomer and mathematician. He was born in Copenhagen 24 December
1838, and died there 26 September 1910.
Thorvald Thiele studied Astronomy at the University of Copenhagen,
where he obtained his Master’s degree in 1860 and his Ph.D. in 1866, with a
thesis on a double star. He was Professor of Astronomy at the University of
Copenhagen from 1875 until his retirement in 1907. He became a member
of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in 1879.
Thiele had an increasingly poor eye-sight (severe astigmatism) and turned
to theoretical work and mathematics instead of observational astronomy; he
published papers in both Astronomy and Mathematics. Among his mathe-
matical contributions are “Thiele’s interpolation formula” for finding a ra-
tional function taking given values at given points, published in 1909. He
made also contributions to Statistics, where he introduced the half-invariants
(later known as cumulants) as well as many other fundamental concepts in
his book from 1889. Moreover, he was interested in Actuarial Science, where
he both did theoretical work and was a founder of the insurance company
Hafnia where he was Mathematical Director from 1872 until 1901; from 1903
he was the chairman of the board of the company. Thiele was an original
thinker, and his ideas were often ahead of his time.
Thorvald Thiele was one of the founders of the Danish Mathematical
Society in 1873, and one of the founders of the Danish Society of Actuaries
in 1901; he was the president of the latter until his death. In 1901, he also
became a foreign member of the Institute of Actuaries in London.
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See further [46], [23, Thiele, Thorvald Nicolai] and [54, Thorvald Nicolai
Thiele].
Appendix B. Phragme´n’s original formulation
Phragme´n first presented his method in a short note [56], dated 14 March
1894, in the Proceedings of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. The
note is written in French, and the method is defined as follows, using the
term force e´lectrice:
De´signons par k une quantite´ variable, et
1:o) commenc¸ons par donner a` la force e´lectrice de tous les bulletins cette
valeur k.
2:o) Avant de proclamer l’e´lection d’un premier repre´sentant, nous e´tab-
lirons entre les candidats un certain ordre de pre´fe´rence, en calculant
pour chacun d’eux la valeur de k qui donne la valeur un a` la somme
de force e´lectrice de tous les bulletins qui contiennent son nom, et
en donnant toujours la pre´fe´rence au candidat pour qui cette valeur
est moins grande.
3:o) Nous proclamerons e´lu pour repre´sentant le candidat qui se trouve
en teˆte de cette liste, et nous re´duirons en meˆme temps la force
e´lectrice des bulletins portant son nom, en y soustrayant la valeur
de cette force e´lectrice qui correspond a` l’e´lection.
4:o) Nous re´pe`terons les ope´rations 2:o et 3:o alternativement jusqu’a` ce
que le nombre prescrit de repre´sentants soient proclame´s e´lus.
5:o) S’il arrive, en faisant l’ope´ration 2:o, qu’il y a deux ou plusieurs can-
didats pour lesquels la valeur de k devient e´gale, on de´terminera leur
ordre relatif d’apre`s la liste analogue obtenue a` l’ope´ration pre´ce´dente.
Si, meˆme a` la premie`re ope´ration, ils ont la meˆme valeur de k, leur
place relative est de´termine´e par la sort (ou par tout autre moyen
qu’on y pre´fe`rerait).
Phragme´n gave his method an expanded treatment in the book [57] the
following year; he also gave a different motivation for the method in 1896 [58]
(see Section 18.6) and made further comments, including comparisons with
Thiele’s methods in 1899 [59]. Rule 5:o) above, on ties, seems to have been
dropped; otherwise there are only minor variations (without mathematical
significance) in the formulations; for example, in [59] he tries to make the
method more easily understood by talking about the “load” a ballot receives
by the election of a candidate, instead of “voting power” (see Remark 3.1).
Appendix C. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods as formulated in
current Swedish law
Both Phragme´n’s ordered method and Thiele’s ordered method are used
officially in Sweden for some purposes, see Appendix D. We give here official
formulations (in Swedish) from current laws.
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The methods are not called “Phragme´n’s” and “Thiele’s” anywhere in the
laws; Phragme´n’s method has no name in the Elections Act, but in the Par-
liament Act (Riksdagsordningen) [3, 12 kap 8 §, 12.8.5] it is called “heltals-
metoden” (the whole number method), which otherwise is the Swedish name
for D’Hondt’s method. This is really a misnomer; although the method
clearly is related to D’Hondt’s method, and Phragme´n argued that his me-
thod was a generalization of D’Hondt’s, it is in several important ways dif-
ferent from it. Moreover, from a mathematical point of view, an important
feature is the use of non-integer place numbers (generalizing the integer
ones in D’Hondt’s method), which makes the name “heltalsmetoden” a bit
bizarre.
C.1. Phragme´n’s ordered method in the Swedish Elections Act.
Phragme´n’s ordered method has been used in the Swedish Elections Act
since 1921 for distribution of seats within each party, although since 1998
only as a secondary method that rarely is used, see Appendix D.
The official formulation in the current (2016) Elections Act [1, 14 kap.
10 §] is as follows. (The formulations have been essentially identical since
1921.)
Vid fo¨rsta utra¨kningen ga¨ller en valsedel fo¨r den kandidat som st˚ar fo¨rst
p˚a sedeln varvid bortses fr˚an kandidater som redan tagit plats. Valsed-
lar med samma fo¨rsta kandidat bildar en grupp. Varje grupps ro¨stetal
ra¨knas fram. Ro¨stetalet a¨r lika med det antal valsedlar som ing˚ar i grup-
pen. Samma tal a¨r ocks˚a ja¨mfo¨relsetal fo¨r den kandidat som st˚ar fo¨rst
p˚a gruppens valsedlar. Den kandidat vars ja¨mfo¨relsetal a¨r sto¨rst f˚ar den
fo¨rsta platsen i ordningen.
Vid varje fo¨ljande utra¨kning ga¨ller en valsedel fo¨r den kandidat som
st˚ar fo¨rst p˚a sedeln, men man bortser fr˚an kandidater som redan f˚att
plats i ordningen. Den eller de grupper, vilkas valsedlar vid na¨rmast
fo¨reg˚aende utra¨kning ga¨llde fo¨r den kandidat som fick plats i ordnin-
gen, upplo¨ses och ordnas i nya grupper, s˚a att valsedlar som vid den
p˚ag˚aende utra¨kningen ga¨ller fo¨r en och samma kandidat bildar en grupp.
O¨vriga befintliga grupper beh˚alls da¨remot ofo¨ra¨ndrade. Fo¨r varje ny-
bildad grupp ra¨knas ro¨stetalet fram. Ro¨stetalet a¨r lika med det antal
valsedlar som ing˚ar i gruppen. Fo¨r samtliga kandidater som deltar i
utra¨kningen bera¨knas ro¨stetal och ja¨mfo¨relsetal.
Ro¨stetalet fo¨r en kandidat a¨r lika med ro¨stetalet fo¨r den grupp eller
det sammanlagda ro¨stetalet fo¨r de grupper vilkas valsedlar ga¨ller fo¨r
kandidaten. Ja¨mfo¨relsetalet fo¨r en kandidat a¨r lika med kandidatens
ro¨stetal, om inte den grupp av valsedlar som ga¨ller fo¨r kandidaten delt-
agit i besa¨ttandet av en fo¨rut utdelad plats. Om detta a¨r fallet, f˚ar
man kandidatens ja¨mfo¨relsetal genom att kandidatens ro¨stetal delas med
det tal som motsvarar den del gruppen tagit i besa¨ttandet av plats eller
platser som utdelats (gruppens platstal), o¨kat med 1, eller, om flera grup-
per av valsedlar som ga¨ller fo¨r kandidaten deltagit i besa¨ttandet av fo¨rut
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utdelad plats, med dessa gruppers sammanlagda platstal, o¨kat med 1.
Platstalet fo¨r en grupp bera¨knas genom att gruppens ro¨stetal delas med
det sto¨rsta ja¨mfo¨relsetalet vid utra¨kningen na¨rmast fo¨re gruppens bil-
dande. Fo¨r kandidat som redan stod fo¨rst p˚a n˚agon valsedel bera¨knas
nytt platstal endast fo¨r nytillkomna valsedlar. Br˚aktal som uppkommer
vid delning bera¨knas med 2 decimaler. Den sista decimalsiffran f˚ar inte
ho¨jas.
Den kandidat vars ja¨mfo¨relsetal a¨r sto¨rst f˚ar na¨sta plats i ordningen.
The Elections Act specifies that calculations should be done to two deci-
mal places, rounded downwards.46 Otherwise, the formulation is equivalent
to the one in Section 9.3.
C.2. Thiele’s ordered method in current Swedish law. Thiele’s or-
dered method is used in Sweden for the distribution of seats within parties
at elections in city and county councils, for example in the election of the
city executive board and other boards, see Appendix D.1. The method
is formulated as follows in the Act on Proportional Elections (Lagen om
proportionella val) [2, 15–18 §]:
15 § Ordningen mellan namnen inom varje valsedelsgrupp skall besta¨mmas
genom sa¨rskilda sammanra¨kningar, i den utstra¨ckning s˚adana beho¨vs.
16 § Efter varje sammanra¨kning skall det namn som enligt 18 § har f˚att
det ho¨gsta ro¨stetalet fo¨ras upp p˚a en lista fo¨r valsedelsgruppen, det
ena under det andra. Namnen ga¨ller i den ordningsfo¨ljd som de har
blivit uppfo¨rda p˚a listan.
17 § Vid varje sammanra¨kning ga¨ller en valsedel bara fo¨r ett namn.
Valsedeln ga¨ller fo¨r det namn som st˚ar fo¨rst p˚a valsedeln, s˚a la¨nge
detta namn inte har fo¨rts upp p˚a listan. Da¨refter ga¨ller valsedeln fo¨r
det namn som st˚ar na¨st efter det namn som redan har fo¨rts upp p˚a
listan.
18 § En valsedel som ga¨ller fo¨r sitt fo¨rsta namn ra¨knas som en ro¨st.
Na¨r den ga¨ller fo¨r sitt andra namn ra¨knas den som en halv ro¨st. En
valsedel som ga¨ller fo¨r sitt tredje namn ra¨knas som en tredjedels ro¨st,
och s˚a vidare efter samma grund.
46This was obviously of practical importance in 1921. Today, with computers, it would
seem better to use exact calculations with rational numbers.
Already the commission [6] that suggested the method in 1913 proposed that the cal-
culations should be done with decimal numbers, and that two decimal places would be
enough for practical purposes; they also for simplicity recommended consistently either
rounding up or down, but favoured rounding up for reasons not further explained. The law
introduced in 1921 chose rounding down, but otherwise followed these recommendations.
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Appendix D. History and use of Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s
methods in Sweden47
As said above, Phragme´n [56] proposed his method in 1894 (see Appen-
dix B), and Thiele [76] as a response proposed his method in 1895.
This was a period when electoral reform was much discussed in Sweden,
both the question of universal suffrage and the election method, see e.g.
[21]. The two questions were linked; the conservatives expected to become
a minority when universal suffrage was introduced, and therefore many of
them wanted a proportional election system; conversely, many liberals and
socialdemocrats wanted a plurality system with single-member constituen-
cies.
Sweden had 1867–1970 a parliament with two chambers, where the Sec-
ond Chamber was elected in general elections, while the First Chamber was
elected indirectly, by the county councils. (Until 1909, the county councils
were also elected indirectly, by electors chosen by city councils and rural mu-
nicipality councils; these councils were elected in local elections,48 and thus
the First Chamber was elected indirectly in three steps.) Until 1909, the
Second Chamber was elected by the Block Vote (Appendix E.1.1), mainly
in single-member constituencies but in larger cities in constituencies with
several members; only men with a certain income or real estate of a certain
value were allowed to vote. There were no formal parties, and no regis-
tration of candidates before the election; every eligible man was a possible
candidate, and the voters could write any names they wanted on the ballots,
although parties and other political organizations recommended certain lists
and printed ballots that were used by most voters. (Even these organized
lists often overlapped, see Examples 13.1 and 13.2.)
In 1896, the government proposed a minor extension of the suffrage (lower
limits for income and real estate), together with introduction of a propor-
tional method in the constituencies that elected several members of parlia-
ment (Andræ’s method, a form of STV, see Appendix E.2.1); however, the
parliament voted against.
Nevertheless, the questions continued to be discussed. Several bills on uni-
versal suffrage for men were introduced in parliament and defeated, mainly
because of disagreement on whether the election system should be propor-
tional or not. A Royal Commission on a Proportional Election Method was
appointed in 1902, with Phragme´n as one of its members. (Nevertheless,
the commission proposed the cumulative method, see Appendix E.1.5, and
not Phragme´n’s own.)
47As far as I know, no version of Phragme´n’s or Thiele’s method has ever been used
outside Sweden. (Thiele was Danish. I do not know whether his, or Phragme´n’s, method
was discussed in Denmark.)
48Until 1918, in local elections, each voter had a number of votes proportional to his
(or in exceptional cases her) tax. There were some limitations, in particular were the
number of votes limited to at most 100 per voter in cities and, from 1900, at most 5000
in rural municipalities; in 1909–1918 the number of votes per voter were 1–40.
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In 1909, finally, universal suffrage for men was accepted together with a
proportional election system, based on D’Hondt’s method (Appendix E.3.1).
Thus parties were formally introduced; there was still no registration before
the election, but the writer was supposed to write a party name on the
ballot, followed by a list of candidates as before.49 50 Each party was then,
by D’Hondt’s method, given a number of seats according to the party names
on the ballots.
It seems that parties had now become better organized and dominated the
political scene, and that it was natural to base the election system on them;
to use a method like Phragme´n’s or Thiele’s to distribute the seats without
party labels was no longer realistic (as it was when the methods were pro-
posed some 15 years earlier). However, the parties were still rather loosely
organized and consisted of various more or less clearly defined factions, and
since Sweden kept the old system of open lists, where the voter could list
any candidates on the ballot, a system was needed for the distribution of
seats within the parties. The method adopted 1909 was Thiele’s unordered
method, but combined with a special rule, called rangordningsregeln (The
Ranking Rule), to prevent decapitation (see Section 7):51
The Ranking Rule. The ballots are ordered. If more than half of the
ballots for a given party have the same first name, then this candidate gets
the party’s first seat. If further more than 2/3 of the ballots have the same
first and second names, then the second name gets the second seat, and so
on. I.e., if more than k/(k + 1) of the ballots have the same k names first,
in the same order, then these get the first k seats (for any k > 1).
The combination chosen in 1909 for distribution of seats within each party
was thus:
Ballots are ordered. The Ranking Rule is used for as many seats as possible.
The remaining seats, if any, are distributed by Thiele’s unordered method,
thus ignoring the order of the names on the ballot.
49It was until 1921 also possible to omit the party name and just list candidates, as
previously. These ballots (“the free group”) were treated as a separate party, with some
special rules. Such ballots were few, and they had only rarely (in some local elections) any
effect on the outcome. In the elections to parliament 1911, only 210 votes of 607 487 were
without a party name. In the county council elections 1910, the free group dominated in
a few constituencies, and in total 7 county councillors (of 1217 in the whole country) were
elected from the free group.
50 In more recent years, party names and candidates are usually registered before
the election, and ballots are printed by the Election Authority. However, registration is
compulsory only from the general election in 2018; until now, it has been possible for
voters to use blank ballots and fill in any party name and any candidates.
51 It is easily verified that both the later introduced ordered version of Phragme´n’s
method and the ordered version of Thiele’s method obey the Ranking Rule, in the sense
that any seat allocated by the Ranking Rule will be allocated to the same candidate by
these nethods too.
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In practice, it turned out that most seats were distributed by the Ranking
Rule. For example, in the elections to the parliament in 1911 were only 21
of the 150 members of the First Chamber, and 18 of the 230 in the Second
Chamber, elected by Thiele’s method.52
However, the combination was not successful, and there were several ex-
amples where the outcome did not seem fair; all of them coming from the
application of Thiele’s method. One important reason seems to have been
that the combination of two rules, where one depended on the order of the
names on the ballot but the other did not, was confusing, and that votes
could have an effect not intended by the voter. And even when the voter
fully understood the method, it was often difficult to predict how many
from the party that would be elected by the Ranking Rule, and therefore
whether the addition or deletion of a name would help or hinder another
(more favoured) candidate. Moreover, the problem was compounded by the
fact that two parties often agreed to an electoral alliance in a constituency,
where they would appear under a common party name in the election, but
otherwise promote their own candidates and their own policies; this was
possible by the open nature of the election system, and it was encouraged
by D’Hondt’s method, which works in a superadditive way, so that small
parties are somewhat disadvantaged (see e.g. [41] for detailed calculations)
and two parties that form an electoral alliance can together never lose a
seat by that.53 Since the different names and lists within a “party” thus in
reality often represented different parties, it was imperative that the dis-
tribution inside each party was fair. One typical problem is described in
Example 13.17.
As a result of dissatisfaction with the results of the new method, a Royal
Commission on the Proportional Election Method was appointed in 1912 to
suggest improvements; one of the four memebers was Edvard Phragme´n.54
The commission report in 1913 [6] (with many constructed examples) dis-
cusses several types of errors that could appear, both because of the combi-
nation of the Ranking Rule and Thiele’s method, and because of deficiencies
in the latter itself. They discuss several possible alternatives55, and come to
the conclusion that the only satisfactory solution is to use ordered ballots.
Moreover, they discuss first the ordered version of Thiele’s method (which
52Note that the same election method always was used for the general elections to the
Second Chamber and for the elections to the First Chamber made by the county councils.
53 It also happened that a party participated in the election using another party’s
name, without any agreement or consent. (For example because the first party did not
expect to get enough votes to get a seat on their own.)
54The three other members were Sixten von Friesen, a leading liberal politician; Ivar
Bendixon, who was Phragme´n’s successor as professor of Mathematics at Stockholm Uni-
versity, and also Vice-Chancellor of the University and a local politician in the city council
of Stockholm; Gustaf Appelberg, a civil servant from the department of Justice. Two of
the four members were thus mathematicians.
55Including two proposed in the Swedish parliament, a scoring rule (Appendix E.2.3),
and several methods that seem to have been invented and discussed within the commission.
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had been proposed in parliament in 1912 by Nilson in O¨rebro) but find se-
rious problems with this method too. Finally, the commission presents and
proposes the ordered version of Phragme´n’s method.
Nothing came out of this proposal immediately, but a new commission
repeated the proposal in 1921, in connection with the reform introducing
universal suffrage for both men and women. This time the method was
adopted, and Phragme´n’s method has been used for the distribution of seats
within parties since 1921, at least to some extent (see below).56
In 1924, the well-established practice of forming electoral alliances was for-
malized and alleviated by allowing ballots to contain, besides the party name
also a alliance name and a faction name; the ballot could thus be labelled
in three levels. (Only the party name was compulsory.) These possibilities
disappeared in 1952, when D’Hondt’s method was replaced by the modified
Sainte-Lague¨’s method, and thus the incentive to form alliances disappeared.
When ballots with alliance and faction names were used, Phragme´n’s me-
thod was used recursively in up to three steps, as described in Section 18.3.
Phragme´n’s method is still used in the distribution of seats within par-
ties (see Appendix C.1), but it was demoted to a secondary role in 1998,
when a system of preference votes was introduced. Each party has one or
several ballots, with lists of candidates decided by the party, and the voter
in addition to choosing a ballot, also can (but does not have to) vote for
one of the candidates on the ballot. The seats given to the party are pri-
marily given to its candidates in order of these preference votes (i.e., by the
SNTV method, Appendix E.1.4), but only to candidates that obtain at least
5% of the total number of votes for the party. Only when there are not
enough candidates that have reached this threshold, the remaining seats are
distributed according to Phragme´n’s method.57
In most cases, the party chooses to have just one list in a constituency,
and then Phragme´n’s method only means that any seats not assigned by
preference votes are assigned in the order the party has put them on the
ballot. And if there are several lists but they have disjoint sets of names,
Phragme´n’s method is just the same as D’Hondts. Thus, Phragme´n’s me-
thod really plays a role only in the few cases where the party chooses to
56 The seats were still distributed between parties by D’Hondt’s method. In 1952, this
was replaced by the modified Sainte-Lague¨’s method (Appendix E.3.3). In 1971, the two
chambers were replaced by a parliament with a single chamber; furthermore, adjustment
seats were introduced for the distribution between parties. None of this affected the use
of Phragme´n’s method within parties.
57Ignoring the candidates that have got seats because of their preference votes. This
seems to be a mistake in the combination of the two methods. Suppose that a party has
two lists ABCD and EFGH in a constituency, and get 3 seats. Suppose further that of
the ballots for the party, 55% are ABCD and 45% EFGH, and also that A and D, but
no-one else, each gets preference votes on more than 5% of the ballots. Then A and D
are elected by their preference votes, and the remaining seat goes to the largest list, i.e.
to B. Hence all three elected come from the same list. It seems that it would be better to
calculate place numbers taking into account also those elected by preference votes.
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have more than one list, with some of the names on more than one list, and
moreover the voters choose to give not too many preference votes.
Local elections have followed essentially the same rules as parliamentary
elections; in particular, they too have for the distribution of seats inside
parties used Thiele’s unordered method together with the Ranking Rule in
1909–1921, and after 1921 Phragme´n’s ordered method, but since 1998 only
for seats not assigned by preference votes.
D.1. Elections within political assemblies. Phragme´n’s method is in
Sweden, besides its use in general elections described above, also used for
elections of committees in the parliament [3, 12 kap. 8 §]. Also in this case,
the method has in practice a very small role; the members of parliament
can be expected to be loyal to their parties and vote on a party list, and
thus the seats a party gets are assigned according to this list. Moreover,
parties usually form electoral alliances for these elections;58 each party in
the electoral alliance can be expected to vote on its own party list, and
then the result of Phragme´n’s method will be that the seats are distributed
within the electoral alliance by D’Hondt’s method.59
In local councils (cities and other municipalities, and counties), elections
to various committees are instead done by Thiele’s ordered method [2].60
Again, the method has in practice a very minor role, for the same reasons
as in the parliament.
Appendix E. Some other election methods
We give here brief (and incomplete) descriptions of some other election
methods, as a background to the methods by Phragme´n and Thiele and
for comparisons with them. The selection of methods is, by necessity, far
58These elections are performed using D’Hondt’s method (Appendix E.3.1), which
has the important property that a party or electoral alliance that has a majority in the
parliament will get a majority in each committee. This method is superadditive and
encourages electoral alliances, as said above.
59 In practice the elections are usually done by consent by voice vote, often unanimous,
to a proposal from the nominating committee, so Phragme´n’s method is not even formally
used. However, the nominating committee has of course calculated what the result would
be of an election, so the election method still plays the same role, although hidden.
60 I do not know the reason why different methods are used in parliament and in
local councils. One possibility could be that it has been thought that the parliament is
more important and that it is justified to use the more complicated but usually better
Phragme´n’s method there, while local councils can do with the simpler Thiele’s method.
However, this is only a guess. In any case, the choice of method very rarely matters, since
as said above, the votes can be expected to be on party lists, and then the result for both
methods will be the same as by D’Hondt’s method.
Note that a political assembly, where everyone can predict how everyone else will vote,
is an ideal setting for tactical voting as in Example 13.13 when Thiele’s method is used.
However, this only works inside an electoral alliance, and I do not know that anyone has
ever tried it – it would hurt your partners and not your political enemies, and would
presumably lead to bad feelings and repercussions.
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from complete; many other election methods have been proposed and many
different ones have actually been used in different countries and contexts.
Note also that the same method often is known under different names. The
methods described below are mainly those of relevance to a discussion of
Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods. For further methods and further discus-
sions, from both mathematical and political aspects, see e.g. [32; 61; 62]. We
give some examples (far from exhaustive) of current or earlier use in elec-
tions. For the election methods actually used at present in parliamentary
elections around the world, see [39].
Note the important difference between elections methods that are propor-
tional, i.e., methods where different parties get numbers of seats that are
(more or less) proportional to their numbers of votes, and other methods
(that usually favour the largest party).61 Proportional election methods are
used for political elections in many countries; in most (but not all) cases
using a list method with party lists, see Secction E.3 below. Recall that
the idea of both Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods is to have a proportional
election method without formal parties.
As above, s > 1 is the number to be elected (in a constituency). We are
(as Phragme´n and Thiele) mainly interested in the case s > 2 (multi-member
constituencies), but the case s = 1 is often included for comparison.
E.1. Election methods with unordered ballots. In these method, each
ballot contains a list of names, but their order is ignored. The number of
candidates on each ballot is, depending on the method, either arbitrary or
limited to at most (or exactly) a given number, for example s, the number
to be elected.
E.1.1. Block Vote. Each voter votes for at most s candidates. The s candi-
dates with the largest numbers of votes are elected.62
The Block Vote is the case s > 2, the multi-member constituency version
of the case s = 1, which is the widely used Single-Member Plurality system,
also called First-Past-The-Post, where each voter votes for one candidate,
61Whether an election method is proportional or not is not precisely defined, even when
there are formal parties. Obviously, there are necessarily deviations since the number of
seats is an integer for each party. Moreover, in practice, whether the outcome of an
election is (approximatively) proportional depends not only on the method, but also on
the number of seats in the contituency, and on other factors such as the number of parties
and their sizes.
62One version requires each voter to vote for exactly s candidates. This led to a
scandalous result in Sweden in the (autumn) election in 1887: Stockholm was a single
constituency with 22 seats (the by far largest constituency). After the election, it was
found that one of the 22 that had been elected was not eligible, because he had unpaid
back taxes. As a consequence, all 6206 ballots with his name were deemed to contain only
21 valid names, and were therefore invalid. As a consequence, all 22 elected (that had
received 4898–6749 votes) were replaced by others (that had received 2585–2988 votes) [8,
pp. 45, 51]. (This changed the majority in the parliament to the protectionists, and as a
result the government resigned.)
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and the candidate with the largest number of votes wins. Single-Member
Plurality is the perhaps simplest possible election method and has a long
history, and it is still used in many different contexts.
Also the Block Vote (with s > 2) is simple and intuitive and has been used
for a very long time. (For example, it has been used since the Middle Ages
in English parliamentary elections, where until 1885 most constituencies had
2 seats. [61, p. 158]) Until the late 19th century, it seems to have been the
dominant election method for elections in multi-member constituencies. It
was the method used in Sweden when Phragme´n and Thiele proposed their
methods.
The Block Vote is still used in general elections in some countries. It is also
widely used in non-political elections, for example in various organizations
and associations. (For example, in elections to department boards at my
university).
The Block Vote is well-known for not being proportional; when there are
organized parties, the largest party will get all seats. Hence, many other
election methods have been invented in order to get a proportional result,
among them the methods by Phragme´n and Thiele discussed in the present
paper.
E.1.2. Approval Voting. Each voter votes for an arbitrary number of candi-
dates. The s candidates with the largest numbers of votes are elected.
Here s > 1. In a system with well-organized parties, Approval Voting
ought to give the same result as the Block Vote (or Single-Member Plurality
when s = 1), see Appendix E.1.1, with each party fielding s candidates and
their voters voting for these. In particular, the method is not proportional.
(Without parties, the result may be quite different from the Block Vote.)
This is also an old method, but seems to have been used much less fre-
quently than the Block Vote. For example, it was used (with s > 1) for
parliamentary elections in Greece 1864–1926, and it is used for distribution
of seats within parties in some local elections in Norway.63 As noted in Sec-
tion 4.1, the method is one of the methods proposed by Thiele [76] in 1895,
viz. his “strong method”. The method was reinvented (and given the name
Approval Voting) by Weber c. 1976 and was made widely known by for
example Brams and Fishburn [16]; see further Weber [78] and Brams and
Fishburn [17]. Approval Voting seems to be used mainly in non-political
elections, for example it is used in several professional organizations.
E.1.3. Limited Vote. Each voter votes for at most ℓ candidates, where ℓ
is some given number with 1 < ℓ < s. The s candidates with the largest
numbers of votes are elected.64
63Versions requiring a qualified majority were used alread to elect the Pope 1294–1621,
and the Doge (Duke) of Venice 1268–1797, in both cases (obviously) with s = 1.
64As for the Block Vote, one version requires each voter to vote for exactly ℓ candidates.
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The idea of this modification of the Block Vote is that a small party can
concentrate its votes on (for example) ℓ candidates and obtain at least some
seats in the competition with a larger party that spreads its votes over more
candidates. This introduces a degree of proportionality, but it is far from
perfect. If ℓ > s/2 (which in practice usually is the case), and the parties
are similar in size, the expected result of optimal voting strategies is that
the largest party gets ℓ seats, and the second largest the remaining s − ℓ
seats, while the other parties (if any) get none.
Moreover, the outcome of an election depends heavily on how the votes of
a party are distributed inside the party. Hence the method makes it possible,
and more or less necessary, for a party that wants to win many seats, to use
schemes of tactical voting. See e.g. [40, Section A.9] for the optimal strategy,
and its result, in an ideal situation when all voters follow the instructions
from their parties, and, moreover, the parties accurately know in advance
the number of votes for each party.
Phragme´n [55] mentions Limited Vote as an example of an unsatisfactory
election method because of the possibilities of tactical voting, saying that
by dividing the votes between several lists, a majority could get all seats,
also against a rather strong minority, and that this actually has happened in
Spain (where the method was used since 1878). Another well-known example
of this was England, where Limited Vote was used in some constituencies
in 1867–1885, and the Liberal Party in Birmingham was very successful in
organising the voters so that they got all seats in each election; this also
gave the method a bad reputation [21, p. 193], [32, p. 27].
Limited Vote was proposed by Condorcet [22, Titre III, Section premie`re,
Article 4] already 1793 (for some elections in the French republic; the pro-
posal was not adopted), and it is still used in a few places.
Note that Limited Vote properly means the case when ℓ < s, but if we
ignore this and allow an arbitrary ℓ, then Block Vote (Appendix E.1.1) is
the special case ℓ = s and Approval Voting (Appendix E.1.2) is the case
ℓ =∞.
E.1.4. Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV). Each voter votes for one can-
didate. The s candidates with the largest numbers of votes are elected. This
can be seen as the special case ℓ = 1 of Limited Vote (Appendix E.1.3),
and it has the same weaknesses as Limited Vote. In particular, the outcome
depends heavily on how the votes are distributed inside the parties; note
that a party can get hurt by too much concentration of votes as well as
by too little concentration. In an ideal situation where all voters belong
to parties and vote as instructed by their party, and, moreover, the parties
accurately know in advance the number of votes for each party, it can be
shown that optimal strategies yield the same result as D’Hondt’s method,
see [40, Appendix A.8]. In a theoretical, and restricted, sense, SNTV can
thus be regarded as a proportional election method. However, just as Lim-
ited Vote (Appendix E.1.3), it requires elaborate voting tactics, and bad
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tactics, e.g. based on incorrect guesses of the party’s strength, can lead to
disastrous results. Phragme´n [57, p. 67] discusses SNTV and regards it as
unsatisfactory.
SNTV is an ancient method, and was mentioned already by Plato [60,
book VI]. It was analysed mathematically by Charles Dodgson65 [26] in
1884. It was used already in 1835 in North Carolina, and it is still used in a
few countries. However, it seems to have been much less common than the
Block Vote.
E.1.5. Cumulative Voting. The idea is that a voter may divide his or her
vote between several candidates. The perhaps the most common version is:
Each voter has ℓ > 1 votes, that can be given to one or several candidates.
(This seems to be the oldest version of Cumulative Voting, used e.g. in the
Cape Colony 1853–1909.) See e.g. Droop [28].
Another version of Cumulative Voting, sometimes called Equal and Even
Cumulative Voting66 uses unordered ballots:
Each voter votes for an arbitrary number of candidates. A ballot with m
names is counted as 1/m votes for each candidate. The number of names
on a ballot may be restricted, for example to at most s, the number of seats.
This method is at present used in Peoria in Illinois, USA (with 5 seats and
at most 5 names on each ballot). In Sweden, it was proposed by Rosengren
in 1896 [34, pp. 14–16], [5, pp. 23–24] and (for distribution of seats within
parties) by a Royal Commission 1903 [4] and then in bills by the government
in 1904 and 1905, but it was never adopted by parliament.
Phragme´n [57, p. 68] discusses Cumulative Voting, saying that it is similar
to SNTV and has essentially the same deficiencies, and therefore “should be
seen as a theoretical experiment without practical usefulness”.
E.2. Election methods with ordered ballots. In these method, each
ballot contains an ordered list of names. The number of candidates on each
ballot is usually arbitrary, but may be limited to at most, or at least, or
exactly some given number, for example s, the number to be elected; some
versions require each voter to rank all candidates. (In the latter case, each
ballot can be seen as a permutation of the set of candidates.)67
E.2.1. Single Transferable Vote (STV). First, a quota is calculated, nowa-
days almost always the Droop quota (rounded to an integer or not), see
Section E.3 below. Each ballot is counted for its first name only (at later
65Better known by his pseudonym Lewis Carroll used when writing his famous chil-
dren’s classics.
66This version is called Satisfaction Approval Voting by Brams and Kilgour [18].
67In elections to the Australian Senate, all candidates have to be ranked. This is rather
impractical, so since 1983, each party makes a list ranking all candidates (its own and all
others), and the voter has the option of voting for one of the party list. This is used
by the vast majority of voters, so the system in reality has become a list system. [32,
pp. 140–141]
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stages, ignoring candidates that have been elected or eliminated). A candi-
date whose number of votes is at least the quota is elected; the surplus, i.e.,
the ballots exceeding the quota, are transferred to the next (remaining) name
on the ballot. This is repeated as long as some unelected candidate reaches
the quota.
If there is no such candidate, and not enough candidates have been elected,
then the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated, and the votes
for that candidate are transferred to the next name.
At the end, if the number of remaining candidates equals the number of
remaining seats, then all these are elected (regardless of whether they have
reached the quota or not).
This description is far from a complete definition; many details are omit-
ted, and can be filled in in different ways, see e.g. [77]. As a result, STV
is a family of election methods rather than a single method. (There seems
to be hardly no two implementations that agree in all details.) The most
important differences between different version are in the treatment of the
surplus, but also other details, such as the order of transfer when more
than one candidate has reached the quota, the treatment of ballots where
all names have been elected or eliminated, and different rounding rules, can
affect the final outcome. (See Example 17.2 for one example.)
The special case s = 1, when only a single candidate is elected, is usually
called Alternative Vote. This case is much simpler than the general case,
since no surplus has to be transferred, so the method only involves elimi-
nations until someone has reached the quota, which in this case means a
majority of the votes.
In the party list case (see Section 11), STV yields the same result as a
quota method with the same quota (see Section E.3), i.e. in almost all cases
Droop’s method (Section E.3.5). (This is easily seen using the formulation in
Footnote 77.) STV is therefore regarded as a proportional election method.
The eliminations are an important part of the method. As a result of
them, even if the voters of a party split their votes by voting on the party’s
candidates in different orders, so that no-one of them gets many votes in the
first round (when only the first name is counted), as the counting progresses
and weaker candidates are eliminated the votes will concentrate on the re-
maining ones. Hence vote splitting within a party will typically not affect
the outcome, unlike with Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods.68
STV is used, in different versions, in some (but rather few) countries,
for example in all elections in Ireland and in some in Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Australia; it is the most common proportional election method
in English-speaking countries.
There are two main groups of different methods of handling the surplus
when a candidate is elected: either some ballots (in number equal to the
68However, eliminations introduce also problems with non-monotonicity, see Foot-
note 27.
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quota) are set aside, and the others are transferred, or all ballots are trans-
ferred but with reduced values, so that the total voting value is reduced by
the quota.69 In the first case it has to be decided how to chose the ballots
to be transferred, and in the second case it has to be decided how to reduce
the values, and there are several versions in both cases.
Some of the methods to do the transfers of surplus from an elected candi-
date are as follows (again omitting some details), see further e.g. [33], [77].
In the descriptions, the quota is denoted by Q, and we assume that a can-
didate just has been elected with v votes; the surplus is thus v −Q. (“The
last group of ballots transferred to a candidate” means all ballots counted
for the candidate if there has not yet been any transfers to the candidate.)
(i) Random selection (the Cincinnati method). v −Q ballots are selected
at random from the ballots counted for the elected candidate.
(ii) Random stratified selection (Ireland). The ballots to be transferred are
taken from the last group of ballots transferred to the elected candidate.
These ballots are sorted according to their next name, and a propor-
tional number is selected for each next name. The transferred ballots
are selected as the ones last added to their group, i.e., in practice they
are selected randomly in each group. (The ballots are put in random
order before the counting starts.) The surplus is thus transferred pro-
portionally to the next name, but if also that candidate is elected, the
next name to transfer to has been chosen by random selection.
This method is used in Ireland for the lower house (Da´il) of the
parliament.
(iii) The Gregory method. All ballots in the last group of ballots transferred
to the elected candidate are transferred. If there are N ballots in this
group, each of them is now counted as (v −Q)/N votes. This version
was introduced in Tasmania in 1907 and has been used there since
then. The Irish Senate uses a minor variation where N is the numebr
of ballots in the group that are transferable, i.e., have some remaining
candidate on them.
(iv) The inclusive Gregory method. All ballots counted for the elected can-
didate are transferred. If there are N ballots in this group, each of
them is now counted as (v − Q)/N votes. This is used e.g. for the
Australian Senate.
(v) The weighted inclusive Gregory method. Each ballot has an initial value
of 1 vote. All ballots counted for the elected candidate are transferred.
Each of them has its current value multiplied by (v −Q)/N .
This method was invented by Phragme´n in c. 1893 (see also Foot-
note 38), although for a version of STV with unordered ballots and
no eliminations, see Section 18.5. It seems to have been reinvented in
1986 by the Proportional Representation Society of Australia, see [33].
69Methods of the latter type are often called Gregory methods, after J.B. Gregory who
proposed one such method in 1880.
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The method is used in Western Australia and in local elections in
Scotland.
The oldest version of STV, proposed by Carl Andræ in 1855 and used in
some elections in Denmark 1856–1953, is called Andræ’s method. It can be
seen as a primitive version; it differs from later versions in that there are no
eliminations.70
Andræ’s method. The Hare quota71 (see Appendix E.3) is used. The
votes are counted in random order. Any candidate that reaches the quota is
elected, and ignored in the sequel. If not enough are elected when all ballots
are counted, then the candidates that now have the largest number of votes
are elected, provided they have more than half the quota; if there still are
remaining seats, the votes are counted again, and if there are m remaining
seats, then each ballot is now counted as a vote for the m first candidates
that not already have been elected. The m candidates with most votes are
elected.
This method was proposed for Sweden in 1896 by the government, but it
was not adopted.
Phragme´n proposed a modification of Andræ’s method, which (unlike all
other versions of STV) used unordered ballots, see Section 18.5.
E.2.2. Bottoms-up. Only the first name on each ballot is counted. The can-
didate with the least number of votes is eliminated. This is repeted (with
eliminated names ignored) until only the desired number s of candidates re-
main; these are elected.
This can be seen as STV (Section E.2.1) with the quota∞, so that no-one
reaches the quota. (Hence there is never any surplus to consider.) When
only one is elected, this gives the same result as Alternative Vote (see Sec-
tion E.2.1).
This very minor method was used in local elections in some municipalities
in South Australia 1985–1999.
Bottoms-up is mentioned here because it might be viewed as an ordered
version of Thiele’s elimination method (Section 4.3). However, when s > 1,
it will in the party list case (see Section 11) not give the same result as
D’Hondt’s method. Actually, in the party list case where everone from the
same party votes for the same ordered list, Bottoms-up will behave strangely,
since if there are at least s parties, everyone except the first candidate from
each party will be eliminated, and thus the seats will go to the s largest
parties, with one seat each. This is the same outcome as Thiele’s elimination
70Eliminations were introduced in STV by Thomas Hare in 1865, who had proposed
earlier forms of STV in 1857 and 1859. Thomas Hare was not the first to propose STV,
since Andræ’s method then already was in use, but he developed and promoted STV and
is seen as the founder of STV in its modern forms. For the early history of STV, see
further [77].
71In this case a misnomer, since Andræ invented the method, with the quota, before
Hare’s writings.
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method with the weak satisfaction function (4.3). On the other hand, if
instead the voters for each party vote are uniformly split between all possible
orderings of the candidates of their party, then Bottoms-up will give the same
result as Thiele’s elimination method (which has unordered ballots and thus
ignores the order).
E.2.3. Scoring rules (Borda methods). Each ballot is counted as p1 votes for
the first name, p2 for the second name, and so on, according to some given
non-increasing sequence (pk)
∞
k=1 of non-negative numbers.
Several different sequences (pk)k are used. The method was suggested
(for the election of a single person) by Jean-Charles de Borda in 1770 [15]
with pk = n− k + 1 where n is the number of candidates, i.e., the sequence
n, n− 1, . . . , 1 (his proposal required each voter to rank all candidates); the
same method was proposed already in 1433 by Nicolas Cusanus for election
of the king (and thus emperor, after being crowned by the pope) of the Holy
Roman Empire [48; 36]. This scoring rule is called the Borda method ; more
generally, any scoring rule is sometimes called a Borda method.
Another common choice of scoring rule uses the harmonic series, pk = 1/k.
This was proposed in 1857 by Thomas Hare (who later instead developed
and proposed STV, Section E.2.1); it was used for parliamentary elections
in Finland 1906–1935 (within parties), and is currently used in Nauru. It
was one of several methods discussed (and rejected) by the Swedish Royal
Commission that instead proposed Phragme´n’s ordered method [6], see Ap-
pendix D. This version gives in the party-list case (see Section 11) the same
result as D’Hondt’s method, so it may be regarded as a proportional me-
thod. (See further [63].) However, tactical voting where the voters of a party
vote on the same name in different orders may give quite different results.
An important difference from Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods and STV
is that with a scoring rule, also the order of the candidates below the first
unelected may influence the outcome. In particular, with a scoring rule,
adding names after the favourite candidate may decrease the chances of the
favourite.
Moreover, scoring rules invite to tactical voting, especially since the or-
dering of all of the candidates is important.72
E.3. Election methods with party lists. As said above, among the pro-
portional election methods, the ones that are most often used are party list
methods, where the voter votes for a party and the seats are distributed
among the parties according to their numbers of votes.73 The seats a party
obtains then are distributed to candidates, either according to a list made
in advance by the party (closed list), or in some way that more or less is
decided by the voters (open list), see Appendix D for examples from Sweden.
72 Borda is said to have commented this with: “My scheme is only intended for honest
men”. [14, pp. 182, 238].
73 The most important proportional method of another type is STV, Section E.2.1.
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Conversely, most (but not all) party list methods that are used in prac-
tice, including the ones below, are proportional, so that each party gets a
proportion of the seats that approximates its proportion of votes.
Many different list methods are described in detail in e.g. Pukelsheim [62];
see also Balinski and Young [13] for the mathematically (but not politically)
equivalent problem of allocating the seats in the US House of Representatives
proportionally among the states.74
There are two major types of party list methods: divisor methods and
quota methods.
In the traditional formulation of divisor methods, seats are allocated se-
quentially. For each seat, the number of votes of each party is reduced by
division with a divisor that depends on the number of seats already given
to the party; the party with the highest quotient gets the seat.75 76
In a quota method, first a quota Q is calculated; this is roughly the number
of votes required for each seat. The two main quotas that are used are the
Hare quota V/s and the Droop quota V/(s + 1) [28], where V is the total
number of (valid) votes and s is the number of seats (cf. Remark 16.5); the
quota is often rounded to an integer, either up, or down, or to the nearest
integer (see e.g. [62] and [40] for examples with different, or no, rounding).
The method then gives a party with vi votes first ⌊vi/Q⌋ seats (i.e., the
integer part of vi/Q); the remaining seats, if any, are given to the parties
with largest remainder in these divisions.77
E.3.1. D’Hondt’s method. The divisor method with the sequence of divisors
1, 2, 3, . . . . Thus, the reduced vote of a party equals the number of votes
divided by 1+ the number of seats already obtained. (The method is some-
times called highest average, since the reduced vote is the average number
74There, until 1941, the method was decided after each census, so the choice of method
was heavily influenced by its result. Moreover, the number of seats was not fixed in
advance and thus also open to negotiations.
75The quotient may be called an reduced vote; the Swedish term is ja¨mfo¨relsetal (com-
parative figure).
76A different, but equivalent, formulation is that the number of seats for each party
is obtained by selecting a number D and then giving a party with vi votes vi/D seats,
rounded to an integer by some general rounding rule (different for different methods),
where D is chosen such that the total number of seats given to the parties is s. See
Pukelsheim [62] for a details and examples. Similar formulations have also been used in
the United States for allocating the seats in the House of Representatives to the states
[13]. The number D is also called divisor ; it can be interpreted as roughly the number of
votes required for each seat. (Just as the quota in quota methods; the difference is that
the number D is not determined in advance by a simple formula, but comes out as a result
of the calculations.)
77An equivalent definition is that seats are distributed sequentially, as just described
for divisor methods, but now the number of vote for a party is reduced by subtracting Q
for each seat that the party already has got. (This shows the close connection with STV,
Section E.2.1).
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of votes per seat for the party, if the party receives the next seat. However,
this name is also sometimes used as a term for all divisor methods.)
D’Hondt’s method is one of the oldest and most important proportional
list methods. It was proposed by Victor D’Hondt in 1878 [24; 25]. D’Hondt’s
method is equivalent to Jefferson’s method, proposed by Thomas Jefferson
in 1792 for allocating the seats in the US House of Representatives propor-
tionally among the states, see [13].78
It is easy to see that D’Hondt’s method slightly favours larger parties (see
[41] for a detailed calculation of the average bias). In particular, the method
is superadditive in the sense that if two parties merge to one (bringing all
their voters with them to the new party, while all other parties keep the
same number of votes), then the combined party will get at least as many
seats as the two parties had together.79 Moreover (and as a corollary), a
party that gets a majority of the votes will get at least half the seats.
In Sweden, D’Hondt’s method was used 1909–1951, see Appendix D.
E.3.2. Sainte-Lague¨’s method. The divisor method with the sequence of di-
visors 1, 3, 5, . . . . This makes it easier that D’Hondt’s method for small
parties to get a seat, and the method is perfectly proportional in an average
sense. (See e.g. [41].)
The method was proposed in 1910 by Sainte-Lague¨ [65]. It is equivalent
toWebster’s method, proposed by Daniel Webster in 1832 (and used at least
in 1842 and 1911) for allocating the seats in the US House of Representatives
proportionally among the states, see [13].80 Sainte-Lague¨’s method is used
in several countries, e.g. Germany.
E.3.3. Modified Sainte-Lague¨’s method. The divisor method with the sequence
of divisors x, 3, 5, . . . , where x > 1 is a constant, usually 1.4. This differs
from Sainte-Lague¨’s method only in that the first divisor is larger than 1.
The method was introduced in Sweden in 1952 with the first divisor 1.4,
and this has also been used in a few other countries. (From the next general
election in Sweden, in 2018, the first divisor will be 1.2 instead [1].)
The modification makes it more difficult than the standard Sainte-Lague¨’s
method for small parties to get the first seat, but it does not affect the
distribution of seats between parties that all have seats.
In Sweden, the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method has been used since 1952,
see Appendix D.
78Jefferson’s method is formulated as in Footnote 76, with rounding downwards. How-
ever, for the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives, the total number was not
fixed in advance; a suitable divisor D was chosen by congress, which makes the method
somewhat different.
79The method thus discourages party splits, which was seen as an important positive
feature of it in the discussions in Sweden in the early 20th century.
80 Webster’s method is formulated as in Footnote 76, with rounding to the nearest
integer. However, Footnote 78 applies here too.
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There is no special mathematical reason for the divisor 1.4; it was cho-
sen in Sweden 1952 because it was expected to give a politically desired
result, see [72]. In the present Swedish system with adjustment seats, the
first divisor does not affect the total distribution of seats, but it affects the
distribution between constituencies within the parties, and the divisor was
changed to 1.2 because simulations shows that this would give the best result
with the present constituencies and party structure.
E.3.4. Method of greatest remainder (Hare’s method). The quota method
using the Hare quota, see above.
The method is perfectly proportional in an average sense. (See e.g. [41].)
In Sweden, the method has not been used in elections, but it is since 1894
used for the distribution of seats between constituencies (before the election,
based on the population or on the number of eligible voters).
E.3.5. Droop’s method. The quota method using the Droop quota, see above.
The method slightly favours larger parties (but not as much as D’Hondt’s
method). (See e.g. [41].)
References
A. Official documents
[1] Vallag [Elections Act]. Svensk fo¨rfattningssamling 2005:837.
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Vallag-2005837_sfs-2005-837/
[2] Lag om proportionellt valsa¨tt [Proportional Elections Act]. Svensk
fo¨rfattningssamling 1992:339.
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Vallag-1992339_sfs-1992-339/
[3] Riksdagsordning [Parliamentary Act]. Svensk fo¨rfattningssamling
2014:801.
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/riksdagsordning-2014801_sfs-2014-801
[4] Beta¨nkande med fo¨rslag till proportionellt valsa¨tt vid val till riksdagens
andra kammare ja¨mte vissa a¨ndringar i regeringsformen och riksdagsor-
dningen. Bihang till Riksdagens protokoll 1904, andra samlingen, 2:dra
afdelningen, fo¨rsta bandet. [Commission Report. Appendix to the Min-
utes of the Swedish Parliament 1904.]
[5] G[ustav] Cassel. Proportionella val. Stockholm, 1903. Bilaga I till [4].
[Appendix to [4].]
[6] Sixten von Friesen, Gustaf Appelberg, Ivar Bendixson, E. Phragme´n.
Beta¨nkande ang˚aende a¨ndringar i ga¨llande besta¨mmelser om den pro-
portionella valmetoden. 3 December 1913, Stockholm, 1913. [Commis-
sion report.]
[7] Proportionsvalssakkunnigas beta¨nkande II. Bihang till Riksdagens pro-
tokoll 1921, andra samlingen, andra avdelningen, andra bandet. [Com-
mission Report, Appendix to the Minutes of the Swedish Parliament
1921.]
PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS 91
[8] Statistiska Centralbyr˚ans underd˚aniga bera¨ttelse ro¨rande Riksdagsman-
navalen a˚ren 1885–1887. Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik (BiSOS).
R) Valstatistik. VIII. Stockholm, 1888.
http://www.scb.se/Pages/List____257403.aspx
[9] Statistiska Centralbyr˚ans underd˚aniga bera¨ttelse ro¨rande Riksdagsman-
navalen a˚ren 1891–1893. Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik (BiSOS).
R) Valstatistik. X. Stockholm, 1894.
http://www.scb.se/Pages/List____257403.aspx
B. General references
[10] Kenneth J. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New
York, 1951.
[11] Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Edith Elkind, Rupert Free-
man & Toby Walsh. Justified representation in approval-based commit-
tee voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 48 (2017), no. 2, 461–485.
Shorter version in Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AAAI 2015), AAAI Press, 2015.
[12] Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Simon Mackenzie,
Nicholas Mattei & Toby Walsh. Computational aspects of multi-winner
approval voting. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2015), 107–
115. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (IFAAMAS), 2015.
[13] Michel L. Balinski & H. Peyton Young. Fair Representation. 2nd ed.
Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2001.
[14] Duncan Black. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge
Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1958.
[15] Jean-Charles de Borda. Me´moire sur les e´lections au scrutin. Histoire
de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences. Anne´e MDCCLXXXI, 657–665 and
31–34, Paris 1784. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k35800
[16] Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn. Approval Voting. Birkha¨user,
Boston, 1983.
[17] Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn. Going from theory to practice:
the mixed success of approval voting. Social Choice and Welfare 25
(2005), no. 2, 457–474.
[18] Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour. Satisfation approval voting. In Vot-
ing Power and Procedures, Rudolf Fara, Dennis Leech, Maurice Salles,
eds. Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2014.
[19] Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Svante Janson & Martin Lackner.
Phragme´n’s voting methods and justified representation. Proceedings
of the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2017),
AAAI Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2017, 406–413.
[20] Markus Brill, Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier & Piotr Skowron. Multiwinner ap-
proval rules as apportionment methods. Proceedings of the 31st AAAI
92 SVANTE JANSON
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2017), AAAI Press, Palo
Alto, CA, 2017, 414–420.
[21] Andrew McLaren Carstairs. A Short History of Electoral Systems in
Western Europe. George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980.
[22] Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet. Plan de Constitution
pre´sente´ a` la Convention nationale les 15 et 16 fe´vrier 1793, l’an II
de la Re´publique. (Constitution girondine.) Digithe`que de mate´riaux
juridiques et politiques.
http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/co1793pr.htm (4 September,
2016)
[23] Dansk biografisk Lexikon. Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, Copen-
hagen, 1887–1905.
http://runeberg.org/dbl/17/0190.html (16 July, 2016)
[24] Victor D’Hondt. Question e´lectorale: La repre´sentation proportionnelle
des partis, par un e´lecteur. Bruylant, Brussels, 1878.
[25] Victor D’Hondt. Syste`me pratique et raisonne´ de repre´sentation pro-
portionnelle, Muquardt, Brussels, 1882.
[26] Charles Lutwidge Dodgson. The Principles of Parliamentary Elections.
London, 1884.
[27] Yngve Domar. Mathematical research during the first decades of the
University of Stockholm. Lecture, Stockholm, 1978.
http://www2.math.su.se/matematik/Historia/Histeng.pdf (16
July, 2016)
[28] Henry Richmond Droop. On methods of electing representatives, Jour-
nal of the Statistical Society of London 44 (1881), no. 2, 141–202.
[29] G[ustaf] Enestro¨m. Letter to the editor. Aftonbladet, 23(?) February,
1896.
[30] G[ustaf] Enestro¨m. Om aritmetiska och statistiska metoder fo¨r propor-
tionella val. O¨fversigt av Kongl. Vetenskaps-Akademiens Fo¨rhandlingar
1896, N:o 7, Stockholm, 543–570.
[31] Maurice Equer. Arithme´tique et repre´sentation proportionelle. La
Grande Revue, 14 (1910), No. 12, 25 June 1910, Suppleme´nt.
[32] David M. Farrell. Electoral Systems. 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, Bas-
ingstoke, 2011.
[33] David M. Farrell & Ian McAllister. The 1983 change in surplus vote
transfer procedures for the Australian Senate and its consequences for
the single transferable vote. Australian Journal of Political Science, 38
(2003), 479–491.
[34] Isidor Flodstro¨m. Proportionella valmetoder. En systematisk o¨fversikt.
J. Beckmans fo¨rlag, Stockholm, 1900.
[35] Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result.
Econometrica 41 (1973), 587–601.
[36] Gu¨nter Ha¨gele & Friedrich Pukelsheim. The electoral systems of
Nicholas of Cusa in the Catholic Concordance and beyond. The Church,
PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS 93
the Councils, & Reform – The Legacy of the Fifteenth Century, 229–
249. Catholic University of America Press, Washington, DC, 2008.
[37] I. D[avid] Hill. Difficulties with equality of preference. Voting matters
13 (2001), 8–9.
[38] Ross Hyman. Divisor method proportional representation in preference-
ballot elections. Voting matters 28 (2011), 15–31.
[39] Inter-Parliamentary Union. PARLINE database on national parlia-
ments. http://www.ipu.org/parline/ (27 August, 2016)
[40] Svante Janson. Proportionella valmetoder. Preprint, 2012–2016.
http://www2.math.uu.se/~svante/papers/sjV6.pdf
[41] Svante Janson. Asymptotic bias of some election methods. Annals of
Operations Research, 215 (2014), no. 1, 89–136.
[42] Svante Janson & Svante Linusson. The probability of the Alabama para-
dox. J. Appl. Probab. 49 (2012), no. 3, 773–794.
[43] D. Marc Kilgour. Approval balloting for multi-winner elections. In
Handbook on Approval Voting, J.-F. Laslier and M. R. Sanver eds.,
Chapter 6. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2010
[44] Martin Lackner & Piotr Skowron. Consistent approval-based multiwin-
ner rules. In preparation.
[45] Jan Lanke. En egendomlighet i vallagen. Report 1985:3, Department of
Statistics, University of Lund, Lund, 1985.
[46] Steffen L. Lauritzen. Thiele: Pioneer in Statistics. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2002.
[47] Jan Behrens, Axel Kistner, Andreas Nitsche & Bjo¨rn Swierczek, The
Principles of LiquidFeedback. Interaktive Demokratie e. V., Berlin,
2014.
[48] I[ain] McLean. The Borda and Condorcet principles: three medieval
applications. Social Choice and Welfare 7 (1990), no. 2, 99–108.
[49] Kenneth O. May. A set of independent necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica 20 (1952), no. 4,
680–684.
[50] B[rian] L. Meek. Une nouvelle approche du scrutin transfe´rable (fin).
Mate´matiques et Sciences Humaines 29 (1970), 33–39.
English translation: A new approach to the single transferable vote II.
Voting matters 1 (1994), 7–11.
[51] Xavier Mora. La regla de Jefferson–D’Hondt i les seves alternatives.
MatMat 2013, no. 4, 34 pp.
http://mat.uab.cat/matmat/PDFv2013/v2013n04.pdf
[52] Xavier Mora. Phragme´n’s sequential method with a variance criterion.
Preprint, 2016. arXiv:1611.06833
[53] Xavier Mora & Maria Oliver. Eleccions mitjanc¸ant el vot d’aprovacio´. El
me`tode de Phragme´n i algunes variants. Butllet´ı de la Societat Catalana
de Matema`tiques 30 (2015), no. 1, 57–101.
[54] John J. O’Connor & Edmund F. Robertson. The MacTutor History of
Mathematics archive. University of St Andrews, Scotland.
94 SVANTE JANSON
http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/ (16 July, 2016)
[55] E[dvard] Phragme´n. Om proportionella val. (Summary of a public lec-
ture.) Stockholms Dagblad, 14 March 1893.
[56] E[dvard] Phragme´n. Sur une me´thode nouvelle pour re´aliser, dans
les e´lections, la repre´sentation proportionelle des partis. O¨fversigt av
Kongl. Vetenskaps-Akademiens Fo¨rhandlingar 1894, N:o 3, Stockholm,
133–137.
[57] E[dvard] Phragme´n. Proportionella val. En valteknisk studie. Svenska
spo¨rsma˚l 25, Lars Ho¨kersbergs fo¨rlag, Stockholm, 1895.
[58] E[dvard] Phragme´n. Sur la the´orie des e´lections multiples, O¨fversigt av
Kongl. Vetenskaps-Akademiens Fo¨rhandlingar 1896, N:o 3, Stockholm,
181–191.
[59] E[dvard] Phragme´n. Till fr˚agan om en proportionell valmetod.
Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 2 (1899), nr 2, 297–305.
http://cts.lub.lu.se/ojs/index.php/st/article/view/1949
[60] Plato. Laws (English translation). Project Gutenberg.
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1750 (14 July, 2012)
[61] The Politics of Electoral Systems. Eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul
Mitchell. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2005.
See also further information on https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php
(20 September, 2016)
[62] Friedrich Pukelsheim. Proportional Representation. Apportionment
Methods and Their Applications. Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2014.
[63] V[ictoriano] Ramı´rez & A[ntonio] Palomares. The senatorial election
in Spain. Proportional Borda methods for selecting several candidates.
Ann. Oper. Res. 158 (2008), 21–32.
[64] Le´on Rouyer. The´orie mathe´matique de la repre´sentation propor-
tionelle. Appendix (pp. 31–58) to Proposition de Loi ayant pour
objet l’application de la repre´sentation proportionelle aux e¨lections
le´gislatives, Ligue pour la Repre´sentation Proportionelle, Paris, 1903.
[65] A[ndre´] Sainte-Lague¨. La repre´sentation proportionnelle et la me´thode
des moindres carre´s. Ann. Sci. E´cole Norm. Sup. (3) 27 (1910), 529–
542.
Summary: Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des se´ances de l’Acade´mie
des sciences, 151 (1910), 377–378.
[66] Olli Salmi. D’Hondt without lists. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/10068
(8 April, 2012)
[67] Olli Salmi, D’Hondt without lists. http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-list@eskimo.com/msg08476.html
(8 April, 2012)
[68] Luis Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez, Norberto Ferna´ndez, Jesu´s A. Fisteus & Pablo
Bastanta Val. Some notes on justified representation. The 10th Work-
shop on Advances in Preference Handling (MPREF), 2016.
http://www.mpref-2016.preflib.org/program/ (16 October, 2016)
PHRAGME´N’S AND THIELE’S ELECTION METHODS 95
[69] Mark Allen Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions:
Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social
welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975), no. 2, 187–
217.
[70] Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski & Je´roˆme Lang. Finding a collective
set of items: From proportional multirepresentation to group recom-
mendation. Artificial Intelligence 241 (2016), 191–216.
[71] Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Stockholm, 1917–2016+.
http://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/artikel/7271 (16 July, 2016)
[72] Bjo¨rn von Sydow. Va¨gen till enkammarriksdagen : demokratisk
fo¨rfattningspolitik i Sverige 1944–1968. Tiden, Stockholm, 1989.
[73] Nore B. Tenow. En proportionell rangmetod, afsedd att p˚a de propor-
tionella valens omr˚ade utgo¨ra en motsvarighet till den vanliga formen
fo¨r majoritetsval i enmansvalkretsar. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 1910,
317–325.
[74] Nore B. Tenow. Felaktigheter i de Thieleska valmetoderna. Statsveten-
skaplig Tidskrift 1912, 145–165.
[75] Nore B. Tenow. Det proportionella valsystemet och dess behov av re-
formering. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 1918, 9–52..
[76] T[horvald] N. Thiele. Om Flerfoldsvalg. Oversigt over det Kongelige
Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandlinger 1895, København,
1895–1896, 415–441.
[77] Nicolaus Tideman. The Single Transferable Vote, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9 (1995), no. 1, 27–38.
[78] Robert J Weber. Approval voting. J. Economic Perspectives 9 (1995),
no. 1, 39–49.
[79] D[ouglas] R. Woodall. An impossibility theorem for electoral systems.
Discrete Math. 66 (1987), no. 1-2, 209–211.
[80] D[ouglas] R. Woodall, Properties of preferential election rules. Voting
matters 3 (1994), 8–15.
[81] D[ouglas] R. Woodall. Monotonicity – an in-depth study of one example.
Voting matters 4 (1995), 5–7.
[82] Douglas R. Woodall. QPQ, a quota-preferential STV-like election rule.
Voting matters 17 (2003), 1–7.
[83] H. P. Young, Social choice scoring functions. SIAM J. Appl. Math. 28
(1975), 824–838.
Department of Mathematics, Uppsala University, PO Box 480, SE-751 06
Uppsala, Sweden
E-mail address: svante.janson@math.uu.se
URL: http://www.math.uu.se/svante-janson/
